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JOINT CENTER FOR OPERATIONAL ANALYSIS

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JCOA
HAITI
CASE STUDY

IN THIS ISSUE:

Considerations for Intelligence Support to Large Scale HADR Operations | Imposing Order on Chaos: Establishing JTF Headquarters | An Iranian View of US Psychological Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan | Psychological Operations and the Iranian Elections | Afghanistan's Opium Alternative: Poppy Fields to Wheat Fields | Developing Future Command Surgeons and Staff for Joint Operations and Assignments

JCOA Mission Statement

As directed, JCOA collects, aggregates, analyzes, and disseminates joint lessons learned and best practices across the full spectrum of military operations in order to enhance joint capabilities.

Disclaimer

The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are those of the contributors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense, USJFCOM, the JCOA, or any other government agency. This product is not a doctrinal publication and is not staffed, but is the perception of those individuals involved in military exercises, activities, and real-world events. The intent is to share knowledge, support discussions, and impart information in an expeditious manner.



Message From the Director

BG John M. Murray, USA
Director, JCOA

As the new Director of the Joint Center for Operational Analysis (JCOA), I am looking forward to continuing the outstanding work begun by BG Tony Crutchfield. He was responsible for taking JCOA to new levels of support to the Joint warfighting communities and I am grateful for his leadership. I am also excited about the future studies and challenges JCOA will face, and how those studies will be used to influence the training and employment of our combat forces. Rest assured, my staff and I will do what we can to support the folks on the front lines!

In this edition of the JCOA Journal, the feature article is on the Department of Defense response to the Haiti earthquake of 12 January 2010. *USSOUTHCOM and Joint Task Force-Haiti: Some Challenges and Considerations in Forming a Joint Task Force*, by COL Tim Ryan, Mr. Russ Goehring, and Mr. Robert Hulslander, describes how the humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) efforts progressed from inception to completion. This article is the first of a new JCOA case study product line designed to get lessons learned to joint warfighters as quickly as possible in an easy-to-read format. It presents an analysis of the steps and challenges encountered during the formation of the joint task force (JTF), and the forces required to provide assistance to the people of Haiti.

The second article by Mr. Hulslander looks at intelligence support for HADR missions, based on the response in Haiti during Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE. *Considerations for Intelligence Support to Large Scale HADR Operations* gives a point-by-point presentation of recommendations for conducting an operation in response to a disaster of this magnitude.

The third article from Dr. Mark Mandeles, titled *Imposing Order on Chaos: Establishing JTF Headquarters*, is a case study on lessons learned from standing up International Security Assistance Force Joint Command and JTF-Haiti.

The next two articles by Mr. Njdech "Nick" Asisian, a Battle Command Training Program Chief Research



Analyst, examine the area of psychological operations (PSYOP) in Iraq, Iran, and Afghanistan. The article *An Iranian View of US Psychological Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan*, gives a unique view based on his experience as an Iranian citizen and soldier in the Iranian Army. Next, in *Psychological Operations and the Iranian Elections*, he looks at the impact of Iranian PSYOP in influencing the Iranian people from a cultural perspective and the underlying political currents to achieve specific ends in the election.

This is followed by a short article from Maj Glen Weaver on developing alternatives to the opium crop in Afghanistan. Having grown up on a farm in the Midwest and with a degree in Agriculture, Maj Weaver discusses possible efforts for developing alternative crops for Afghanistan farmers in his article *Afghanistan's Opium Alternative: Poppy Fields to Wheat Fields*.

The last article in this Journal is from Col Burkett, MD, USJFCOM Command Surgeon and Mr. Jerry Tuero, on *Developing Future Command Surgeons and Staffs for Joint Operations and Assignments*. It discusses the need to fully integrate the command surgeon and staff in the planning and execution of exercises in order to ensure their expertise and integration in real-world HADR operations.

I encourage all readers to make full use of the JCOA products shown in the listing included at the back of the Journal. Do not hesitate to contact JCOA if we can provide any assistance or information from lessons learned which will assist in the conduct of joint operations.

John M. Murray
Brigadier General, U.S. Army
Director, Joint Center for Operational Analysis



JCOA UPDATE

In June of this year, the Joint Center for Operational Analysis (JCOA) welcomed its 5th Director, BG John (Mike) Murray. His last assignment was as the Deputy Commanding General (M), 1st Cavalry Division Fort Hood, Texas. He has arrived during interesting times with the new organizational changes set in place by BG Crutchfield, as well as the Secretary of Defense's public announcement recommending disestablishment of US Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM). BG Murray is committed to the execution of our mission and will do so with little or no interruption until told otherwise.

There are two major study efforts underway: the Transition to Stability Operations (TSO) study, and a follow-on to the civilian casualty (CIVCAS) study named Adaptive Learning Afghanistan (ALA). The TSO study assigned by GEN Odierno, Commander, US Forces-Iraq (COMUSF-I), in December 2009 is a two phase study; Phase I was completed in May 2010 and phase II is currently underway. The purpose of the study is to capture those key insights, best practices, and challenges that occurred as the force transitioned to a stability operations focused mission from January 2009 through August 2010. After a successful outbrief to GEN Odierno in August, he asked us to expand the study to include "partnered counterterrorism" as an additional focus area. We anticipate an early November completion. General Petraeus, Commander, International Security Assistance Force (COMISAF) and Commander, US Forces-Afghanistan, recently tasked JCOA to conduct a follow-on study to our CIVCAS body of work. The details of this new tasking are still being refined, but in general, it will identify best practices and challenges impacting unit preparation and adaptation to emerging lessons, in order to validate ongoing CIVCAS reduction measures and provide doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) recommendations for continued improvement. In theater collection begins this October with final papers due to be completed by February 2011. A series of quick look papers and briefs will be provided in the interim, using a slightly different approach by focusing this study on process improvement and not as much on the operational lessons and best practices.

In every JCOA Journal I mention the importance of integration and dissemination of our completed projects. We continue to develop new ways by which to inject useable, meaningful, and relevant findings quickly into the DOTMLPF process; our most challenging task. One new way to accomplish task is via Joint Lesson Advisories (JLA). JCOA has developed the JLA as a new product format to more effectively share lessons. The JLA is designed to quickly and effectively stimulate existing DOTMLPF processes. Large written reports present several problems for the lessons learned community. First are the problems associated with electronically transferring and printing a large document. Second is the ability of the target audience to take the required time to read and pull the applicable DOTMLPF material from the document. The JLA is designed to be two pages for ease of transmission and review. In those two pages is a description of the issue, why it happened, other references, and concrete recommendations in DOTMLPF format. Owners of DOTMLPF change processes can then make an educated decision on whether or not to investigate the issue further. Current JLAs are available on the USJFCOM Non-secure Internet Protocol Routing Network (NIPRnet) and the Secure Internet Protocol Routing Network (SIPRnet) pages, JCOA's North Atlantic Treaty Organization CRONOS page, and on JCOA's SIPRnet Knowledge Today (KT) page.

Despite the fact that changes for USJFCOM are on the way, JCOA will remain focused on our assigned mission with little or no degradation in capability. We currently have two very important tasks at hand—working directly for the COMUSF-I and Commander US Forces-Afghanistan (COMUSFOR-A). We cannot afford to let up!

"Reputations are hard to earn and easy to lose. So, every day, we, individually and collectively, must strive to sustain that reputation, which is that we are a trustworthy and reliable partner on the battlefield, that we will do what is needed." Gen Norton Swartz, Chief of Staff USAF

Mr. Bruce Beville
Deputy Director JCOA

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USSOUTHCOM and Joint Task Force-Haiti ... Some Challenges and Considerations in Forming a Joint Task Force

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Prologue

On 12 January 2010 at 4:53 PM, a magnitude 7.0 earthquake, centered under the capital city of Port au Prince, hit the small Caribbean country of Haiti. The resulting death toll was estimated at over 230,000. In a matter of minutes, the largest earthquake to hit the region in over 200 years had decapitated the country's government and many organizations already there assisting them. Among the souls lost were senior leaders of the United Nations representatives to Haiti, the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH),¹ and the Government of Haiti (GoH). Also lost were 14 of 16 GoH ministry buildings and an estimated 97,000 dwellings, with 188,000 damaged. Over 700,000 people were displaced within Port au Prince alone. The people and the government of Haiti were in a state of shock and a challenging relief effort was made even more challenging by a nearly paralyzed local government.

Response by the US Government and international community was immediate, ultimately involving over 140 nations and 1000 non-governmental organizations (NGO), charities, and private organizations.² The US Agency for International Development (USAID) was designated the Lead Federal Agency to coordinate US government actions in helping the Haitian government respond and recover. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) issued an execute order (EXORD 2236) on 13 January authorizing US military humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) operations for Haiti. On 14 January US Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) obtained Secretary of Defense approval and stood up Joint Task Force Haiti (JTF Haiti) to lead the Department of Defense (DOD) mission within Haiti.

Introduction

This study looks at how USSOUTHCOM responded to the crisis in the first few weeks and how USSOUTHCOM, while working through ambiguous mission requirements and chaotic conditions, formed

a joint task force to carry out the Haitian relief efforts. Operation Unified Response was a success story. But there were many factors that complicated the formation of JTF Haiti and its subsequent operations within a joint, interagency, and multinational environment. This brief case study is not a comprehensive look at all that took place, but instead, it focuses on some challenges experienced during the early stages of the operation and how those challenges were overcome and ultimately shaped the course of the response. These included:

- Organization of the parent combatant command (COCOM)
- Decision making with uncertain mission requirements
- Selecting and deploying the forces to build the JTF
- Coordination, collaboration, and communication with non-DOD agencies

USSOUTHCOM Initial Response

Organization of the Parent Combatant Command

USSOUTHCOM's pre-existing staff organization made the already difficult task of forming a JTF even more challenging. While maintaining a "war-fighting" capability is a mandate for all COCOMs, USSOUTHCOM has long been focused on theater security cooperation and was functionally organized in a way best suited for that task (see Appendix A).³ In 2008, USSOUTHCOM had replaced the traditional J-code staff with functionally aligned directorates so as to fully integrate efforts with interagency (IA) and NGOs, as well as multinational and private organizations to achieve their national and theater objectives.

At the time of the earthquake, the commander of USSOUTHCOM, General Douglas Fraser, had been in command for a little over six months and had some concerns about the effectiveness of the unique organization. To this end, he and his staff held a Director's

meeting on 8 January 2010 to discuss the issue. According to the USSOUTHCOM Chief of Staff, BGen David Garza, the purpose was “to discuss modifications to the enterprise model because several of us, to include General Fraser, felt that we had lost some of our ‘planning discipline’ [as well as capacity] across several of the staff functions; specifically across the planning horizons: Watch, COPS (current operations), FUOPS (future operations), FUPLANS (future plans).”⁴

Less than a week prior to the disaster such concern would appear prophetic, but the changes discussed had not been put into place by 12 January. So when the crisis began, the traditional primary and special staff organization and functions necessary to deal with the response—especially crisis action planning (CAP)—were not in place and ready.⁵ The staff was also not manned with sufficient depth to sustain operations in a crisis of this magnitude. As an economy of force COCOM, USSOUTHCOM headquarters (HQ) was only staffed at about 85 percent strength.

“On 12 January 2010 when the Haiti earthquake hit, we immediately went into crisis action mode and quickly realized that we did not have the personnel depth to maintain 24/7 daily operations. We also realized we needed personnel support pronto. Accordingly, the Boss (General Fraser) went to the JS (Joint Staff) and COCOMs and requested personnel augmentations. Within 24 hours, we received several staff augmentations. Initially, USNORTHCOM provided 3 FO/GOs (flag/general officers) and 34 Action Officers.”⁶ (Note: This would rapidly grow to 11 FO/GOs and approximately 274 augmentees at the COCOM HQ)

The command clearly needed and requested augmentation and the response received was almost overwhelming. The command not only had to work through the problems associated with the crisis itself, but they also had to assimilate what would eventually be 274 new members to the COCOM staff. Ultimately, the command received very rapid augmentee support from the Joint Staff, USNORTHCOM (US Northern Command), USPACOM (US Pacific Command), USJFCOM (US Joint Forces Command), USEUCOM (US European Command), USTRANSCOM (US Transportation Command), and the Services. This unique staff organization made their integration that much more difficult.

“So as you can imagine, with so many personnel augmentations it was critical that we quickly integrate these wonderful folks in the right J-code slots so that we could leverage their talent sets. However,

our enterprise model with only six directorates (Security/Intel, Policy/Strategy, Resources/Assessment, Enterprise Support, Partnering, and Stability) did not facilitate the augmentee integration process. The organization of the enterprise model does not allow for quick ‘plug and play’ by the rest of the DOD members from throughout the other COCOMs and agencies.”⁷

Decision Making Under Uncertain Conditions

USSOUTHCOM commenced crisis action planning on the evening of 12 January—over 12 hours before they would get official tasking from the Joint Staff. The most immediate tasks at hand were making estimates as to the extent of the damage and determining what the DOD contribution to the whole-of-government response would be. Two significant challenges quickly emerged:

- The lack of clear on-the-ground assessments to enable decisions regarding the organization of JTF Haiti and subsequent force flow
- The nagging planning shortfalls during CAP and mission execution that resulted from the functionally organized staff

Gaining Situational Awareness

In addition to the complications their staff organization and manning shortfalls were causing, the staff had to “fight” to gain situational awareness. For the first several days after the earthquake, there was little information coming out of Haiti to inform decision making. Communication systems were down, movement was essentially stopped due to the rubble, and many agencies that would normally be a source of input, such as the country team in the Embassy, Government of Haiti (GoH) officials, the United Nations (UN), NGO’s, and many others, were equally as devastated by the disaster as the general population. Even before the earthquake, these entities did not have a truly robust assessment capability. It was also evident early on that the disaster assessment capabilities of the Office of Federal Disaster Assistance (OFDA) and the Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) were insufficient for the huge task assigned to them.

With only spotty reporting coming through normal channels, many of the decision makers outside of Haiti turned to news coverage, limited reports via phone

communications, and social media to make their initial assessments. In the first hours and days, there were more members of the media on the ground in Port au Prince than US military. Using real-time video and satellite feeds, the media were often able to get out in front of the military in describing the on-the-ground situation.⁸ This provided a useful window to those in and outside the country, but the media reporting added another twist to the problem. It tempted those outside the country to use what was perceived as the “10,000-mile screwdriver” to adjust actions in theater.

News reports also became a driver for a deluge of inquiry during the first weeks of the disaster. Responding to the resulting demand for detailed tactical information from senior decision makers placed heavy demands on the USSOUTHCOM leadership/staff's time and energy, and was often disruptive to the planning process. Early on, many of the leaders in Miami spent as much as 6-8 hours each day preparing for, or executing video teleconferences with leaders in Washington, often being asked questions about issues in Haiti to which they had no immediate means to find the answers.

Assessing the situation within Haiti was only part of the requirement. USSOUTHCOM also had to gain situational awareness on what all the other US and international contributors were planning and executing in support of the relief efforts. Foreign embassies in Washington, DC, bombarded the State Department with inquiries regarding how to coordinate their support to the operation. In turn, USSOUTHCOM had to continually adjust their assessment of anticipated support to USAID. In this case, the functional staff structure, with its already robust integration of interagency representation, coupled with augmentation from USNORTHCOM and many liaison officers (LNO) from interagency partners, gave USSOUTHCOM a greatly enhanced ability to gain situational awareness of the whole-of-government effort. The integration of USSOUTHCOM's interagency partners early in the planning effort became an important force multiplier.

Information Gathering

To address critical information gaps, USSOUTHCOM employed a combination of traditional intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) systems, and non-traditional tools such as those found on commercial internet sites. Technical ISR platforms provided imagery to support hydrographic and geographic

surveys, a rough assessment of damaged infrastructure and lines of communications (LOC), and disposition of internally displaced persons (IDP). Within the first 24 hours, USSOUTHCOM re-tasked its sole P-3 aircraft to conduct full motion video (FMV) of Port au Prince to assess the damage and incorporated additional external resources over time. National technical means, commercial satellites, and the RQ-4 GLOBAL HAWK also provided geospatial intelligence within the first 48 hours to improve situational awareness. Additionally, USSOUTHCOM experimented with a new sensor, ALIRT (airborne laser imaging research test bed), utilizing LIDAR (light detection and ranging), which provided assessment capability for evaluating infrastructure damage. USJFCOM's Joint Warfare Analysis Center (JWAC) provided detailed analyses of a variety of critical infrastructure systems such as roads, water, and electricity. Finally, Google Maps[®] was used to provide up-to-date satellite imagery (through GeoEye Inc.) for use by relief organizations.

In the second week, with the information sharing capability gaining strength and the ISR architecture beginning to develop, the addition of RQ-1 PREDATORS and RC-26 Air National Guard aircraft and their respective ground stations provided much needed FMV capability to forces on the ground to monitor food distribution efforts, IDP movement, and response to any dynamic tasking directed by the JTF Haiti commander. The posting of over 4,000 hand-held images from the numerous Navy and Marine helicopter flights aided what would become the longer term recovery stage.

“The USSOUTHCOM J2 provided estimates on the viability of Haitian hospitals by using satellite imagery showing movement around the buildings; but this gave no real intelligence on functionality, capability, or staffing that can only be obtained from in-person assessment.”⁹

Ultimately, much of the information gathering had to be accomplished the old fashioned way—with boots on the ground. USSOUTHCOM deployed human intelligence teams to provide information on the human terrain environment. By using social networking sites, blogs, clergy, non-governmental organizations, and the Haitian diaspora, USSOUTHCOM supplemented its traditional ISR capabilities with sources that could provide first-hand accounts of where to focus humanitarian efforts within the country. The arriving troops from the 22 Marine Expeditionary Unit and the 2/82d Airborne Brigade Combat Team (BCT) conducted detailed ground reconnaissance to provide assessments and to

document the locations of critical infrastructure and local leaders. US Special Operations Command-South (USSOCSOUTH) deployed special operations forces (SOF) teams and provided on-the-ground assessments in six principle areas outside of Port au Prince. Later, the innovative use of Google Earth imagery and map backgrounds by 2/82 BCT, combined with the details of the air and ground reconnaissance, became the basis for a viable HADR common operational picture (COP). This provided a critically needed ability to achieve geo-spatial situational awareness, share it broadly with all stakeholders, and thus, better integrate all efforts.

Information Sharing

The leadership at USSOUTHCOM recognized that communication and information sharing was going to be a vital key to success. They therefore decided early-on to use “open” communications and an unclassified information-sharing network to facilitate this, allowing for expanded coordination and collaboration with the widest possible range of stakeholders. Though degraded, the commercial communications infrastructure became part of the de-facto crisis response coordination architecture and a viable alternate means to military communications. For the first several weeks, much of the operation in Haiti was run off of cell phones and mobile email devices.

On the Internet, the command leveraged the All Partners Access Network (APAN)¹⁰ and a user defined operational picture (UDOP), allowing them to post updates, display geo-rectified products, and link into USAID and other governmental and non-governmental sites. These eventually created a near real-time information sharing environment that enabled collaboration and information sharing within the command. Multiple other websites accessible by the interagency, NGOs, and private volunteer organizations (PVO) were used by USSOUTHCOM and JTF Haiti.

“I can honestly say that ... we have not had any problems sharing information. One of the key reasons for this is that from the outset of this crisis, we at the USSOUTHCOM Headquarters decided to classify our operations order as UNCLASSIFIED. This classification gave us ease of transmission across the military, civilian sectors, and with our partner nations. The other reason is that General Fraser has on a daily basis established a drum beat of mutual support and communications connectivity with all stakeholders.”¹¹

Determining Requirements

Most of the major force deployment decisions were made within the first 72-96 hours when the situation was still very unclear. As a result, the USSOUTHCOM and fledgling JTF staffs had to make some bold assumptions about their expected requirements. “*Many of the early assessments were simply guesses. USSOUTHCOM guessed at what ... capabilities and capacities would be needed and sent them forward without ever being requested by the lead agency (USAID).*”¹² According to BGen Garza, the early lack of situational awareness clouded the determination of requirements and priorities, ultimately complicating the delivery and distribution of manpower and supplies.¹³

Though USSOUTHCOM had developed a functional plan (FUNCPLAN 6150-06) for HADR operations in theater, the plan was written for a traditional J-code organization and had not been updated to reflect the USSOUTHCOM organization just prior to the earthquake. Moreover, there was no standing concept of operations (CONOP) or operations plan (OPLAN) with an associated time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD) built for a HADR event that the staff could use to begin force flow planning. Adding to these complications, USSOUTHCOM’s logistics and deployment expertise had been disaggregated under the original functional staff organization.

Reorganization

Five days into the crisis, amid the immediate demands for information and decisions, the USSOUTHCOM Commander directed the staff to reorganize into the traditional “J-code” structure.¹⁴ Nearly overnight the USSOUTHCOM staff conducted an “in-stride” reorganization, simultaneously functioning as a JTF while laying the groundwork to stand-up JTF Haiti.

The more traditional structure allowed faster integration of and a more immediate contribution by external augmentees (see Appendix A).¹⁵ However, the contingency deployments were well into the second week before the newly reorganized J4 shop and deployment operations center were fully up and running.

“The in-stride decision by General Fraser to realign to a J-code Structure was a pivotal decision for USSOUTHCOM. This decision allowed us to quickly organize around a well understood organizational methodology designed for coordinated planning across essential planning functions necessary for any event on the spectrum of

conflict. This alignment gave us the ability to speak a common language, quickly facilitate the infusion of the staff augments, employ OPTs [operational planning teams] efficiently, communicate better internally and with external stakeholders like the JS, Components, JTFs, JTF Haiti, other partner nations, agencies, and the IA. It also had the effect of invigorating the work force and it gave us better teamwork in support of this crisis. The model we were under did not survive the crucible of the crisis.”¹⁶

Building the JTF and Organizing its Functions

Selecting and deploying forces

On 12 January, the USSOUTHCOM Deputy Commander, LTG Ken Keen, was in Port au Prince as part of a routine theater security cooperation visit. That afternoon, LTG Keen was at the residence of US Ambassador to Haiti Kenneth Merten preparing for dinner. Meanwhile, three members of his staff had returned to their lodging at the Hotel Montana, a popular lodging destination for foreigners. When the earthquake hit, the hotel structure was shaken so violently that it completely collapsed, trapping many inside and eventually causing scores of deaths. LTG Keen’s Haiti desk officer, Lt Col Ken Bourland was among the deceased. Now, accompanied by only a small staff and armed with little more than their BlackBerry communication devices and one land line (using AMB Merten’s international calling card), LTG Keen became the nucleus for what would become the JTF headquarters.

Selecting the Commander

The decision of who would command the JTF was almost automatic. Rather than bring in a commander and staff that were unfamiliar with Haiti, USSOUTHCOM decided to build the JTF around a leader already there. Gen Fraser knew that he would personally be strapped without a deputy in the USSOUTHCOM headquarters. But, he also knew that for many reasons beyond Keen’s physical presence in Haiti, LTG Keen was the right leader for the job. LTG Keen was a very experienced hand in the USSOUTHCOM area of operations (AOR) and had built personal relationships during his years of theater engagement. Possibly most important among those relationships was his long-time friendship with Major General Peixoto, a Brazilian infantry officer and the commander of the MINUSTAH contingent, who

fortunately was spared when several other of its key leaders were killed in the collapse of their headquarters. Their relationship, which extended back many years to an exchange program in which CPT Keen was assigned to the Brazilian Airborne Brigade where Capt Peixoto was a Pathfinder, was critical to working through a host of highly politicized issues, not the least of which was delineating security responsibilities between the US and MINUSTAH.

“LTG Keen was selected to lead the JTF over USARSOUTH standing JTF because he was on the ground in Haiti at the time of the earthquake. Furthermore, he had a great relationship with the MINUSTAH commander in Haiti.¹⁷ It became an intuitive decision to build a JTF around a man (Keen) instead of bringing one in. JTF Haiti was more intuitive than mechanical due to the unique circumstances mentioned above and due to the scale of the calamity.”¹⁸

Identifying the Component Parts

JTF Haiti was officially established by vocal order (VOCO) on 14 January 2010. But the process of identifying and assembling the component pieces of the JTF would take at least the next six weeks to accomplish. With no assigned forces and no standing contingency plan, the USSOUTHCOM and JTF staffs had to build the force from scratch. Almost immediately, major building blocks of the JTF such as TF-41, including the USS Carl Vinson, the 22nd and 24th Expeditionary Strike Groups, as well as the 2/82 Airborne Brigade Combat Team were committed to the response.

However, many of the remaining forces and command and control (C2) necessary to build a JTF for a contingency of this nature were not part of the global response force (GRF) and had to be identified on the fly. The lack of a designated JTF HQ or joint logistics C2 element within the GRF required deployment planning on short notice, by a USSOUTHCOM staff with little force deployment planning capacity, adding to an already challenging force flow situation (see Appendix A). Many enabling capabilities (to include engineering, civil affairs, psychological operations, public affairs, and medical) required for this JTF were also not in a contingency status.

The potential component elements of the JTF were in various states of readiness and were scattered widely across the United States. Some were in the Active Component, others in the Reserve Component, each

with different mobilization timelines. Some were at or near “force projection platforms” such as Ft. Bragg and Pope AFB, while others were scattered across the US and had to move long distances to reach an aerial port of embarkation (APOE) or a sea port of embarkation (SPOE). These considerations added to the challenges at this early stage of planning and complicated the decision making at the COCOM-level with regard to JTF composition and force sequencing.

Selecting the Core of the JTF HQ

Early on, one of the next major decisions was identifying the “core” command and control element to build the JTF staff around. There were several courses of action available. The three main options considered were: 1) a subordinate Service component command (US Army South (ARSOUTH), 2nd Fleet, II MEF, or 12th Air Force); 2) the USSOUTHCOM Standing Joint Force Headquarters (SJFHQ); or, 3) an external organization that was “JTF capable.”

From the start, LTG Keen felt that, given the nature of the crisis, it would be important for at least some, if not all, of his headquarters to be stationed on land. He wanted to be connected to the embassy, the government, the UN, other relief organizations, and, most importantly, the people. He believed that a highly visible land-based presence was important to reassure the Haitian people. This effectively narrowed the candidates down to the two ground Services. II MEF was unavailable due to commitments for USCENTCOM, so ARSOUTH appeared to be the logical choice as they had been “certified” as a JTF capable HQ.¹⁹

However, one of the major concerns in those early days was a potential for significant security issues that might cause a mass exodus of Haitians toward Cuba and the US.²⁰ Accordingly, the Joint Staff tasked USSOUTHCOM to be prepared to conduct mass migrant operations. Only one organization was trained and rehearsed at this task, and that was ARSOUTH. Therefore, USSOUTHCOM designated ARSOUTH as JTF-Migrant Operations (JTF-MIGOPS) with the specified task to deploy its JTF HQ to US Naval Station Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and prepare to conduct migrant operations support.²¹ With ARSOUTH committed, USSOUTHCOM had to find an alternate headquarters for the JTF.

The next option was to use the SJFHQ and build around it. Lead elements of the USSOUTHCOM SJFHQ arrived in Port au Prince within 24 hours of the earthquake. While providing important initial JTF staff capability, the SJFHQ could not form the core of the JTF staff without significant personnel augmentation. All but 22 of its original 56 personnel had been integrated into the USSOUTHCOM staff to make up for manning shortfalls.²² Although the 22 that arrived on the ground in Haiti brought with them an understanding of the country and the broader USSOUTHCOM AOR, they were too few to provide a viable staff for 24/7 operations.

As these problems with manning the JTF were becoming apparent, LTG Keen received a phone call from LTG Frank Helmick, Commander of the XVIII Airborne Corps at Ft. Bragg, NC, and a personal friend of Keen’s. Helmick offered the XVIII Corps Assault Command Post (ACP) and many of his key staff members to Keen with which to form the headquarters. The ACP was already packed and ready to deploy for a training exercise on the 14th, and a brigade combat team from the 82nd Airborne Division was part of the GRF and already tagged for deployment. The decision was made.

Deploying the Forces

USSOUTHCOM initially adopted a “push” approach to force deployment. Because speed was of the essence and the obvious requirement to respond to a disaster of such magnitude so great, the command opted to overcome ambiguity with mass in numbers. The comment by the JTF Commander, LTG Ken Keen, illustrates this approach well: “Just tell them to keep sending me stuff, I’ll tell them when to stop.” Later, as the numbers and capabilities of boots-on-the-ground increased and JTF Haiti matured, assessments and the associated requirements became clearer and a “pull” approach was implemented, moderately improving the efficiency of force and resource flow.

Within 28 hours of the earthquake, a team of Air Force special operators reopened the Port au Prince airport. Air Force Combat Control Teams (CCT) established the initial airfield operations capability including air traffic control, and kept it running so massive quantities of humanitarian assistance could begin arriving and injured personnel and evacuees could be transported out. The Air Force Contingency Response Group (CRG) followed shortly after, bringing additional capa-

bility and smoothing the coordination and flow of air support and airfield management. The airport had been initially bottle-necked by the massive international response and the USSOUTHCOM “push” of available forces, but some quick and innovative actions broke the log jam, allowing forces and relief supplies to begin to flow smoothly.²³ W.L. “Ike” Clark, USSOUTHCOM’s Humanitarian Assistance Division Chief noted:

“The opening of the airport by the US was critical since initial over-the-shore supplies were more hampered. They went from around 35 flights per day to just over 200 flights per day, which was incredible. From the humanitarian assistance perspective, logistics is the best thing that the military does for such a disaster and we did it well.”²⁴

Within 72 hours after the disaster, the XVIII ABC ACP, led by MG Allyn (XVIII ABN Deputy Commanding General),²⁵ was on the ground providing a trained and well-honed staff around which the JTF would mature. Though very experienced as a result of its recent Iraqi Freedom tour, the XVIII Corps staff was not joint and required the addition of a host of “plugs” to round it out. In addition to the USSOUTHCOM SJFHQ that arrived on Day 2, the USJFCOM Joint Enabling Capabilities Command (JECC) arrived within 72 hours, providing key enabling capabilities that rounded out the XVIII ABN joint planning capability, including current operations, future operations, and logistics. Along with the J3 and J4 planners, the JECC package included the USJFCOM Joint Public Affairs Support Element (JPASE)²⁶ and the Joint Communications Support Element (JCSE).²⁷


JPASE provided media specialists and production capability to address the vacuum that was initially filled by the public media. JCSE provided an early entry communications package to support JTF Haiti command and control. Soon, staff plugs from the Joint Force Maritime Component Command—Task Force 41, the 12th Air Force’s Air Component Coordination Element (ACCE), as well as numerous other joint and interagency staff members began to turn the Army “green” staff into a joint “purple” staff.

With the increasing number of boots-on-the-ground came a better understanding of the relief requirements and associated staffing capabilities necessary for 24/7 JTF HQ operations. The existing joint manning document (JMD) proved inadequate, requiring requisition of more personnel. According to BGen Garza, staffing and deploying the JTF Haiti headquarters was the most significant challenge USSOUTHCOM faced.

“The key challenge is the requisition of personnel to fill the Joint Manning Document (JMD) for the JTF Headquarters. We established a new JMD for JTF Haiti and we have methodically but slowly been filling each position.”²⁸

The fully matured JTF Haiti command and control structure with arrival dates is depicted in the following figure.

As JTF Haiti matured, CDRUSSOUTHCOM gave it greater C2 responsibility. One week after the earthquake (19 January), the JTF Haiti HQ had 78 personnel. By 27 January, the staffing would grow to 355. A timeline of key actions in this process is shown below:



- 12 January 1653L — Earthquake hits
- 12 January — LTG Keen meets with US Ambassador and Haiti Gov’t
- 13 January — DART arrives²⁹
- 13 January — Lead elements of USSOUTHCOM SJFHQ element arrive

- 13 January — USSOCSOUTH elements and USSOUTHCOM Situation Assessment Team arrive
- 13 January — 1st Special Operations Wing/CCT/pararescue jumpers arrive (immediate opening of the APOD)
- 14 January — JTF Haiti officially stands up
- 14 January — SOC Military Information Support Team arrives³⁰
- 14 January — Lead elements of 1-73 CAV (2/82) arrive
- 15 January — XVIII ABC Assault Command Post arrives
- 15 January — JFCOM JECC planners arrive³¹
- 15 January — JPASE Joint Information Bureau set up³²
- 15 January — CRG arrives³³
- 15 January 2000L — JTF Haiti Initial Operational Capability
- 17 January — JTF-MIGOPS (ARSOUTH) deploys
- 19 January — XVIII ABC closed; JTF Haiti at 208 personnel
- 19 January — JTF Haiti assumes greater mission update brief (MUB) role³⁴
- 21 January — Deployable Joint Command and Control (DJC2) operational³⁵

Gaining Control of the Deployment Chaos

As mentioned previously, USSOUTHCOM initially adopted a “push” approach to force deployment. It now fell to the JTF Haiti staff to organize this and implement a “pull” approach. Force flow was initially based on verbal orders with no previously established TPFDD. This resulted in an uncoordinated sequencing of units and equipment that continued for the first two weeks after the disaster. Further complicating the situation, supporting commands did not adequately communicate between each other as to what forces were being moved to the joint operational area (JOA) on verbal orders. The rapid infusion of manpower and supplies, while creating inefficiencies, was nonetheless effective in giving the JTF the means to stabilize the situation and save lives. RADM Parker, USSOUTHCOM J3 commented, *“We had 16 pages of VOCOs regarding force flow. Official RFFs [requests for forces] were not required and the bureaucracy was eliminated by this approach. This was the enabler for speed-of-response.”*

Yet that speed of response had its downside. The initial lack of the requisite audit trail, due to reliance on verbal orders, deprived supporting and supported commands of synchronized force flow planning and tracking. Because effective joint reception, staging, onward-movement, and integration (JRSOI) was not implemented as force flow began, and a joint logistics operations center (JLOC) not established until 12 days into the disaster, JTF Haiti planners and operators felt they did not have adequate visibility of “what they had, where it was, and what was coming.”³⁶ Rather than approaching the HADR mission from an operational level perspective, JTF Haiti was responding to immediate tactical level needs with “whatever showed up at the airfield from well meaning contributors.”³⁷ To adjust to this lack of visibility of incoming assets, JTF Haiti created the force flow working group (FFWG) consisting of personnel from the J3 and J4 who met daily to deconflict issues and apprise the commander. This would be one of several ad hoc organizations and processes set up on the fly as C2 transitioned from USSOUTHCOM to JTF Haiti.

Coordination, Collaboration, and Communication with non-DOD Agencies

The nascent JTF initially fell in on the embassy as this provided space, communications, and the proximity to support the initial response and to develop staff relationships with the multitude of non-DOD responders.³⁸ While this arrangement was greatly beneficial to initial coordination and collaboration, the influx of so many personnel greatly strained the embassy infrastructure, and existing communications quickly proved inadequate. To overcome this, additional personnel were housed in tents on the embassy grounds and the JTF headquarters was established in a vacant lot next to the embassy and the UN headquarters, thereby maintaining what would be critical proximity to major collaborating partners as the operation matured. The JCSE also established additional communications through deployable systems and workarounds to alleviate communications shortfalls.³⁹

The JTF Haiti commander realized early-on that it would be critical to organize the boards, centers, cells, and working groups within his JTF in a way that would best facilitate a collaborative environment and align efforts with the UN, MINUSTAH, and NGO/PVOs. As an example, JTF Haiti stood up a 30-person humanitarian assistance coordination cell (HACC) as a mechanism to integrate with the UN Cluster system.⁴⁰ The

JTF commander designated BG Matern, a Canadian exchange officer assigned to the XVIII ABC HQ, the responsibility to lead the HACC efforts. Primarily staffed by members of the 98th Civil Affairs (CA) Battalion (ABN) and led by LTC Josh Stevens, the HACC began the task of integrating US military support to USAID and the Government of Haiti by coordinating, planning, and assisting the establishment of medical clinics and food and water distribution points. The JTF also provided key support to the staffs and working groups of USAID and the UN.

Possibly the most important assistance provided was in the area of planning and planners. A United Nations strategic plans officer recently commented about Operation Unified Response:

*"The military's planning capability is not the most expensive part, but it is probably the most valuable. The international coordination structure would not have stood up if they weren't there – we tapped into the JTF planning capacity."*⁴¹

LTG Keen and his staff also recognized the need to implement an effective strategic communications plan to get out in front of the expanding public media presence. To accomplish this they organized the joint interagency information cell (JIIC). The JIIC was a centralized, coordination body comprised of US Government agencies, headed up by a JIIC director and assisted by the US Embassy Public Diplomacy Officer.⁴² The communications goal was to ensure key audiences understood the United States' role in the global effort and to portray the US as a capable, efficient, and effective responder. Focusing on the key audiences of the Haitian people, the Haitian leadership, the international community, and the American people, the core themes emphasized "Haitians helping Haitians" and ever-expanding partnerships. Of equal importance was dispelling the undesirable themes that the US was keeping an inept Haitian government afloat, that it was an occupying force, or that the US would rebuild Haiti.⁴³ The White House sent a "trusted agent" to Haiti in an effort to synchronize situational awareness and messages, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, ADM Mullen, sent his personal public affairs officer (PAO) to serve with the JTF commander. *"For the first few days of the crisis, the guy that was most valuable to me was the Chairman's PAO—he was with me all the time."*⁴⁴

Epilogue

In the end, the US DOD relief effort was quick and massive. At its height, the COCOM and JTF provided C2 and coordinated the efforts of a significant DOD response:

- USS Carl Vinson
- USNS Comfort
- 2nd BCT/82nd Airborne Division
- 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU)/ Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG)
- 24th MEU/ESG
- 6 US Coast Guard Cutters
- 2 US Air Force Groups
- Numerous Special Operations Forces and Enabling Forces

With a high water mark of 22,000 personnel, 33 ships, and over 3,300 sorties (including 458 strategic lift), Operation Unified Response:

- Delivered over 13 million tons of cargo and relief supplies
- Evacuated over 13,000 American citizens
- Reorganized and operated the airport
- Repaired seaport facilities and opened port operations
- Treated 19,000 patients
- Conducted over 250 medical evacuations (MEDEVAC)
- Distributed 75 tons of medical supplies
- Fed a substantial population (4.9 million meals; distributed 17 million pounds of bulk food; and over 2.6 million bottles of water)
- Distributed emergency shelter for more than 525,000 families
- Provided engineering assessments of over 2,048 structures and 300 acres of land
- Removed 77 blocks of rubble
- Provided military planning support to USAID, intergovernmental organizations (IGO), and NGO efforts.

Commenting on the challenge of standing-up a JTF and transitioning C2 of the HADR mission from USSOUTHCOM to JTF Haiti, BGen Garza stated:

"The COCOM Staff has a BIG role in being the strategic shaper for the JTF so that the JTF can function at the operational and tactical levels. The challenge in this case was that we at the

USSOUTHCOM headquarters had by necessity to be the operational and strategic headquarters for this crisis while the JTF headquarters stood up. Once the JTF HQ was a functional headquarters, they contacted us and took control of the operational/tactical level actions and now we are transitioning to the strategic level shaping actions. So, the COCOM HQ has to 'look up and inform down' along strategic level actions by J-code function and other policy level considerations."⁴⁵

In Retrospect: Some Questions to Consider

- When and how C2 responsibilities shift from the COCOM to the JTF would appear to be more intuitive than mechanical and involve a variety of considerations. What are those considerations? What can be done to make this transition more seamless and efficient? (Consider that the original concept of an SJFHQ was to address these challenges. Additionally, the JECC was organized to bring critical enablers to stand-up a JTF rapidly).
- What role do personal relationships play in overcoming the challenges of forming a JTF? Is there a downside?
- How does a JTF in HADR strike a balance between achieving speed of response with gaining situational awareness to drive force/resource flow requirements?
- In HADR, to what degree is the strategic message and communications important? What are the most effective ways and means of developing and promulgating it?
- Based on USSOUTHCOM's experience, should each COCOM have standing HADR contingency plans (CONPLAN) and joint manning documents ready to support the formation of small, medium, and large JTFs? What types of forces and capabilities should be emphasized and why? Why is geography and location an important variable to consider in this regard?
- Achieving unity of effort in an international collaborative environment is a critical requirement. Based on USSOUTHCOM's experience, what traditional and non-traditional boards, centers, cells, and working groups provide the venues needed?
- Today's era, where we are faced with multiple competing military contingencies and reduced budgets and resources across the government, may demand efficiencies that we have heretofore not been required to achieve. Considering the unpredictable

nature and requirements of any number of contingencies DOD may be called on to support, how do we improve the efficiency of response without sacrificing effectiveness?

About the Authors:

COL John T. "Tim" Ryan is currently assigned as the Chief of Studies and Analysis for the Joint Center for Operational Analysis, USJFCOM. He has had numerous assignments in Armor and Cavalry units in the US, Europe, and the Middle East. Most notably, he served as a tank company commander during Operation DESERT STORM, as a brigade operations officer in Kosovo, and as a heavy task force commander with the 1st Cavalry Division during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM II. He has also had key assignments as a company team trainer at the Army's National Training Center, as a tactics instructor at the US Army Infantry School, and as a joint plans officer at US Joint Forces Command during his first joint tour. Following battalion command, COL Ryan served in the Army Initiatives Group as a strategic planner/strategic communications coordinator for the Department of the Army G3/5/7. COL Ryan holds a Bachelor of Science in Education (cum laude) from Western Carolina University, a Master of Military Arts and Sciences in Theater Strategy from the Army's School of Advanced Military Studies, and a Master of Science in National Resource Strategy (Distinguished Graduate) from Industrial College of the Armed Forces, National Defense University.

Mr. Russ Goehring is a retired US Army officer. Since retirement he has served in a wide variety of positions within DOD and the corporate sector. He also served as an operations officer for the emergency response team-advance for FEMA Region II. He is currently serving as an analyst at the Joint Center for Operational Analysis.

Mr. Robert Hulslander retired as a US Army Strategic Intelligence Officer in 2008. After retirement he worked for Johns Hopkins University, Applied Physics Lab as a Senior Staff Analyst before rejoining US Joint Forces Command, Joint Center for Operational Analysis as a Senior Operational Analyst. He has a Bachelor of Arts with a Major in Geography and Minor in Anthropology. In 1995, he received a Masters degree in Strategic Intelligence from the Joint Military Intelligence College and authored a thesis entitled "Understanding Cultural and Ethnic Conflicts: Implications for Intelligence Support to Operations

Other Than War: "His assignments have included tours with the 1st Armored Division; the JFK Special Warfare Center and School; 7th Special Forces Group; Joint Intelligence Center Pacific; the US Military Academy at West Point; Combined Forces Command Korea; Special Operations Command South; and USJFCOM. LTC (Ret) Hulslander has served in both Iraq and Afghanistan and in Haiti in 2004 and 2009. In 2009 he led and developed a study for the US Ambassador to Haiti and US Southern Command focused on DOD 1207 finding for the Haiti Stabilization Initiative.

Endnotes:

¹ MINUSTAH is the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (French: *Mission des Nations Unies pour la stabilisation en Haïti*). MINUSTAH was established by United Nations Security Council Resolution 1542 on 30 April 2004 with the primary mission of peacekeeping. The mission's military component is led by the Brazilian Army and the force commander is Brazilian (Brigadier General Floriano Peixoto Vieira Neto). The current UN mission is authorized until 15 October 2010. The force is composed of 8,940 military personnel and 3,711 police, supported by international civilian personnel, a local civilian staff and United Nations Volunteers. The Mission's Chief, Hédi Annabi of Tunisia and his deputy, Luiz Carlos da Costa of Brazil, and the acting police commissioner, Royal Canadian Mounted Policeman Doug Coates of Canada, were killed in the earthquake.

² The US government and international community's initial response included:

- 12 January USAMB Disaster Declaration
- 12 January USEMB AMCIT Emergency Notification
- 12 January GOH Requests US Assistance
- 13 January POTUS Directs DOD Support to Haiti
- The Haitian government, the United Nations, and donor representatives met in Haiti on 14 January to coordinate their efforts.
- Secretary General Ban Ki-moon sent Assistant Secretary General Edmond Mulet to Haiti on 13 January to direct the U.N.'s immediate response efforts
- On 15 January 2010, the U.N. Humanitarian Country Team in Haiti issued a Flash Appeal for emergency financial assistance in the amount of \$575 million.
- Numerous nations and NGO's responded by sending numerous search and rescue teams, medical personnel, and humanitarian aid workers.
- The Organization of American States (OAS) pledged humanitarian, financial and other support to Haiti at a meeting on 14 January.
- With personnel already on the ground pre-earthquake, the 15-member Caribbean Community (CARICOM) mobilized its disaster emergency response system to

assist Haiti, and several members sent emergency supplies or financial assistance.

³ The inclusion of the interagency as critical members of the primary staff had as its goal the integration of the expertise needed to be able to identify, plan, and execute more effective stability and partnering operations within Latin America. Of particular note was the fact that this principle was of such importance that Senior Foreign Service (SFS) Officers occupied key positions: second only to the Commander himself was the Civilian Deputy to the Commander. This position was a three-star equivalent filled by a senior Ambassador of the Department of State (DOS). Likewise, the Partnering Directorate, which was a primary focal point for US interagency and military interaction with US and international NGOs, had another SFS Officer from DOS (one-star equivalent) assigned as the Deputy Director. Another significant difference between this structure and that of a traditional COCOM was that "J-codes" were grouped within directorates based on the function of that directorate and the expertise required to support that particular function/mission.

⁴ Interview with BGen David Garza, USSOUTHCOM Chief of Staff, 3 February 2010.

⁵ Traditionally part of the commander's primary staff, the J1, J2, J4, and J6 were at least one level removed from direct access to the commander—not even having a seat at the normal command and staff meeting table. Likewise, special staff that would prove critical to the HADR mission were not included (engineer and surgeon).

⁶ Garza, 3 February 2010.

⁷ Garza, 3 February 2010.

⁸ Interview with Maj Bradsher, augmentee from OSD/PA to USSOUTHCOM, 1 February 2010. According to Maj Bradsher, NBC was on the scene 48 hours before any DOD PA.

⁹ Interview with Miguel Cubano, CAPT, USSOUTHCOM Command Surgeon, 3 February 2010.

¹⁰ All Partners Access Network (APAN) is a "community of communities" web site that combines the benefits of unstructured collaboration (wikis, blogs, forums) and structured collaboration (file sharing, calendar) with the personalization of social networking to facilitate unclassified information sharing with multinational partners, non-governmental organizations, and among various US Federal and State agencies.

¹¹ Garza, 3 February 2010

¹² Interview with Jose Aundujar, Medical Planner, Permanent Party assigned USSOUTHCOM; and Steven Jeffs, 3 February 2010

¹³ Garza, 3 February 2010.

¹⁴ A written memorandum from BGEN Garza as a follow-up to the interview on 3 February provided his observations of

the value added of having transitioned, albeit in stride, to the J-code structure. His observations were:

- C2: Provided us unity of effort and faster speed of communications across our staff and external to our HQs. Our components, MILGRPs, partner nations, JS, and JTF were all on the J-code model. So switching to J-code model provided us “overnight self synchronization” with internal/external stakeholders that gave us “renewed energy and focus” in support of JTF Haiti. NOTE: We decided right away that in order to help us share information with our many partner nations, agencies, and other stakeholders we were going to label this crisis as UNCLASSIFIED. This decision has paid big time dividends every day of the operation.
- Intel: This switch elevated our Intel GO to Director for Intelligence (J2) to lead our Intel Department into the many activities necessary for us to shape success in support of JTF Haiti, but also across the region. This has been a huge benefit because under the Enterprise Model our J2 was subordinate under the J3. This subordination of a critical Staff Function is simply not the best arrangement for leveraging all of the talent sets found in the intelligence community. As a result, the J-2 has been flourishing and delivering more timely and useful information.
- Fires: Lethal fires planning played no role in this crisis. However, non-lethal fires in the form of IO planning played a relevant role as we began employing products and tools to better communicate with the Haitian populace and to help shape upcoming actions with them and our many stakeholders. This switch better leveraged the JFCOM plugs provided to us like the Joint Information Center and JCOA. The J-codes facilitate the gathering of information and their plug and play utility.
- Maneuver: This function was not employed as we provided mobility of assets and forces but the JTF provided the necessary maneuver guidance for their assigned forces. [Additional observation from 2 July memo: The movement and distribution of goods and supplies from key nodes within the AOR requires a central coordination center like the humanitarian assistance support center to coordinate and manage all participating NGOs.]
- Logistics: We had eliminated the J4 staff functions and nested all logistic areas under the title of enterprise support. In the process we lost our planning focus and discipline across the key logistic functional areas and consequently when the crisis hit we were behind the logistical planning curve. The establishment of the J-4 was absolutely KEY to us putting our arms across the functions of operational logistics. We established a JLOC/SDDOC in SC HQs to help us provide the strategic mobility picture necessary to efficiently schedule, prioritize, and flow forces, equipment, into the JOA. We co-located the JLOC/SDDOC with the global force managers to establish ops-log fusion. [Additional observa-

tion from 2 July memo: the Haiti Earthquake crisis was a logistics centric event and a COCOM must quickly establish a theater logistic network to support and monitor all stakeholder demands.]

- Force Protection: Our JTF, Components, and MILGRPs were better informed and better able to provide necessary support to the JTF and SC HQs.
- KM process: Another benefit from switching to the J-codes was that it made us look hard at our KM process. We had recently brought the KM Leadership Institute to USSOUTHCOM HQs to teach 24 personnel on KM fundamentals. So, although we had a common base of reference, this was the first time we had worked through a crisis together in a J-code model. And, what we found out was we needed a lot of work in the areas of people, processes and system alignment. To this end, the NORTHCOM Team provided us a KM Team of PROs who were instrumental to our quick realignment and information management process.
- Strategic Communications: In the area of Strategic Communications, we simply refined the already existent Strat Comm process and leveraged the battle rhythm of our Working Group. Our Strat Comm WG is very inclusive and as a result we threw them more issues to tackle so that we could stay two moves ahead of the key events on the calendar. Their refinement under a brand new Strat Comm Chief, the development of their products, and their integration with the JTF Joint Information Center and DoS/JS/WHEM was and continues to be critical to every major event in Operation Unified Response.
- Flattened organization: The switch to J-codes flattened the organization because it took us from six to nine Directors. In the process, we brought more Subject Matter Expertise to the table in an unfiltered way because three of these Directors are Full Colonels who had been buried in the old organization. These three Colonels (J1, J4, J6) have been simply superb in performance and diligence. Not surprisingly, information across these three Directorates and to the Boss moves faster because it is not subjugated under another Director. A good example of this flattening process is that it allows us to better analyze our Employment and Funding Authorities across our Principle Staff Leads without having their expert opinion subjugated to someone who does not have the same level of expertise.

¹⁵ In the interview with BGEN Garza, he cited several specific actions that contributed to this: The J1, J2, J4, and J6 assumed primary staff responsibilities; the J4 stood up a LogOps (JLOC) cell with NORTHCOM / JECC assistance; External augmentation, especially NORTHCOM SJFHQ, gave the staff critically needed breadth, especially for planning (J33, J35 and J5) and depth to conduct 24-hour ops; and the addition of eight FO/GOs provided the experience and ability to interface with the various senior-level agencies involved in the operation.

¹⁶ The in stride decision by the COCOM to change to the J Code organizational model was to provide unity of effort, facilitate the plug, and play talents of 530 personnel augments, facilitate information sharing amongst the USSOUTHCOM HQs, Components, JTF Haiti, and external stakeholders, and apply a common organizational language. Garza, Feedback on JFCOM Draft on Standup of JTF Haiti, 2 July, 2010.

¹⁷ LTG Keen had both a professional and personal relationship with MG Peixoto, who commanded the UN Military Mission in Haiti, responsible for overall security.

¹⁸ Garza, 3 February 2010

¹⁹ This requirement has its basis in a tasking from the 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review directing DOD to transform designated existing Service two- and three-star operational HQ to fully functional and scalable JTF capable HQ units beginning in FY 07. The desired end state is not a "standing JTF HQ" for every imaginable mission requirement, but rather a Service HQ enhanced through pre-crisis organization, manning, equipping, training, and certification initiatives that is ready to step up to JTF HQ responsibilities over a range of possible contingencies with appropriate augmentation. Certification of a JTF capable HQ is a COCOM Commander responsibility. The acceptable standard for JTF capable HQ is the capability to command and control integrated joint operations employing assigned and attached forces, including multinational forces, and to coordinate/integrate OGA, IGO, NGO, and multinational partner support to accomplish assigned missions in a defined JOA. JTF capable HQ will be proficient in the basic joint functions that integrate, synchronize, and direct joint operations, which are: command and control, intelligence, fires, movement and maneuver, protection, and sustainment.

²⁰ The precedent for this concern was founded in a history of Haitians migrating by sea to the US to escape economic or political circumstances beginning in the 1970s. 25,000 Haitians arrived in south Florida during the Mariel boatlift. Since 1981, the USCG has interdicted thousands of Haitian migrants with noticeable spikes in 1992 and 1994 over political instability. Finally, DHS granted temporary protected status (TPS) to Haitians in the United States at the time of the earthquake. Standing CONPLANs are in existence in anticipation of migrant operations with USSOUTHCOM and USARSOUTH responsible.

²¹ See USSOUTHCOM OPORD dated 22 January 2010, paragraph 3(b)(3).

²² The original USSOUTHCOM SJFHQ concept was an integrated core HQ with 56 personnel who trained, worked, and deployed as a unit. Thirty-four of the SJFHQ personnel were matrixed out to USSOUTHCOM staff offices to fill holes and maximize steady state effectiveness. While maximizing steady state capability, the matrixed personnel were needed at USSOUTHCOM in a crisis and could not deploy. The remaining 22 SJFHQ personnel deployed to Haiti.

²³ The 1st SOW arrived at Port-a Prince within 28 hours, quickly establishing air traffic control and facilitating the rapid flow of JTF Haiti personnel and equipment as well as initial HA aid.

²⁴ Interview with W.L. "Ike" Clark, Humanitarian Assistance Division Chief, Permanent Party assigned USSOUTHCOM, SC J-7 Stability Directorate; 19 February 2010.

²⁵ MG Allyn served as the Deputy Commander JTF Haiti and JFLCC commander.

²⁶ JPASE provides scalable and expeditionary joint public affairs (JPA) capabilities to support world-wide operational requirements. JPASE is an early entry capability that enables the JFC to gain and maintain the initiative in the information domain

²⁷ JCSE is composed of AC, Reserve and Guard personnel that can globally deploy within hours of notification to provide CS support to CCMDs. JCSE can provide a communication package tailored to the specific needs of a full JTF HQ or Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF), and has the unique ability to solve communications and interoperability problems between Services, coalitions, and host nation partners.

²⁸ Garza, 3 February 2010.

²⁹ DART is a USAID rapid response management team composed of disaster relief specialists who conduct assessments, identify and prioritize needs, manage onsite relief activities, recommend response actions, and coordinate with affected country and other response organizations. The teams are typically deployed after devastating disasters of significant magnitude.

³⁰ The Military Information Support Team (MIST) was a four-person team from the 4th PSYOPS Group (Airborne). The MIST is a rapidly deployable, mission-tailored team trained to use a variety of diverse media platforms including local radio stations, newspapers, and various printed materials to focus attention on particular events. In support of JTF Haiti, they were employed to advance the strategic communications goals and themes discussed elsewhere in the case study.

³¹ The US Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) Joint Enabling Capabilities Command (JECC) employs, manages, and develops USJFCOM Joint Enabling Capabilities (JEC) for Global Response Force execution and emerging operational requirements. When directed, JECC deploys USJFCOM JECs and other requested capabilities in order to provide immediate, short-duration support to establish, organize, and operate a Joint Force HQ. JECC deployed a 12-person team headed by Col. Mark Dewhurst in support of JTF Haiti.

³² JPASE provides scalable and expeditionary joint public affairs (JPA) capabilities to support world-wide operational requirements. JPASE is an early entry capability that enables the JFC to gain and maintain the initiative in the information domain.

³³ Contingency response group (CRG) is responsible for training and rapidly deploying personnel to quickly open airfields in remote locations and extend Air Mobility Command's ability to deploy people and equipment around the globe.

³⁴ Mission Update Brief.

³⁵ Deployable Joint Command and Control (DJC2) is an integrated command and control headquarters system which enables a commander to set up a self-contained, self-powered, computer network-enabled temporary headquarters facility anywhere in the world generally within 6 - 24 hours of arrival at a location.

³⁶ Interview 5 May 2010: LTC(P) Ronald Shun, USJFCOM JECC; served as lead J4 planner for JTF Haiti

³⁷ LTC(P) Ronald Shun

³⁸ The embassy was among the few buildings that were able to withstand the earthquake. The embassy local area network was used to provide initial webmail capability. Proximity to embassy personnel helped JTF Haiti build relationships with the country team and other US relief personnel. These relationships were leveraged to develop connections with international organizations, non-governmental organizations, and private volunteer organizations.

³⁹ The initial communications infrastructure was severely degraded and knowledge of Haitian communications systems was limited. The use of the Embassy MLO office and LAN as well as Blackberries provided an initial communications and web mail capability. XVIII ABC Assault Command Post (ACP), JNN, and Executive Communications set arrived on 17 January, but it was not compatible with DJC2. As the XVIII ABC staff learned about DJC2 capabilities, it became readily apparent that while DJC2 provided the transmission capability for NIPR and SIPR, and Microsoft Exchange, there were tools that XVIII ABC was comfortable with and expected to use in DJC2. The list of requirements that did not come with DJC2 included: Defense Connect Online, MIRC Chat, NX Light, PureEdge, and Approve it. All the requests required adding software and manipulating the network firewall which resulted in many hours of troubleshooting. An important lesson learned was to look beyond the "how many NIPR drops can you support", and clearly understand the services that the users are expecting, especially in the area of collaboration. Also, the DJC2 standup was delayed due to site location and preparation, but its inherent capability was ultimately stretched to provide about 200 workstations.

In the end, communications were greatly facilitated by the unclassified environment.

⁴⁰ The HACC served as the JTFs connective tissue capable of facilitating a Whole of Government relief strategy through collaborative partnerships. The HACC's mandate was to:

- Coordinate, synchronize, track, and assess HA operations.
- Create/maintain humanitarian common operational picture.
- Integrate with all stakeholders IOT develop prioritized list of support requirements.
- Serve as the primary JTF interface with UN, NGO, and Interagency partners.

⁴¹ Unknown UN strategic plans officer (Quote taken from JCOA Haiti Earthquake Study Brief)

⁴² The USG agencies and organizations represented in the JIIC included:

- DOS, USAID, DART
- DOD, JTF Haiti, Combat Camera, IO
- HHS/CDC,
- DHS (Coast Guard, FEMA, ICE, CBP, TSA)


⁴³ Actions taken by JTF Haiti to get its strategic messages out included:

- Using news media embeds with units
- Conducting area circulation with JTF Haiti leadership and news media
- Leveraging Social Media tools like Facebook and Twitter to tell the story
- Synchronizing themes and messages with the Embassy/DoS, USAID and others
- Routinely conducting KLE with the US Ambassador, UN and GoH leadership
- Engaging CODELS
- JTF Haiti staff regularly engaging their GoH and UN counterparts
- Disseminating more than 70,000 radios to the Haitian people


⁴⁴ Interview with LTG Keen, 23 February 2010.

⁴⁵ Garza, 3 February 2010.

US Southern Command Pre-Earthquake (Enterprise)




US Southern Command In-Stride Reorganization



Contingency Force Projection

- The lack of a designated JTF HQ or joint logistics C2 element within the Global Response Force required deployment planning on short notice, adding to an already challenging force flow situation



UNCLASSIFIED

Considerations for Intelligence Support to Large Scale Humanitarian Assistance – Disaster Relief Operations: Observations from Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE

Mr. Robert Hulslander, USA Ret.
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On 12 January 2010, a magnitude 7.0 earthquake that was centered under the capital city of Port-au-Prince, hit the small Caribbean country of Haiti. The massive death toll and destruction of infrastructure was estimated to be the largest to hit the region in over 200 years. The corresponding response by the US Government (USG), and in particular the US military, was likewise the largest contingency deployment for non-combat purposes in recent history. Involving 22,000 personnel, 33 ships, and over 3,300 sorties (including 458 strategic lift), Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE would rely heavily on many traditional military capabilities.

On 13 January, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) issued an execute order (EXORD 2236) authorizing US military humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) operations for Haiti. On 14 January, the Secretary of Defense directed US Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) to stand up Joint Task Force Haiti (JTF-H) and lead the DOD mission within Haiti.

Having just completed a study on the USG's response to the Haiti Earthquake as a member of the Joint Center for Operational Analysis (JCOA) collection team, I decided to draft this "think piece." As previously alluded to, reliance on traditional military capabilities and skill sets is by default associated with any large scale military response, even if used in non-traditional ways or environments. That is not to say that HADR is not a mission for the military. On the contrary, both doctrine and reality make it clear that it is a mission for which the military is the most capable of performing in dire circumstances. It is the adaptation of traditional skills learned for the military's primary *raison-d'etre* that requires consideration. While the subject was not covered in depth in our JCOA study, owing to the necessity to cover a broad expanse of issues, it is nonetheless one that I believe deserves more discussion as it has a number of important implications. The question becomes; how do we apply years of training, specific systems, and processes devoted to applica-

tion in combat to non-combat scenarios? How do we prepare for and make the necessary adjustments that enable us to capitalize on our inherent capabilities, yet allow the adoption of adaptive tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) fitting to the situation at hand?

While those questions could be asked of any facet of military operational art and conduct, this article addresses only a single aspect: traditional intelligence support, when it comes to large scale HADR operations like Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE, must consider a few temporary, albeit important, paradigm shifts in order to successfully support the combatant command (COCOM) and joint task force (JTF). Among these are:

1. Intelligence organizations which traditionally operate in and through a highly classified architecture must be prepared to support operations (with at least the requisite personnel and activities) in totally unclassified environments and support structures.

- Success in HADR lies in the military's ability to partner and support a number of interagency (IA), United Nations (UN), non-governmental (NGO), and private volunteer organizations (PVO). Collaboration between such organizations in HADR can only occur in unclassified environments.
- Analysts will have to access databases (many of which will be on the internet, outside of traditional intelligence architectures) they may be largely unfamiliar with in order to gain situational awareness (SA), develop an appropriate understanding of the lexicon common to this type of operation and organizations involved, and to develop the needed insights that will support analysis. A number of web-sites are sponsored by the US Interagency (USIA), UN, NGOs, and PVOs that are useful for SA on those organizations, their related efforts, and a degree of collaboration. Although not affiliated with particular official organizations, social network sites like Twitter, Facebook, and various blogs can be referenced and used for additional SA. Populations

affected by disasters may rely on these as a critical form of communication between those in the affected area(s) and contacts outside of it.

- In as much as there is at least a partial guide to what uniqueness there may be to developing HADR requirements, counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine provides a good start point. COIN, like HADR, places the population at center stage. As with non-kinetic targeting principles, focusing on the existing humanitarian relief/infrastructure (“nodal”) of the supported nation is a good focus. Examining the “network” of key leaders and the governmental support infrastructure and capabilities is also important. Similar analysis should also focus on humanitarian assistance (HA) and relief providers. While this information will greatly assist the commander and his staff’s decision making process, it ultimately must be shared broadly with all stakeholders who will be collaborating together.
- Dissemination of all manner of information is maximized. This poses a number of challenges and concerns that must be considered. Chief among them is the protection of information. Ultimately, the commander must weigh the potential danger of operating in a totally unclassified environment with the requirement to move rapidly in order to save lives. This decision must be made early on, and the J2/Senior Intelligence Officer (SIO) must be prepared to advise the commander on specific areas of risk vs. reward.
- Minimizing and/or precluding the inadvertent disclosure of military capabilities and USG intentions (for more than just the immediate concerns of the operation) can be mitigated by COCOM and potential JTF J2s (in conjunction with J3 Operations – responsible for operations security (OPSEC)) drafting an annex within a HADR concept plan (CONPLAN) that specifically establishes guidelines for what can and cannot be conveyed in an unclassified and open communications architecture. In unclassified and open operations, like those supporting HADR, we (the USG and military) are an open book and everyone is watching, especially our adversaries. The final piece is ensuring that the staff is well versed (ie, trained) in the appropriate procedures to protect what we must.

2. A combination of traditional intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and non-traditional means of collecting information may be

required to satisfy demand. This also poses a number of challenges and considerations:

- Photo imagery and full motion video platforms, while quite useful in developing SA, has its limitations. Surveys and assessments are critical in the early stages of determining requirements. The amount of destruction to important infrastructure, condition of critical lines of communications (LOC), disposition of internally displaced persons (IDP), topographical, and hydrographic analysis support are all areas that traditional ISR platforms can be used to provide substantial support to planning and operations. However, airborne military ISR platforms are frequently low-density, high-demand assets. Leveraging commercially available sites on the internet (Google Earth satellite imagery for example) and hand-held photography taken by locals at the scene and posted to the internet, may also provide a way to address asset availability shortfalls.
- Dissemination of military asset based imagery also poses a time-consuming challenge. Operating in an unclassified and open environment requires that procedures be established ahead of time that allow maximized sharing of such information and products to any stakeholders in the operation that may need it, and without disclosing capabilities. COCOMs and component foreign disclosure officers (FDO) brought into the planning process early can contribute substantially to this effort.
- Human ISR is critical in the realm of HADR support—since it either confirms or denies on the ground what’s being seen from the air. For instance, while imagery may show a bridge over a gorge on a main LOC as being intact, only an engineer assessment of the bridge’s support structure underneath (not seen by an overhead platform) will be able to make a determination that it can be used to support relief operations, or it must be repaired. Additionally, there are (and will be) elements of information important to determining HADR requirements that cannot be obtained by overhead ISR: availability of host nation medical personnel; status of local hospitals; adequacy of food, water, and shelter; and security of the population in given areas to name a few. Early insertion of military assessment teams (complemented by individuals from key agencies that are likely to be involved—Office of Foreign Disaster Relief (OFDA)/Disaster Assessment Response Team

(DART), US Agency for International Development (USAID), Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), etc., whenever feasible) is important to this undertaking.

- Special operations forces (SOF), with their low visibility, early entry capability, combined with their inherent skill sets, are assets that can contribute significantly to HADR operations. This is especially true in early stages when developing an understanding of needs and requirements. SOF provide commanders with the ability to confirm situations in areas not readily accessible to other forces or organizations. SOF have inherent skill sets that lend themselves to HADR scenarios. For instance, Special Forces 18Ds and Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) paratroopers (PJ) are highly trained and among the best trauma medical technicians and search and rescue experts in the world. Likewise, Special Forces 18Cs are capable engineers that can provide limited, but expedient engineering assessments. Air Force combat control teams can open and run critical HADR aerial ports of debarkation (APOD) with very short notice. Navy sea-air-land (SEAL) teams can conduct hydrographic surveys for potential sea ports of debarkation (SPOD) locations. Complementing these capabilities are SOF civil affairs and psychological operations (PSYOP) teams who bring the ability to tie in with, and help coordinate, joint civil-military relief efforts, strategic communications, and public affairs. Consultation between COCOMs and their respective theater special operations commands (TSOC) for development of a SOF annex for HADR would be good business.

3. Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIR) in these scenarios may more closely resemble something akin to “priority information requirements” and contain information that is both unique and specific to the type of HADR being supported. Regardless, the requirement to identify and develop these with/for the commander early on is still a critical ingredient to success:

- Requirements for information important for the commander’s decision making process will have elements that are fairly common to all HADR operations that can be war-gamed ahead of time and codified in a HADR CONPLAN Intel annex; host nation (HN) medical system and facilities (locations, strengths, shortfalls, etc.); government structure and relative capabilities to support a HADR

(the question may be asked, “up to what degree/level of crisis can the HN adequately support?”); location and adequacy of food and water supplies; presence of USIA, UN, NGOs, and PVOs currently in country that can be leveraged; transportation infrastructure; and, number and types of professional organizations in the HN that can contribute to a HADR response (engineers, sanitation, construction, etc.). Early knowledge of such information will provide the SIO and intelligence staff a foundation to rapidly develop PIR for the commander’s approval at the onset of a crisis, and greatly facilitates the staff crisis action planning (CAP) process. PIR should focus on helping the commander determine both the scale (size/scope) and adequacy (what type of capabilities will be needed) of the response. Most common information requirements will relate to HN capabilities to respond to the crisis. These should be prioritized by how long it will take the HN to respond, and to what degree.

It is this delta between what the HN can provide and when that will have to be planned for by the COCOM, resourced by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Services, and Components, and then ultimately delivered to the joint operations area (JOA).

- In developing PIRs for a HADR, there are key members of the COCOM staff that the SIO will want to collaborate with. Most notable are staff principals that are most closely related to the requirements for a HADR: The J4 Logistics Directorate (HADR is typically logistics heavy endeavors); the J6 Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Systems Directorate (the communications architecture may have to rely on commercial, vice military systems); the Staff Engineer, or the senior most Army Combat Engineer, or SEABEE (engineer assessments on existing capabilities in the country of question, and what will be needed to support disaster relief, reconstruction, and supply throughput will be in great demand early on); and the Staff Surgeon (aside from logistics, medical and health issues/capabilities within the HN are frequently of greatest concern). Also, the geographic location of the HN (Is it land locked? Is it a maritime location?) may determine the preponderance of the type forces involved. The Navy or Marines may, for instance, have particular information require-

ments (or insights) for HADR operations in a maritime location around which PIR should be developed to support the operation. The JTF for a maritime location may actually be a JTF “afloat.” The SIO should be prepared to seek out senior operations officers and/or other appropriate personnel from the Services and USG as appropriate in developing PIR.

- With progression of the HADR operation, PIR should change (it is a dynamic process driven by the commander’s needs) corresponding to plan phase changes, or changes in lines of operation (LOO). Typically, answers to PIR are, at least in part, disseminated through daily intelligence summaries (INTSUM) reviewed by the staff and components. In a HADR that works in an unclassified environment, INTSUMs may need to become “information summaries” or, INFOSUMs. While they provide information in a manner similar to that of an INTSUM, the INFOSUM answers key questions and provides assessments of things that affect the objectives of the JTF and those diverse organizations with whom they are collaborating. To be as comprehensive and broadly meaningful to all stakeholders as possible, it should include valid/applicable reports and observations from those same organizations that the JTF and USG are partnering with, as well as those of the HN government.
- While PIR in support of a HADR are focused largely on answers to questions that can be (and must be) discussed broadly and openly, we cannot forget that even when we embark on operations for purely altruistic and humanitarian purposes we have antagonists and adversaries out there. The response of some will be benign. Others may attempt to interfere, or harm our forces, while still others may simply look for opportunities to paint the US in a bad light. Such possibilities will be the subject of PIR, even in a HADR, that will remain classified accordingly. Issues of force protection are straight forward. However, the answer to confronting adverse propaganda as we undertake HADR operations is to develop PIR that anticipate adversarial reaction to, and criticism of, our efforts. It is of great importance that the SIO coordinate closely with strategic communications and the Public Affairs Office to ensure that the right themes and messages are developed to protect our people, inspire our allies and friends, and promote a positive, enduring image.

About the Author:

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Imposing Order on Chaos: Establishing JTF Headquarters

Dr. Mark D. Mandeles
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Editor's note: *This is an abridged version of a case study prepared by the Joint Center for Operational Analysis (JCOA) for use by joint and Service military education institutions. It was conceived to allow instructors and students to examine the formation of a joint task force headquarters (JTF HQ) from several perspectives and levels of analysis.*

Introduction

Following World War II, the joint task force (JTF) emerged as an organizational means to control joint forces. From their inception, JTFs have often been ad hoc and usually established during a crisis. They are often employed when the cost of failure is very high. These JTF characteristics—"ad hoc" and "consequential"—make JTF stand-up and effectiveness worth examining.

The Standing Joint Force Headquarters (SJFHQ) concept addressed how to quickly and effectively stand-up a JTF to respond to contingencies. The history of the SJFHQ concept shows the continuing tradeoff between assigning adequate numbers of people and resources to prepare for unknowable future crises and the efficient employment of public funds to accomplish tasks that are more easily predicted.

This case study compares and contrasts efforts to stand-up the International Security Force Assistance (ISAF) Joint Command (IJC) in Kabul, Afghanistan, and JTF-Haiti (JTF-H) in Port-au-Prince. The establishment of these JTFs was compounded by uncertainty, ambiguous and imperfect information concerning mission and scope, and in-stride formation while people converged from different commands. We examine each of these JTFs and then discuss the four common themes evidenced during our study: trusted agents, ad hoc structures, flexible human intelligence, and logics of action.

Standing-up ISAF Joint Command Headquarters

Political Context. On 27 March 2009, President Obama announced his strategic goal of disrupting, dismantling, and defeating extremists in Afghanistan.¹ Shortly thereafter, on 11 May 2009, Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates announced that he had recommended to President Obama that GEN Stanley A. McChrystal be appointed the senior American military commander in Afghanistan, and that LTG David M. Rodriguez be appointed to a new position as deputy commander of US Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A), with responsibility for the day-to-day management of the Afghanistan counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign. Gates praised McChrystal and Rodriguez for their "unique skill set in counterinsurgency," and told the assembled journalists, "We have a new strategy, a new mission, and a new ambassador. I believe that new military leadership is also needed."²

Key to the new strategy was the establishment of the IJC, a "corps-like headquarters" situated organizationally between ISAF and the regional commands (RC). On 4 August 2009, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) approved the command structure reorganization, establishing the IJC and making its commander LTG Rodriguez.³ The IJC was to conduct the "full spectrum of COIN operations and stability operations in support of COMISAF's campaign plan," thus freeing ISAF to focus on its strategic and theater issues, including its partnership with the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan.⁴

Initial Considerations. In May 2009, prior to the stand-up of the IJC, LTG Rodriguez faced a broad and daunting problem without clear and formal authority. As GEN McChrystal's deputy, he had to establish daily operational command and control of the largely autonomous ISAF RCs to implement the COIN strategy; GEN McChrystal's ability to devote more of his attention to strategic issues depended upon LTG Rodriguez's success. Command and control over the RCs became Rodriguez's priority function,⁵ which he conducted via "battlefield circulation," (i.e., visits to RCs to talk with subordinate commanders and staffs

about COIN doctrine, policies, and operations). To a casual observer, battlefield circulation was simple; Rodriguez only needed radios and transportation to conduct battlefield circulation.⁶ However, it consumed a lot of time and demanded a great deal of intellectual preparation and concentration. In addition to visits to the RCs, Rodriguez distributed post-meeting minutes to attendees and others, and initiated a process to quickly answer questions posed by RC commanders and staffs.⁷

Beside his priority of establishing command and control over the RCs, LTG Rodriguez's second priority was standing-up a headquarters—a task complicated by multifaceted bureaucratic constraints and sensitivities inherent in a multinational organization. Personnel shortfalls had to be reconciled with two manning documents: the US Joint Manning Document and the NATO Crisis Establishment document. Attention to these two documents was especially important given the time required for additional authorized personnel to arrive in theater. Rodriguez also had to determine where to assign NATO flag officers, devise organizational structures and processes, build and outfit communications and office infrastructure, and create and distribute standard operating procedures (SOP) and orders.

In May 2009, US Joint Forces Command's (USJFCOM) deputy commander, VADM Robert S. Harward, visited USFOR-A in Kabul and used the occasion to talk with GEN McChrystal and LTG Rodriguez about solutions to the key operational and organizational problems they faced. From this meeting and ensuing discussions, the idea of tasking USJFCOM's Joint Enabling Capabilities Command (JECC) to help stand-up the IJC was born. A member of the USJFCOM forward support element (FSE) facilitated the dialogue and prepared the letter requesting forces.⁸

The problems of conceiving the shape and structure, composition, and relationships for the not-yet established IJC HQ—and then implementing that conception—were matters for which Rodriguez would need a great deal of help from many people. Proposing models of IJC staff organization and developing staff processes would be handled by JECC personnel who would deploy to Kabul in August—three months later.⁹

JECC Deploys to Kabul. The first official US Central Command (USCENTCOM) Request for Forces (RFF) to the Joint Staff was dated 24 June 2009, but the RFF did not include a request for assistance from JECC.¹⁰ In mid-July, LTG David Rodriguez sent a personal

letter to USJFCOM requesting JECC support. JECC began to coordinate with IJC staff to identify the support required and to determine the appropriate composition of its 25-person joint deployable team (JDT). A modification to the USCENTCOM RFF on 12 August 2009 requested JECC to “bridge key billets” in current and future operations, fires, assessments, planning, and knowledge management.

On 19 August, an advanced echelon (ADVON) party of four JECC personnel departed Suffolk, Virginia for Afghanistan. The ADVON arrived in Kabul on 21 August and embedded with the IJC staff. The four-person ADVON team quickly determined that the IJC staff's immediate requirements included the development and provision of a training plan for the incoming V Corps personnel who would form the backbone of the combined joint operations center (CJOC).

The 21-person JDT main body arrived in Kabul on 29 August and was detailed to Camp HQ ISAF, the New Kabul Compound, and North Kabul Area International Airport (NKAIA). Placing the JDT personnel in three separate locations fostered partnerships with IJC staff, but hindered intra-team communication. By 1 September, the JDT had further divided into roughly three groups: plans, operations, and knowledge management, and was fully engaged in working with Afghan, ISAF, and NATO partners.¹¹ The JDT would not be reunited as a single team until the IJC HQ's 12 November ceremony marking its full operational capability.

JDT Plans Group. The JDT assigned two planners to ISAF HQ CJ5. These JDT planners assumed leadership roles and contributed to initiatives concerning the 2010 Afghan parliamentary and district elections, strategy for the use of private security companies, and development of Afghan infrastructure. Other JDT planners worked on the development of the IJC Implementation Operations Order (OPORD). To develop staff planning estimates, JDT planners consulted the NATO *Guidance for Operational Planning* and US Army Field Manual 5.0; led working groups on operations, logistics, Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), training, and governance and development; conducted research; and worked with senior planners at the US Embassy, US Agency for International Development (USAID), United Nations (UN) Assistance Mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA), and the Afghan Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Interior, and Directorate of National Security. The estimates produced were used to develop the IJC common operating picture, and to

enable additional planning. Other groups of planners developed a force expansion order and analyzed the campaign plan through 2014.

JDT Operations Group. Some JECC personnel, including the JDT lead, had participated in the AUSTERE CHALLENGE exercise with V Corps conducted about three months before the mission to stand-up IJC began. JECC personnel were collocated at NKAIA with the V Corps personnel designated to form the core of the CJOC. As the JDT lead recalled, “I built a lot of relationships with people from V Corps who actually deployed to do this mission. So, right off the bat, we had a trust-based relationship, which was critical in getting the IJC stood-up.”¹²

The JDT Operations Group’s first tasks were to develop the individual training plan for incoming personnel and guide V Corps personnel through the new training programs. JECC personnel also filled key billets on the CJOC floor from the time of the mission rehearsal exercise through the stand-up of the IJC.

JECC personnel established trusted agent relationships with V Corps personnel. The JECC main body arrived in Kabul only three days before V Corps, but that period was sufficient to provide JECC personnel greater familiarity with the setting at NKAIA.¹³ Consequently, JECC personnel guided V Corps through the reception and integration process, and scheduled briefings and classes on Afghanistan and NATO-unique collaborative information systems. The support JDT provided V Corps on arrival at NKAIA translated into credibility for JDT as trainers and advisers through the achievement of full operational capability in November.

JDT Knowledge Management Group. Among other tasks, the JDT’s knowledge management (KM) experts supported the office of the IJC Director of Staff (DOS). In early September 2009, the DOS office was undermanned, the staff lacked experience operating within a NATO organization, and the British general officer assigned to the position had not yet arrived. JDT personnel assisted in addressing all DOS responsibilities by acquiring relevant NATO documentation, tracking ISAF and IJC SOPs, and assisting the establishment of the DOS office’s processes and procedures.

JDT’s KM experts faced three primary challenges. First, they had to create processes to implement LTG Rodriguez’s vision of a flat, collaborative information environment. This task involved developing a unique operational-level KM enterprise architecture

which allowed the DOS to manage staff functions and processes in order to build and to sustain knowledge despite high staff turnover rates.¹⁴

Second, in addition to their work for IJC and the office of IJC DOS, the KM experts’ talents and skills were requested by ISAF HQ, RC South HQ, and the emerging CJTF 435 HQ. The KM experts were in high demand and often spread thin.

Exacerbating this, the third challenge involved a delay in the arrival of permanently assigned personnel with KM skills and experience. The JDT KM personnel mitigated some of that demand for KM-trained people with their presence, while also working to coordinate KM contractor support to ISAF. Eventually, however, the JDT KM experts had to extend their tour in Kabul for another 90 days while a permanent personnel solution was developed.

JDT’s KM experts established the protocol and linguist support services despite administrative challenges posed by the NATO manning document, *Crisis Establishment (CE)*. The operative *CE* did not account for linguist-translation services or information technology equipment to support IJC, and if the *CE* did not specify a requirement, NATO would not provide the function or capability. JDT KM personnel worked outside NATO channels to obtain five linguists within the first week of operation and an additional eighteen linguists and nine top secret-cleared contractors so that essential IJC missions could be executed while the *CE* document was being revised.

After Action. The IJC achieved initial operational capability (IOC) on 12 October 2009 and full operational capability (FOC) on 12 November 2009, on schedule with the timeline set several months before by LTG Rodriguez. In early December, GEN McChrystal predicted that the IJC would “orchestrate this fight much better than we have done before or was the habit before.” In written testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee, McChrystal added that between May and December 2009, “We have been implementing organizational and operational changes that are already reflecting improvements in our effectiveness.”¹⁵

In standing-up the IJC HQ, the characteristics of the JECC personnel—more than JECC’s doctrine, lessons learned, and playbooks—enabled success. Their intelligence, dedication to the mission, willingness to work hard for long hours in austere conditions, eagerness to tackle unfamiliar tasks, and ability to apply and

adapt experiences to situations encountered were key elements of this success.

In the context of multiple challenges, the scope of JECC's attention and achievements in support of standing-up the IJC HQ was notable.¹⁶ In a few short months, JECC personnel:

- Developed initial in-country training for US Army V Corps
- Conducted ISAF force expansion planning
- Developed the “transfer of lead security responsibility” document
- Prepared the IJC mission rehearsal exercise prior to IOC
- Developed the IJC staff operating model, process, and battle rhythm
- Developed training for ISAF and IJC key leaders
- Stood-up the CJOC
- Developed the KM plan
- Developed campaign assessments
- Conducted focused planning for regional commands
- Established IJC command and control
- Planned for the 2009 Hajj
- Planned for the Afghan presidential run-off election
- Planned for the Afghan presidential inauguration
- Planned for the Afghan parliamentary and district elections
- Developed an ISAF private security company strategy

Standing-up JTF-Haiti¹⁷

We will now take a look at the stand-up of JTF-Haiti and the ways in which the Department of Defense (DOD) attempted to impose order on chaos. Although the environment was very different from that faced in Kabul, common themes of trusted agents, ad hoc structures, flexible human intelligence, and logics of action were evidenced.

The Earthquake. In the late afternoon of 12 January 2010, a magnitude 7.0 earthquake devastated the Haitian capital city of Port-au-Prince. The death toll was estimated at about 230,000 within the zone of moderate to heavy earthquake damage.¹⁸ Thirteen of fifteen government ministries were destroyed, and many government employees died. The building housing the United Nations Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) headquarters also collapsed, killing many UN staff

members, including the Head of Mission and his principal deputy, and trapping others.¹⁹ During the first hours after the earthquake, AMB Kenneth H. Merten, US Ambassador to Haiti, issued a disaster declaration, the government of Haiti requested US assistance, and US Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) began mission analysis of the ways in which it might support the request. On 13 January, President Obama directed DOD support to Haiti and designated USAID as the lead federal agency to coordinate all US government actions. Following President Obama's direction, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) issued an execute order (EXORD 2236) to authorize US military humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR). USSOUTHCOM, in support of USAID, began detailed crisis action planning.

USSOUTHCOM's Organizational Context. In 2008, USSOUTHCOM reorganized itself, aligning its organizational structures with its theater security cooperation mission. The reorganization replaced the typical combatant command “J-code” structure with functionally organized directorates. Codified in January 2009, the USSOUTHCOM reorganization aligned its structures and efforts with those of other US government agencies, nongovernmental agencies (NGO), and multinational and private organizations.

Although USSOUTHCOM had completed a plan in January 2006 to respond to HADR emergencies, the plan had not been updated to reflect the new functional directorates. Additionally, although well-practiced in HADR missions across a range of disasters, USSOUTHCOM had not yet developed a standing concept of operations (CONOP) or operation plan (OPLAN) using time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD) to conduct force flow planning in the event of such an emergency.

Selecting JTF-H's Commander and Core Organizational Element. On 12 January, LTG Ken Keen, USSOUTHCOM's Deputy Commander, was visiting AMB Merten at his residence in Port-au-Prince when the earthquake occurred. Shortly afterward, LTG Keen met with members of the Haitian government and the US Ambassador. LTG Keen's presence in Haiti, coupled with his extensive experience in the area, were the primary reasons USSOUTHCOM selected him to lead JTF-H. An additional factor supporting his appointment was his professional relationship and personal friendship of 26 years with Brazilian Maj Gen Floriano Peixoto Vieira Neto, MINUSTAH's military commander.²⁰

With LTG Keen's appointment, JTF-H had a commander, but an organizational element had not yet been identified. Keen considered three alternative courses of action to establish JTF-H. The first option was to task one of USSOUTHCOM's four subordinate Service component commands (US Army South [ARSOUTH], 2nd Fleet, II MEF, or 12th Air Force) to form the JTF. The second option was to name USSOUTHCOM's SJFHQ the JTF-H. The third option was to identify a "JTF capable" organization external to USSOUTHCOM.

Early in these deliberations, LTG Keen decided that JTF-H should be stationed on land as a visible means of reassurance to Haitians that help was being organized, and to facilitate easier coordination with the US Embassy, government of Haiti, the UN, and various NGOs. This decision focused attention on ARSOUTH and II MEF; however, due to a commitment to USCENCOM, II MEF was unavailable.

Meanwhile, Joint Staff and USSOUTHCOM staff began to consider options to prevent mass migration of Haitians. Standing contingency plans assigned ARSOUTH as the responder to migrant operations. The Joint Staff tasked USSOUTHCOM to prepare for migrant operations, and USSOUTHCOM then designated ARSOUTH as JTF-Migrant Operations (or JTF-MIGOPS). ARSOUTH was given the initial task of deploying to US Naval Station Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, to coordinate and conduct migrant support operations if required. Since ARSOUTH was now committed as JTF-MIGOPS, USSOUTHCOM looked to its own SJFHQ element to form JTF-H's core element.

On 13 January, 20 USSOUTHCOM SJFHQ personnel arrived in Port-au-Prince. Of the 56 people in USSOUTHCOM's SJFHQ who had trained and worked to deploy as a unit, 34 could not deploy because they had been assigned to other USSOUTHCOM staff offices to maintain steady-state operations. Consequently, the SJFHQ did not have sufficient manning to form the core JTF staff, facilitate coordination with the Haitian government, the US Embassy, USAID, MINUSTAH, and NGOs, or to reassure the population that relief would soon be available. General Douglas Fraser, USSOUTHCOM Commander, called the Chairman of the JCS to request a unit to form the core of a JTF. The Chairman brought the issue to the "Tank" for discussion, and it was decided to use XVIII Airborne Corps (ABC). The XVIII ABC provided USSOUTHCOM a ready alternative to its undermanned SJFHQ. Equally important to assigning XVIII ABC the task of standing-up JTF-H was a telephone conversation between two

long-time friends: LTG Frank Helmick, XVIII ABC Commander, and LTG Keen. LTG Helmick offered to support the effort and LTG Keen accepted.

USSOUTHCOM, the *de facto* JTF until the arrival of XVIII ABC, faced immediate personnel shortfalls. GEN Fraser requested people from the Joint Staff and other combatant commands. Augmentee support to USSOUTHCOM from USNORTHCOM, USPACOM, USJFCOM, USEUCOM, USTRANSCOM, and the Services eventually totaled more than 500 people.²¹

Within 24 hours of the earthquake, 3 general officers and 34 action officers from USNORTHCOM arrived at USSOUTHCOM in Miami. These people and other arriving augmentees were accustomed to operating within a J-code or Army G-code organizational structure. For all intents and purposes, the USSOUTHCOM functional directorate organization presented the drawbacks of an ad hoc structure to the augmentees:

- Unknown roles and relationships between people and offices
- Little knowledge about the skills and competencies of people in the functional directorates
- Lack of knowledge and familiarity with the functional directorates' routines
- Lack of knowledge about coordination processes, procedures, and points of contact between USSOUTHCOM directorates and organizations and those outside USSOUTHCOM

The USSOUTHCOM staff tried over a period of five days to socialize augmentees to the USSOUTHCOM organizational structure. It became apparent that the augmentees' difficulties in operating, coordinating, and moving information within functional directorates created obstacles to executing high-tempo and high-consequence tasks. As a result, GEN Fraser directed the staff to reorganize to the J-code structure. BGEN David Garza, USSOUTHCOM Chief of Staff, observed:

The in-stride decision by GEN Fraser to re-align to a J-code structure was the pivotal decision for USSOUTHCOM. This decision allowed us to quickly organize around a well-understood organizational methodology designed for coordinated planning across essential planning functions necessary for any event on the spectrum of conflict. This alignment gave us the ability to speak a common language, quickly facilitate the infusion of staff augments, employ [operational planning teams] efficiently, communicate better internally

and with external stakeholders like the Joint Staff, Components, JTFs, JTF-Haiti, and other partner nations, agencies, and the interagency. It also had the effect of invigorating the work force, and it gave us better teamwork in support of this crisis. The model we were under did not survive the crucible of the crisis.²²

Initial force flow planning was also complicated by the urgency of organizing quickly to respond to a developing HADR crisis, the absence of a designated JTF HQ, and the lack of a joint logistics command and control capability within the Global Response Force. Elements required for JTF-H, such as engineering, civil affairs, psychological operations (PSYOP), public affairs, and medical were not immediately prepared to respond to this contingency.

On 14 January, JTF-H was established by vocal order; a formal written order was published a short time later. The next day, the XVIII ABC Assault Command Post (ACP) was in Haiti. The ACP had a trained headquarters staff capable of fulfilling the functions of JTF-H. On 16 January, a USJFCOM JECC contingent arrived in Haiti, providing current operations, future operations, and logistics planners to supplement and enhance the capabilities of the XVIII ABC ACP. In addition to planners, the JECC package included the Joint Public Affairs Support Element (JPASE) with media specialists and production capability and the Joint Communications Support Element (JCSE) with communications equipment and personnel.

The US Embassy was one of the few governmental buildings in Port-au-Prince that survived the earthquake. JTF-H personnel gathered at the Embassy, which provided space, initial communications, and a convenient location in which JTF-H and other US relief personnel could work.

Earthquake damage to Haiti's communications infrastructure limited and hindered collaboration and coordination. The Embassy local area network and Blackberry devices provided initial webmail capability for the US HADR team, but the size of the relief effort soon outstripped the Embassy's capability. The JCSE aided communications with the Deployable Joint Command and Control (DJC2) suite, which provided access to about 200 workstations, as well as other "workarounds." Providing communications, however, was complicated by two factors. A site not subject to flooding and suitable for construction of a platform had to be located, and DJC2 was incompatible with XVIII ABC ACP's

Executive Communications set, which arrived on 17 January. DJC2 provided transmission capability for Nonsecure Internet Protocol Router Network (NIPR), SECRET Internet Protocol Router network (SIPR), and Microsoft Exchange, but was incompatible with the ACP's tools, including Defense Connect Online (DCO), MIRC, NX Light, and PureEdge. Requests to add software and to manipulate firewalls in DJC2 led to many hours of troubleshooting.

Comparing JTF HQ Stand-ups

Four common themes were evident in the successful stand-up of JTF-H and IJC HQ: trusted agents, ad hoc structures, flexible human intelligence, and logics of action. A brief discussion of each follows:

Trusted agents. The reciprocal link between trust and outcomes illustrates the dependence of formal structures and processes on personal relationships and rapport.²³ Center for Naval Analyses analysts documented difficulties of developing cohesive JTF HQ staffs when crisis action planning cells were augmented by people unknown to the people on the scene.²⁴ Trust and personal relationships have often been cited as force multipliers.²⁵

GEN McChrystal, VADM Harward, and LTG Rodriguez were long-time friends and special operations colleagues, and these relationships facilitated close and effective working interaction. GEN McChrystal viewed trusted and talented agents as a key factor enabling success. In a 9 August 2009 email to GEN David H. Petraeus, McChrystal declared "I believe we have a shortage of the right talent—they have simply not been assigned here. This is not a new challenge ... I firmly believe that it will be the talent of the organization which will help us win this war. ... I plan to personally review/accept all COLs and GOs [general officers] coming into theater." Ten days later, ADM Michael Mullen, Chairman of the JCS, said "I have taken my best people and given them to McChrystal. He literally has an open book or a blank check to get the best people that we have there on the military side, because this is the top priority."²⁶ LTG Rodriguez made several "by-name" requests for help in re-forming the command and control relationship with the RCs and in standing-up IJC. Commanders at lower echelons in Afghanistan also relied on people with whom they had personal relationships to increase the likelihood that HQ formal structures would function effectively.

Trusted agents also were instrumental in coordinating actions while the JTF-Haiti was being formed. The trusted agent relationship between LTG Helmick and LTG Keen facilitated the use of XVIII ABC's ACP as the core of JTF-H, and the friendship between Keen and Helmick was analogous to that of McChrystal and Rodriguez.

Additionally, LTG Keen was a long-time friend of Maj Gen Floriano Peixoto, Commander of MINUSTAH. Their paths had crossed many times since the mid-1980s, and they had developed and continued their friendship through letters, email, and phone calls.²⁷ Although Maj Gen Floriano Peixoto was not in Haiti when the earthquake occurred, he returned to Haiti on 13 January and quickly established an emergency operations center at the MINUSTAH logistics base at the Port-au-Prince Airport. On 14 January, LTG Keen made an unannounced visit to the MINUSTAH temporary headquarters to exchange information on the relief efforts and the pending arrival of US military forces. Florian Peixoto was meeting with Brazilian Minister of Defense (Ministério da Defesa) Nelson Jobim and the Brazilian contingent to MINUSTAH. Keen was invited to join the meeting, which led to a "hand-shake" agreement on the coordination of roles and responsibilities. MINUSTAH's mission would continue to be providing security and stability. JTF-H would provide humanitarian assistance, and US military personnel would conduct security tasks only while conducting humanitarian assistance. Keen and Floriano Peixoto later agreed to combine forces whenever possible.

The 14 January discussion set conditions for combined operations, including "coordinated shared sectors, administered distribution points for food, and ... other humanitarian assistance." Liaison officers were exchanged between each headquarters, along with contact information for all branch and service chiefs, senior aides, and advisors. Neither Keen nor Floriano Peixoto needed "a signed document that articulated each partner's role. A statement of principles was later developed, but only to provide organizations outside the participating military forces an explanation of how MINUSTAH and JTF-H worked together."²⁸

Not all trusted agents were long-time friends or colleagues. Some trusted agents were, in a sense, handed off by one trusted agent to another. The Chairman of the JCS, Admiral Mullen, sent his public affairs officer (PAO) to help LTG Keen shortly after the earthquake because Mullen recognized the importance of public

affairs in establishing expectations and requirements, and wanted to ensure that a skilled person was present. As Keen recalled, "For the first few days of the crisis, the guy that was most valuable to me was the Chairman's PAO—he was with me all the time."

The hand-off of trusted agents extended to units, too. As GEN Fraser remarked, the "outstanding personal and professional relationship" between LTG Keen and Maj Gen Floriano Peixoto "permeated all levels of interaction and engagement" between MINUSTAH and JTF-H, "alleviating many of the potential frictions that could arise from two parallel military command structures operating in the same vicinity."²⁹ At the tactical unit level, MINUSTAH and JTF-H units developed the same type of "trusted agent" relationship as did JECC and in-coming V Corps staff in Kabul. The knowledge and experience MINUSTAH units possessed about Haiti put them in position to help newly arriving paratroopers understand the operating environment and gain situational awareness.³⁰

Ad hoc structures, processes, and procedures. Ad hoc structures and processes lack the main resources of established organizations: known contacts, roles, and stable relationships between people and offices; the knowledge people possess to apply organizational routines to their tasks; and procedures people use to pass information and knowledge to others. In ad hoc organizations and processes, people have to learn how to execute assigned tasks, and how to work within and between organizations. Standing-up JTF-Haiti and IJC HQ involved the impromptu and improvised creation of structures and processes, and people relied on old and new personal relationships to overcome challenges while structures and processes were being formalized.

Two weeks after the Haitian earthquake, JTF-H still did not have processes in place to match relief needs with arriving supplies. Force flow was ad hoc and based on verbal orders; supporting commands did not communicate adequately with each other about what forces and materiel were transported to Haiti. Ad hoc organization of logistics resulted in speedy, but uncoordinated sequencing of units and equipment. The reliance on verbal orders deprived supporting and supported commands of an audit trail and limited force flow planning and tracking. JTF-H planners did not know "what they had, where it was, and what was coming." As a result, JTF-H used "whatever showed up at the airfield from well-meaning contributors."

To reduce the impact of improvisation on meeting tactical needs, the JTF stood-up a Joint Logistics Operations Center on 24 January. Its force flow working group (FFWG), composed of J3 and J4 personnel, met daily to coordinate arrival and distribution of supplies, develop more accurate requirements, and provide assessments to LTG Keen of the growing capacity to match damage assessments to required resources. The FFWG was one of several ad hoc structures and processes created to impose order as organizational oversight transitioned from USSOUTHCOM to JTF-H.

There was a similar reliance on ad hoc structures, processes, and procedures in standing-up IJC HQ, and in establishing command and control relationships between IJC and the RCs. JECC team members recalled the difficulty of operating in a NATO command without NATO staff officer qualifications or experience, and without standard operating procedures.³¹

The fluidity of ad hoc structures and processes posed difficult challenges for coordination. Personnel coming into IJC from ISAF did not know what to do, what rules and procedures to use to accomplish tasks, and with whom they should work. Standing-up IJC was made more difficult by the absence of a common understanding of the situation and tasks to guide action.

Americans had to make an effort to learn how to apply NATO organizational routines. One JECC team member noted, “I wish I had understood what NATO was a little bit better than I did. The understanding of what they do ... took several days ramping up just trying to read documents on SOPs and how ISAF actually operates or NATO actually operates.”³² In this environment of improvisation, even some NATO officers did not know how to apply organizational routines.³³

Senior leaders in IJC and JTF-H appreciated the necessity of transforming ad hoc structures, processes, and procedures into deliberate and planned structures, processes, and procedures. GEN Fraser gambled with the risks of increasing confusion and disorganization—in the midst of a HADR crisis—by re-introducing a J-code structure to replace USSOUTHCOM’s existing functional organization. In this case, GEN Fraser’s decision did not meet the kind of resistance to functional organization encountered at IJC, because, for incoming staff and general officer augmentees, the J-code structure was “a well-understood organizational methodology designed for coordinated planning across essential planning functions, [which] gave us the ability to speak

a common language, ... facilitate the infusion of staff augmentees, [and] employ [operational planning teams] efficiently.” In IJC, the DOS “enthusiastically” supported the formalization of processes to enable commanders’ understanding of “exactly what processes they are performing, how they are performing ... and measuring them for efficiency.”

Flexible human intelligence. Mathematician John von Neumann, a participant in and observer of official high-level World War II strategic discussions, called “the flexible type of human intelligence” “the most powerful weapon of all,” greater even than atomic weapons on the conduct of war.³⁴ Von Neumann’s view was echoed by an unnamed field-grade officer serving in Iraq: “The most high-tech weapons in the US military reside in the ‘brain housing group’ of soldiers and Marines.”³⁵ More recently, GEN Raymond Odierno captured the essence of “flexible intelligence” when he stated, “My point is that we cannot, nor should we, try to prepare our leaders for every possible scenario they may face. But as experience in Iraq and elsewhere has shown, what we absolutely must do is train our leaders how to think, how to adapt, and how to succeed amidst uncertainty. ... Our nation has always—and will always—need adaptive, creative, and agile leaders who can excel in ambiguity.”³⁶

Flexible intelligence refers to an individual’s ability to solve problems—especially when the problems do not mesh with anticipated scenarios, tasks, processes, and tools—and was a key factor in successful efforts to establish the IJC and JTF-Haiti. As an example, the 720th Special Operations Group combat controllers were on the ground in Haiti only 26 hours after the earthquake. The Port-au-Prince airport had no power and a structurally damaged control tower. GEN Fraser noted that these battlefield airmen didn’t have radar, but they worked all day, all night, and in all weather conditions. Within 72 hours, they increased airport operations from no inbound traffic to 60 flights a day, approximately three times the pre-earthquake normal capacity. They quickly established air traffic control, and began to facilitate the flow of people, equipment, and aid into Haiti. JTF-H personnel worked with Haitian aviation administration officials to establish the Haiti Flight Operations Coordination Center, which constructed a phone-based, and then a web-based system, to schedule flights.³⁷ The leaders of JCSE’s USSOUTHCOM detachment “were superb in handling the myriad requirements from a very demanding customer under extremely difficult circumstances which

were made worse by no clear guidance on the roles and responsibilities.”³⁸

Flexible human intelligence enabled the development of situational awareness following the earthquake when the extent and severity of damage were unknown. Effective planning and efficient delivery and distribution of supplies and manpower depended upon accurate description and assessment of damage; however, there were many challenges to developing damage assessments. Adequate numbers of Government of Haiti, Haitian National Police, and MINUSTAH personnel who could aid and guide assessments on the ground were unavailable. They were shocked and disoriented, and needed time to begin working at a high level again. The roads were impassable except by motorcycle and foot, which increased the physical challenges of moving on the ground to survey and assess destruction. Communication services were damaged—electric power grid, radio, and land-line and cellular telephones worked sporadically. Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) systems and platforms provided invaluable information for planning and assessment, and USSOUTHCOM staff supplemented military ISR systems with commercial satellite and Internet-based map display tools. Google satellite imagery was updated very quickly, and Google imagery and maps were used by units to create graphic and interactive common operational pictures.³⁹

In Kabul, austere physical conditions and immature infrastructure posed difficulties comparable to those encountered in Haiti. In addition to environmental constraints, JECC team members had no prior experience in standing-up a 3-star JTF, and most had not read or used official SJFHQ doctrine—Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM) 5125.01A. Yet, they figured out what to do, and their exercise of “flexible human intelligence” was crucial to being able to meet unknown and unanticipated requirements.

Logics of Action. The activities and tasks performed in any single organization are not specified in advance of action, except in a very general manner. Spelling out the detail of actions and tasks is complicated by the degree to which environmental stimuli—such as information or events outside the organization—initiate or limit action. Standard operating procedures guide who does what, why, where, when, and how. In stable environments, SOPs are tools that (a) increase likelihood of intelligent response to a class of problems by applying deliberate thought and analysis to align means

with ends; and (b) free people from the necessity of developing individual courses of action for common problems.

“The military doesn’t do messy,” observed ADM Michael Mullen, Chairman of the JCS.⁴⁰ Yet, in reality, the military frequently is called to *respond* to “messy.” Even a cursory look at US military HADR operations, standing-up JTF HQs in a combat zone, or conducting counterinsurgency (COIN) campaigns reveals this to be true. The almost inevitable assignment of messy problems to the military underlies the need to describe and understand how people establish new JTF HQs in uncertain, chaotic, austere, and stressful conditions.

The primary approach employed to prepare people to act in uncertain conditions is to teach or train them to use analytic techniques. The assumptions underlying this pedagogical strategy are that action follows choice, and choice is an outcome of analysis, calculation, and assessment.⁴¹ Basing consequential choices and actions on analysis is a feature of Western civilization. When people and organizations prepare to make decisions and choices, the default approach is to identify, lay out, compare and analyze the options.

But, people and organizations also act by using rules-based logic, such as SOPs or doctrine. In doing so, they act by matching an appropriate action to a recognized situation. A JECC officer recalled a discussion with a NATO officer that captured the attraction of procedures and processes in a rules-based logic of action: “He said, ‘It doesn’t matter what we do over here. We have procedures.’”⁴²

On the one hand, it may not always be clear which rules are appropriate or apply to a particular situation, and rules-based action can lead to foolishness. On the other hand, intelligent organizational and individual action depends on the development of rules through analysis of goals, options, and experience.⁴³ People used rules- and calculation-based logics in standing-up IJC HQ and JTF-Haiti. However, as they began to understand the extent and numbers of uncertainties they faced, the basis for action changed from one of matching a situation to a course of action to one of searching for information and calculating a proper action. People adjusted workload and tools to conditions; made efforts to relate means to the mission; used trusted agents to share information, collaborate, coordinate, and assess; and created ad hoc structures, processes, and procedures to accomplish tasks. People were able to rely increasingly

on rules-based logics only as successful efforts accumulated in establishing HQ processes and structures.

In Haiti, as noted above, the USSOUTHCOM “enterprise model” was unfamiliar to staff augmentees from other combatant commands (COCOM) and agencies; they could not apply rules-based logic to identify the directorate in which they should work, or how to work. GEN Fraser’s decision, after five days of unsatisfactory performance, to reorganize his command into a J-code structure made it possible for individual staff augmentees, all familiar with roles and responsibilities associated with the J-code structure, to integrate quickly into the staff and work effectively.

In Kabul, JECC team members and ISAF staff transitioning to IJC initially approached the design of IJC staff structure using a rules-based logic (that is, they tried to apply a well-understood model staff structure, the J-code structure, to a new situation). The J-code structure, however, did not meet LTG Rodriguez’s requirements. His initial attempt to employ a cross-functional team structure in IJC was resisted by NATO staff, who preferred the familiarity of a rules-based logic—to apply to a COIN campaign, i.e. an unfamiliar problem—to the alternative of using a calculation-based logic to figure out what to do. In addition, implementing a cross-functional team organizational structure into IJC implied unknown significant changes to each NATO country’s military career track, which probably also contributed to resistance.⁴⁴

People used rules- and calculation-based logics in standing-up IJC HQ and JTF-Haiti. When they discovered that rules-based action was inappropriate, they switched to calculation-based action. When they were able to develop effective rules-based structures, processes, and procedures, they employed them. They clearly preferred to be guided by rules-based logic.

Operational Implications

A USJFCOM senior analyst observed that, “Some JTFs may be perfectly organized for the wrong missions. ... [But,] the military adjusts to the needs of the mission.” The ability to impose order on chaos is very valuable. Indeed, an anonymous UN strategic plans officer in Haiti observed, “The [US] military’s planning capability is not the most expensive part, but it is probably the most valuable. The international coordination structure would not have stood up if they weren’t there—we

tapped into the JTF planning capacity.”⁴⁵ Commanders and staffs in Kabul and Haiti adjusted, under difficult and austere conditions, to the needs of the mission; they used trusted agents to facilitate setting goals and coordinating actions, and they exercised “flexible intelligence” to figure out when to apply doctrinal guidance, and when to devise workable ad hoc structures, processes, and procedures.

A February 2010 JECC analysis of JTF readiness cautioned combatant commanders to be prepared to “address each situation on its own terms, in its unique political and strategic context, rather than attempting to fit the situation to a preferred template. ... [Commanders must also be prepared to conduct and integrate] combat, security, engagement, and relief and reconstruction activities ... to meet the circumstances.”⁴⁶ This view is consistent with the 2009 *Capstone Concept on Joint Operations* view that “all joint operations are ... an adaptation based on learning about the situation through action.”

Yet, this guidance is in tension with the underlying intent of most manuals (i.e., to design and develop a template for action or a rules-based logic of action that covers most situations people encounter). Gen James N. Mattis explained the source of tension in examining the application of operational design and joint operational planning when he observed that commanders and staffs have often applied these processes “mechanically.” That is, commanders and staffs approach “complex military problems,”

As if progressing through a sequence of planning steps would produce a solution. I would expect this habit to be common particularly in organizations where a commander reacts to these processes rather than leads them. ‘Over-proceduralization’ inhibits the commanders’ and staffs’ critical thinking and creativity, which are essential to finding a timely solution to complex problems. An approach that does not emphasize thinking and creativity is incomplete. My assessment is that our current doctrinal approach to fostering clear, careful thinking and creativity, particularly early in design and planning is insufficient and ineffective.⁴⁷

Military organizations in stable and peacetime environments—those having relatively steady inputs of resources and personnel to deal with familiar tasks and assignments—seek to standardize action in doctrine. Yet, recourse to doctrine cannot take the place of analysis when conducting operations in unstable environ-

ments, for example in responding to a natural disaster or a thinking and cunning enemy. Lessons learned from the stand-up of JTF-H and the IJC provide examples of the type of adaptation often required.

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Endnotes

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⁵ JCOA interview, COL Michael Findlay.

⁶ JCOA interview, COL Michael Findlay.

⁷ JCOA interview, CDR Geoffrey Gage, USN, with Dr. Mark D. Mandeles and Maj Vincent Richard, USAF, Suffolk, VA, 8 Decem-

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⁸ JCOA interview, Maj John M. Picudella, USMC, with Dr. Mark D. Mandeles and Maj Vincent Richard, USAF, Suffolk, VA, 8 April 2010 interview.

⁹ JCOA interview, CDR Geoffrey Gage.

¹⁰ RFF 1016 was modified five times, with the last modification occurring in November 2009.

¹¹ JECC, "RFF 1016 After Action Report," draft, 19 November 2009.

¹² JCOA interview, COL Carl L. Giles.

¹³ JCOA interview, CDR Frederick J. Reisinger, USNR, and LCDR Timothy Steele, USN with Dr. Mark D. Mandeles and Maj Vincent Richard, Suffolk, Virginia, 2 December 2009; JCOA interview, Lt. Col. Joseph Wassel, and MAJ Lawrence Smedley; JECC, "RFF 1016 After Action Report," draft, 19 November 2009.

¹⁴ JCOA interview, MAJ Michael Beane, USAR, CWO3 Brian Wimmer, USA, and Michael Cushing, civilian contractor with CDR Richard Trevisan, USN and Maj Vincent Richard, Suffolk, Virginia, 7 December 2009.

¹⁵ GEN Stanley A. McChrystal, "Oral Testimony," US Senate, Senate Armed Services Committee, "Hearing to Continue to Receive Testimony on Afghanistan" (8 December 2009), p. 22; GEN Stanley A. McChrystal, "Written Testimony," US Senate, Senate Armed Services Committee, "Hearing to Continue to Receive Testimony on Afghanistan" (8 December 2009), p. 4.

¹⁶ JECC, "RFF 1016 After Action Report," draft, 19 November 2009.

¹⁷ This discussion of Operation Unified Response and the creation of JTF-Haiti depends heavily on Russell Goerhing's analysis in JCOA case study, "USSOUTHCOM and JTF-Haiti, Some Challenges and Considerations in Forming a Joint Task Force," 22 June 2010.

¹⁸ The CIA estimated that about 2 million people resided in the zone of moderate to heavy earthquake damage. See <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ha.html>. This site was last updated on 24 June 2010, and was accessed on 20 July 2010.

¹⁹ Gen. Douglas M. Fraser, USAF, Commander, US Southern Command, "Posture Statement," before Armed Services Committee, US Senate, 111th Congress (11 March 2010); LTG P. K. Keen, Maj Gen. Floriano Peixoto Vieira Neto, LTC Charles W. Nolan, LTC Jennifer L. Kimmey, and CDR Joseph Althouse, "Relationships Matter: Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief in Haiti," Military Review (May–June 2010), pp. 2–12.

²⁰ MINUSTAH is the acronym for Mission des Nations Unies Pour la Stabilisation en Haïti. MINUSTAH was established on 1 June 2004 following the 30 April 2004 approval of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1542. MINUSTAH is led by a civilian special representative to the UN Secretary General. The military force commander is under the special representative's control. Keen, et al., "Relationships Matter," p. 6.

²¹ The cited number of 500 individual augmentees deployed to JTF-H should not be considered an authoritative figure. Several different figures emerge from different "counting rules," including whether the number of augmentees is a sum of augmentees over time, or the

highest number of augmentees in Port-au-Prince on a single day. The number of augmentees also does not include the number of civilians who deployed from other US executive departments.

²² Cited in JCOA, "USSOUTHCOM and JTF-Haiti, Some Challenges and Considerations in Forming a Joint Task Force," 22 June 2010

²³ Discussion, negotiation, and compromise occur as rapport is being established. This case study's author recently reviewed a study, prepared at the US Army Center for Military History, of the establishment of MNF-I HQ in 2004. The CMH historian wrote, "One senior planner, who had never before served in a combined headquarters, observed that staff work in Baghdad involved much more discussion and consensus building than was usual in the US service or even joint organizations."

²⁴ Center for Naval Analyses, *Reorganizing the Headquarters at MARFORLANT: A Quicklook Study*, CQR 96-7.10 (20 April 1996) cited in Maj E. D. Barteh, USMC, *Standing Joint Task Force Headquarters—A Step in the Right Direction?* USMC Command and Staff College, M.A. thesis, 1997

²⁵ For example, in 1996, RADM Jay B. Yakeley III and Maj Harold E. Bullock noted, "Recent exercises with the Japanese Self Defense Force in Yakima, Washington, provided the forces of both nations with important combined operations experience. Professional as well as personal relationships established among US and foreign militaries, country teams, and regional agencies are force multipliers in crises where time is short and smooth integration is essential. Personal trust and confidence is just as critical within the US military team." Jay B. Yakeley III and Harold E. Bullock, "Training the Pacific Warriors," *Joint Force Quarterly* (Summer 1996)

²⁶ Bill Gertz, "Inside the Ring: McClintock's New Role," *Washington Times* (20 August 2009), p. B1

²⁷ For example, in 1984, then-Captain Keen participated in an exchange program with the Brazilian Airborne Brigade where he met then-Captain Peixoto. In 1987, then-Major Keen attended Brazil's Command and General Staff Course in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. In 1988, then Captain Floriano Peixoto attended the US Army Infantry Officer Course at Fort Benning, Georgia. Then-Major Keen worked at the US Army Infantry School, and they continued their friendship. Keen, et al., "Relationships Matter," p. 4

²⁸ Keen, et al., "Relationships Matter," pp. 8–9

²⁹ Fraser, "Posture Statement," p. 26

³⁰ Keen, et al., "Relationships Matter," p. 9

³¹ JCOA interview, CDR Frederick J. Reisinger, USNR, and LCDR Timothy M. Steele, USN, with Dr. Mark D. Mandes and Maj Vincent Richard, USAF, Suffolk, Virginia, 2 December 2009

³² JCOA interview, MAJ Michael Beane, Michael Cushing, and CW3 Brian Wimmer

³³ JCOA interview, CDR Patrick Taglavore, USNR, with CDR Richard Trevisan, USN, and Maj Charles Knox, USAF, Suffolk, Virginia, 7 December 2009

³⁴ John von Neumann, "Defense in Atomic War," in A. H. Taub, ed., *John von Neumann: Collected Works*, Vol. IV: *Theory of Games, Astrophysics, Hydrodynamics and Meteorology* (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1963), p. 525

³⁵ Elaine M. Grossman, "Day-to-Day Burdens Test Fortitude, Patience, Faith: Tensions Rise Across Ranks in Iraq as Troops are Told to Gut it Out," *Inside the Pentagon*, 4 November 2004, p. 12

³⁶ GEN Raymond Odierno, [no title; acceptance speech], Naval War College Distinguished Leadership Award, delivered at Newport, Rhode Island, 20 May 2009

³⁷ Fraser, "Posture Statement," p. 31

³⁸ Russell J. Smith, Lt. Col., USAF, JCSE (Airborne) Deputy Commander, Memorandum for Record, Subj: After Action Report for Operation Unified Response, Date: 15 February 2010

³⁹ Fraser, "Posture Statement," pp. 36–37; JCOA, "Operation Unified Response: Haiti Earthquake Response," May 2010, slides 61–62

⁴⁰ Cited in Jeff Chu, "How America's Top Military Officer Uses Business to Boost National Security," *Fast Company*, Issue 145 (1 May 2010)

⁴¹ Recommendations to improve intelligence and COIN expertise developed at NATO's Joint Force Command HQ lessons learned conference focused on increasing the number of topics NATO should teach and train personnel, such as "systems analysis training for all areas of expertise," and increasing the clarity and specificity of job descriptions. See Joint Force Command Headquarters Brunssum, "JFC Brunssum KCB ISAF CJ2 Lessons learned Conference, 29 Mar–1 Apr, After Action Report," 3500.00/JBKKCB/152/10, 18 May 2010

⁴² JCOA interview, Maj Benjamin DuBois, USAFR, with LCDR J. W. Stolze, USN, and Maj Charles Knox, USAF, Suffolk, Virginia, 4 December 2009

⁴³ James G. March and Herbert A. Simon, *Organizations*, 2nd edition (Cambridge: Blackwell Publishers, 1993), pp. 11–13; James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, "The Logic of Appropriateness," ARENA Working Papers 04/09, Centre for European Studies, 2009; Daniel Kahneman, "Maps of Bounded Rationality: A Perspective on Intuitive Judgment and Choice," Nobel prize lecture, <http://search.nobel-prize.org/search/nobel/?q=Maps+of+Bounded+Reality&i=en>, accessed 15 January 2010; Daniel Kahneman, "Maps of Bounded Rationality: Psychology for Behavioral Economics," *American Economic Review* 93 (December 2003). See also Herbert A. Simon, "Rationality as a Process and as Product of Thought," *American Economic Review* 68 (May 1978)

⁴⁴ JCOA interview, MAJ Tim Wright, USAR, with Maj Vincent Richard, USAF, LCDR J. W. Stolze, USN, and CDR Richard Trevisan, USN, Suffolk, Virginia, 4 December 2009

⁴⁵ Cited in JCOA, "USSOUTHCOM and JTF-Haiti, Some Challenges and Considerations in Forming a Joint Task Force," 22 June 2010, p. 14

⁴⁶ JECC, *Improving Readiness for Joint Task Force Headquarters, Concept of Operations*, Version 4.0, 2 February 2010, p. 13–4

⁴⁷ Gen James N. Mattis, "Vision for a Joint Approach to Operational Design," 6 October 2009

An Iranian View of US Psychological Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan

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Editorial Abstract: *The author, a former Iranian citizen and soldier, offers a unique perspective on contemporary PSYOP efforts. He provides background on Iranian PSYOP organizations and views, and then describes Coalition efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan as seen through the eyes of Iranian military authors.*

Editors Note: *Reprinted from the Joint Information Operations Warfare Center (JIOWC) Journal, IO Sphere, Spring 2007.*

In the last few decades, psychological operations (PSYOP) became a very important part of modern military doctrine. In general, PSYOP intends to weaken the enemy's will to fight, give extra strength to friendly forces, and—perhaps the most important part—reduce the number of human casualties during military operations.

Allied forces used psychological operations during World War II when engaged in a bloody war with the Axis forces in the European and in the Pacific Theaters. In the past 50 years, we have witnessed noteworthy progress of psychological operations based on modern technology, and a better understanding of human psychology. Since the end of WWII, new conflicts and international problems have risen one after another. The latest international crisis was 11 September 2001 (9/11), when Al Qaeda members attacked the United States mainland. This attack generated a critical reaction from the US and precipitated US involvement in two wars, in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Naturally the regional states—especially Iran—became interested in understanding the nature of the US Army's astonishing initial success in both countries. Iran, as the most important and powerful country in this region, has legitimate reasons to be more cautious about the US Army's presence on both its eastern and western frontiers. At the same time, one should not forget that Iran and the US have had very strange relations since 1979, and there is no hope of improvement in the foreseeable future.

The recently published *Iranian Journal of Psychological Operations* paid extra attention to the US Army PSYOP effort in both Operations Enduring Freedom (OEF) and

Iraqi Freedom (OIF), and published an extensive analysis titled “A Comparative Study of US PSYOP in Iraq and Afghanistan,” by Mr. Ali Reza Biabanavard. He has a master's degree in political science but no degree in psychology. His analysis is based on the theoretical issues of war and peace, the evolutionary process of PSYOP in the US, and finally an Iranian evaluation of the US Army's PSYOP activities in OEF/OIF.¹

In order to understand the nature of Iran's military and security structure, one should become familiar with the Revolutionary Guard Corp's (IRGC) history and its operations, which is the first part of this article. The second part discusses the background of Iran-US relations, and why Iran feels insecure with the presence of US forces in the region. This includes analysis of what the Iranians learned from the Iraq and Afghan wars, as well as how they intend to contain any new US PSYOP actions in the region.

The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps and the Journal of Psychological Operations

The main idea behind the IRGC's creation was protection of new political elite members and protection of the regime at any cost. The IRGC's members and affiliates are fully trusted and are loyal to the theocratic regime. The IRGC was a small and ineffective organization compared to Iran's Army and Secret Service; however, the Iran-Iraq War made this organization a first rate fighting army. The other major factor that made IRGC a rising star was its unconditional loyalty to the establishment. This helped them to expand their operational capabilities beyond anyone's imagination.

The Iranian political elite clearly understood they needed a modern approach to old problems. Right after the end of the Iran-Iraq War, the Iranian government put intensive efforts into building institutions specializing in government, politics, and security. Naturally, the IRGC became the first candidate to implement this new political approach. The government strongly encouraged IRGC officers and members to obtain a higher education in any field that they desired. Unlimited financial assistance made this organization a hub of intellectual capability and a “soft powerhouse” to be taken seriously.

The government allowed the IRGC to be involved in creating and running think-tank organizations, which heavily emphasized national security and military issues. One of the IRGC's creations is the Cultural Secretariat of the IRGC Chief of Staff, located in the former US Embassy residence in Tehran. This organization is the center of the IRGC's soft power. Besides other responsibilities, the Cultural Secretariat exclusively researches and writes on *One Face of US PSYOP in Southwest Asia (Defense Link)* psychological operations. In the last three years, this office has published a very sophisticated quarterly called the *Journal of Psychological Operations*. This journal exhibits a high level of professionalism, and introduces very complicated articles about many different international and regional issues. It is worth mentioning that it also translates many US PSYOP articles into Farsi. This journal should receive the highest attention from US psychological operations specialists, academia, and relevant policy makers.

Background

After 9/11, the United States engaged in serious conflicts in the Middle East and other parts of the world. The greatest engagements took place in Afghanistan and Iraq, where US forces were able to defeat both the Taliban and Iraqi Army in a very short period of time. The US Army's decisive victories opened a new era in a region where the Islamic Republic of Iran automatically became a regional superpower, after 1400 years.

However, Iranian specialists noted the US presence presented a serious threat to Iranian national security and its regional sphere of influence. For instance, the Iranian journal *Defense Policy* evaluated the current Middle East situation and its problems based on a few important factors that could eventually influence Iranian interests. The author observed:

The Middle East is in total chaos because of the lack of security structure, the influence of domestic politics, regional countries' intergovernmental relations, and trans-regional influences that create a chaotic situation in the region. Based on the factor of regional insecurity, Iran's government cannot afford to ignore the crucial elements of defense policy such as self-reliance, and coalition formation that generates power, containment, and prevention.

Besides self-reliance and forming coalitions with regional countries, Iranian military analysts want to place checks and balances on the US via containment and war prevention. At the same time, Iran complains

about US behavior toward the Middle East and her failure to acknowledge that, in the post-9/11 era, Iran plays a positive role in the region and does not create extra problems. The Iranian side believes their country's post-9/11 behavior should be considered seriously and rewarded by providing regional opportunities for Iran. In contrast, Iran did not receive any reward while the United States engaged in direct intervention in the region, and implemented belligerent policies which directly undermined Iranian national security during a time of increased economic, political, cultural, and military pressures.² Consequently, the Iranian policy of containment and prevention toward the US, and the Iranian belief that the US is responsible for belligerent anti-Iranian policies, continues to help generate regional confrontation between both countries.

Besides this competition, Iran feels extremely vulnerable to internal and external pressures. It must learn how to survive in a fast-paced globalized world. In other words, the Iranian state is competing against time, and clearly understands it does not have enough time to reach equality on either the regional or international scene. Mr. Morad Ali Sadoughi, a political analyst at the Iranian Center for Strategic Studies, notes:

The Islamic Republic of Iran struggles to protect the country's political independence, and pursues sovereign economic, military and cultural values that will be futile if the Republic does not take serious steps to encourage technical, scientific innovations, or at least obtain technology for home grown productions. The other important issue is that the government must help to create a strong research and development base in country. If the government does not pay attention to these issues, this country will walk through a future that others will design for [and thereby decide] her fate.³

In addition to regional competition and technological problems, both of which directly influence Iranian national security, the Islamic Republic of Iran and the US have additional outstanding problems. These include: nuclear issues, the war on terrorism, Iran's role in destabilizing both Iraq and Afghanistan, Iran's antagonism toward Israel, and so on. All of these reasons have made Iran believe the US will eventually try to overthrow the current Iranian government, either by military or political means.

Furthermore, the US has extensive presence in Iraq, Afghanistan, Turkey, Azerbaijan, and other neighboring countries. Iranian military planners are facing a bitter reality that Iran is incapable of winning a symmetric war against the United States. Therefore, they

have turned their interests to other US military capabilities, such as asymmetric warfare in the streets of Baghdad and Kabul, and psychological operations in the OEF and OIF regions.

With regard to asymmetric warfare, the Iranian military leadership—especially the IRGC—is thoroughly preparing for a possible US land invasion. They studied Iraq and Afghan asymmetric warfare tactics very closely. They came to the conclusion that in order to contain any future US land invasion, they should at least remind American military planners and soldiers that whatever they witnessed in Iraq and Afghanistan would be nothing in comparison to Iran. The ongoing recruitment of suicide bombers is a clear manifestation of this trend.

In the last few years, suicide bombing units were created in cities across Iran, with leaders even openly asking people to participate in these units. Only a year ago the “Basij” paramilitary group printed applications for new recruits wanting to join these suicide groups. In this application it was mentioned that “in order to achieve all-round readiness against the enemies of Islam and the sacred Islamic Republic and to protect the foundations of Islam, the Lovers of Martyrdom Garrison plans to organize ‘a martyrdom-seeking division’ for each province in the country and give them specific and specialized training. We therefore request all our pious brothers and sisters, who are committed and determined to defend Islam, if willing, to submit two photographs of themselves, a copy of their identity cards, and the filled-in application form below to the following address, so that preparations for their organization and training could begin.”⁴

Under heavy international pressure, the Islamic Republic ceased to advertise creation of the suicide divisions after it passed this responsibility to a non-governmental organization called “The International Headquarters for Honoring Muslim Martyrs.” This group tries to recruit volunteers from all walks of life. An even more specific application form lets volunteers mention *where* they want to conduct their suicide mission: fighting against the American forces in Iraq; fighting against the Israeli forces in Palestine; and finally, killing [author] Salman Rushdi. Such clarification as to where an Iranian suicide bomber could appear is alarming to both American and Israeli forces in Iraq and Israel. Does this mean that Iranian suicide bombers are running in the streets of Baghdad or Tel Aviv? Or do they simply want to remind us that they are willing to hit our targets if Iran is attacked? Is

فرارگاه عاشقان شهادت به منظور آمادگی همه جانبه علیه دشمنان اسلام و نظام مقدس جمهوری اسلامی و نیز حراست از کیان اسلام در نظر دارد در هر استان کشور «یک لشکر استشهادی» را از بین نیروهای شهادت طلب و شجاع مردمی همان استان تشکیل داده و آنان را تحت آموزش های تخصصی و ویژه قرار دهد. لذا از کلیه برادران و خواهران مؤمن، علاقمند و معتقد به دفاع از اسلام درخواست می گردد در صورت تمایل با ارسال دو قطعه عکس ۳×۳ کپی شناسنامه و برگ درخواست عضویت به آدرس:

تهران صندوق پستی ۶۶۴-۱۶۵۳۵

ثبت نام به عمل آورده تا مقدمات سازماندهی و آموزش آنها فراهم گردد. قابل ذکر است نیروهای لشکر استشهادی هر استان در همان استان تجهیز و آماده عملیات استشهادی خواهند شد

فرم درخواست عضویت

نام و نام خانوادگی: _____ ش: _____ فرزند: _____

پنجاب: _____ به آدرس: _____

مقامی عضویت در لشکر استشهادی استان: _____ می باشد: _____

امضا: _____

Martyrdom Seekers Recruitment Form (Iran focus.com)

the implication simply to put more psychological pressure on our military planners?

The reason behind this extensive Iranian interest in US psychological operations does not stem from a position of power and self-confidence; rather, it comes from the fact that the Iranian political elites feel extremely weak and vulnerable to any outside pressure on the Iranian state. This feeling of insecurity comes from two different directions: the Mullahs and the nationalists. The Mullahs display self-preservation behavior, as they try to preserve their physical well-being and political future by hiding behind the state. On the other hand, nationalists believe any serious foreign military operation or internal political instability will endanger the Iranian state for a long period of time.

Iranian military analysts consider US psychological operations as a first step to a future conflict between the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran. Therefore, instead of sitting idly by and doing absolutely nothing, the Iranian military analysts chose to study US PSYOP in both the OIF and OEF regions. They consider this a first step in creating an effective defense policy and aborting any hostile PSYOP. It is also a way to contain any escalation of the conflict between the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran.

The previously mentioned, evaluation of the current US PSYOP effort in OEF and OIF, published in the *Journal of Psychological Operations*, provides a very valuable resource for understanding Iranian military doctrine in more depth.⁵

An Evaluation of US PSYOP in OEF and OIF

Ali Reza Biabannavard is the author of “A Comparative Study of US PSYOP in Iraq and Afghanistan.” He discusses the theoretical issues of psychological operations through the early nineteenth century, including the Clausewitzian theories of war and peace. He notes that the father of European modern military strategy clearly understood the importance of psychological operations as a tool for victory.

Mr. Biabannavard quotes Clausewitz on several occasions, first noting “War is an act of violence whose object is to compel the enemy to do our will.” Second, he observes “War is the continuation of politics by other means.” Biabannavard stated war is a factor of physical annihilation of the enemy, and is a tool to change a target country’s attitude. He believes Clausewitz was very much in favor of psychologically influencing the enemy, rather than total destruction. He mentions that “Clausewitz considered influencing the enemy’s behavior in line with the agent country’s will as a major goal.” In other words, “if we influence the enemy’s mind then we do not need to impact an enemy’s arms.”⁶

The first very striking element is that an Iranian military analyst—who had close ties with the IRGC—begins to incorporate Western understanding of peace and war into his analysis. This is of major importance, as some [Western] people complain that we are unable to understand the Iranian behavior, because they are distinctly different. On the contrary, Iranian politicians and military leaders’ behaviors are very much predictable if we try to understand them through their literature and analysis; and they seem to have less trouble understanding us.

After a theoretical discussion of psychological operations and its background, the author then tries to explain how PSYOP works in general. He states that psychological operations have been divided into three periods, including “pre-war era, war era, and post-war era.”⁷ In the pre-war era, the author considers three important steps as being necessary to begin any serious operation. “An agent country, which is ready to launch a psychological operation against the target country, must first convince its own population that war is in the national interest of their country.”⁸ The author uses the Vietnam War

as an example where the US Government did not properly prepare the American people to support a conflict of such magnitude. He argues that the Vietnam War had a significant influence on the minds of US military planners, thus they now prepare psychological operations in the early stages of any conflict.

The second step in the pre-war psychological process is to prepare potential allies. In this example, Iran is using the *Martyrdom seekers recruitment form (Iranfocus.com)* to convince susceptible members in the community that the agent country’s action works in favor of the world community, thus benefiting everyone. The agent country does not need to be very ideological, but it does need to use a common language that everyone can agree upon.⁹

The last step of the pre-war psychological operations process is to convince the target country’s citizens they will be better off without their current leader(s).¹⁰ Here the author provides an interesting example from the end of the 1991 Desert Storm operation in Southern Iraq. The people there were tired of the Baath Party dictatorship, and the Iraqi government’s leadership was weak. According to this Iranian explanation, the situation “forced” people to fall under the influence of American psychological operations.¹¹ As a result, the Southern Iraq Shia population rose against Saddam Hussein’s government hoping they could get help from coalition forces in order to topple the government. On the contrary, they never received coalition assistance, and their uprising was crushed in blood. In other words, the author considered the Shia population’s uprising a direct consequence of the Coalitions’ psychological operations during Desert Storm.

After the pre-war psychological preparation of all interested parties, the agent country enters into direct confrontation with the target country’s military. The psychological operation process is mostly concentrated on the battlefield, and the plan is to weaken the enemy army’s personnel and soldiers. The author suggests a successful military operation depends on how willing military planners are to work with psychological operations specialists, in order to make sure their operations match PSYOP tactics, thus convincing enemy forces that resistance is no longer an option. The impact of PSYOP is very short lived because of the high pace of operations; therefore, any military or propaganda activity must be launched simultaneously before allowing the enemy time to organize a response.¹²

Perhaps the most difficult part of the PSYOP process begins right after the end of hostilities. Again, the most important task in this stage is to legitimize the operation. The legitimizing portion of the operation targets the same three audiences as in the pre-war period. The first is the agent country's internal public opinion, emphasizing that the operation was in fact successful and everyone is content with the results. The second part is convincing the international community of what a great job the agent country has done in order to preserve the other country's interests and security. The third part of the legitimizing process is to convince the target country's population that they are better off without their previous leader(s) and they will be at an advantage with their newfound freedom.

The US vs the Middle East

According Mr. Biabannavard, after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Second Gulf War, the US capitalist system needed to reconstruct an "imaginary enemy," this time in the Middle East and in other Muslim countries. The US began to organize a very sophisticated PSYOP effort against these countries.¹³ In other words, one can conclude the author believes the US is not capable of maintaining global power without having an ideological or economical enemy.

In addition to creating an enemy, the US government got involved in shaping the destiny of the Middle East. However, the program faces serious obstacles, such as the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, which reduce US influence in the Arab world while providing unconditional support to the Israeli side. The other problem was rapid disintegration of the Second Gulf War Coalition, thus the United States was unable to implement its policies as effectively as desired. Further, Russian and Chinese elements in the region were able to change the balance of power by providing missile and nuclear technologies to Iran, which consequently must be used to challenge the US position in the region.¹⁴ Further, both states provided Iran very sophisticated military technology, which could create serious problems in the future, and are extensively involved in Iran's economy.

The important problem here was the unofficial alliance between Russia and China, which strives to create a new balance of power by introducing missile and nuclear technologies to challenge US hegemony in the region. The author believes the United States was forced to intensify its PSYOP against both Iraq and Iran¹⁵ due to two factors: the US's intention to create a new enemy; and Sino-Russian efforts to create a

new balance of power in the region. The author notes the history of US pressure on Middle Eastern countries dates back to the 1970s, and the high point of this pressure came in 2003 when the United States attacked Iraq.¹⁶

In the last part of his analysis, Biabannavard describes US PSYOP tactics in the region. In general, the author believes the US designed a very sophisticated operation. He emphasizes 13 different steps used to manipulate Middle Eastern countries, with the first and second step somehow related. The first is US assistance in building satellite media; and the second is advertising the American way of life, which is directly contradictory to the region's indigenous traditions. In other words, the United States is challenging Islamic thought and social structure in order to create a favorable environment for US policies, and ultimately to bring the area under the Western umbrella through military, economic, or ideological means (*Fortress on the Iran-Iraq border (Defense Link)*).

The other eleven steps include a negative explanation of the Middle Eastern countries' policies and the exaggeration of regional problems. In addition, he finds the US discredits the regional leaders on the basis of financial, political, and moral corruption. Furthermore, the United States signs one-sided treaties with individual regional countries with a complete disregard to the other regional players. Additional steps include: undermining the interests of other countries; exaggerating regional crises; creating regional and ethnic conflicts; exaggerating the defense of human rights and the rights of minorities; and finally, financially assisting the opposition groups.¹⁷

Iranian PSYOP specialists believe these are the major points of United States concentration, in order to force changes in behavior on a regional scale. In addition to this general statement regarding the United States influence operations in the Middle East, the author provides two current examples.

Afghanistan and Iraq vs the US

Mr. Biabannavard follows the same analysis when examining Afghanistan and Iraq. He divides US PSYOP into three different stages as before, noting some differences in each country, but describing generally similar processes.

Afghanistan

"A comparative study of US PSYOP in Iraq and Afghanistan" claims the United States was prepared to overthrow the Taliban government long before 9/11. Biabannavard perceives some irony in this behavior. During the [1979-1988] Soviet-Afghan war, the same militant groups—and even Osama Bin Laden—were on the US Government's payroll for a long period of time. However, the reason behind the change of allegiances in Washington was based on different factors. The first reason was the existence of paramilitary groups, such as Al Qaeda in Afghanistan, which were responsible for bloody attacks against American interests around the world.¹⁸ The second reason was purely geostrategic: Afghanistan is located on the crossroads of China, India, Iran, Pakistan, and Central Asia. Of course, the US was aware of the location of Central Asian oil and gas pipelines crossing Afghanistan.¹⁹ Whichever country controls Afghanistan can ultimately control the economic and military routes along the north-south axis of Central Asia, and the east-west axis connecting China to Iran. Therefore, having Afghanistan on the American side would help contain China, Russia, and Iran, while at the same time assisting US access to Central Asia's natural resources. All of this could ultimately release the US from being a hostage to the Persian Gulf oil producers.

The third reason was 9/11 provided two different golden opportunities for US interests: First, it legitimized the Afghan war as a war on terror; and second, Russia and China were unable to oppose US retaliation, thus becoming practically pacified on the Central Asian chessboard for a short period of time.

Based on these military, geostrategic, economic, and other windows of opportunity, the United States launched a PSYOP campaign in two different directions. The first covered the regional and international offensive against the Taliban government; and the second convinced the Afghan people not to defend the Taliban government.

On the regional and international levels, the United States accused the Taliban government of providing shelter to Bin Laden and his group, plus offering drug smugglers safe haven. They also pointed to the Taliban's ruthless behavior toward Afghan people, their support of the war on terrorism, masterminding September 11th, and finally weakening US national security in the process.²⁰ This triggered a significant US reaction toward the Taliban government. Preparing international public

opinion would have to be complemented by domestic reactions against the Taliban government.

On the domestic level, US PSYOP picked up on the Taliban government's inability to solve the Afghan people's social and economic problems after the end of the Soviet-Afghan War. Themes dealt with destruction of historical monuments, distribution of food during official holidays, and the establishment of Afghan radio stations in San Francisco and Washington, DC. Biabannavard wraps up his discussion with development of a secret radio station, the distribution of pamphlets, and the conduct of a propaganda war.²¹

Iraq

The second case in "A comparative study of US PSYOP in Iraq and Afghanistan," asserts that immediately following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States decided to overthrow regimes outside the US sphere of influence, by any means. The first target of this new "humanitarian intervention" policy was Iraq.

Biabannavard goes on to subdivide phases of the US-Iraqi PSYOP operation. In the first place, the US found a perfect reason to challenge the Iraqi government by claiming the existence of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). At the same time, the world community had undeniable facts that Iraqi forces used chemical weapons against their own Kurdish population and Iranian forces during the First Gulf War, and during the Iran-Iraq War. Therefore, the WMD accusations worked very well against the Iraqi government.

The second step began right after the 9/11 event, when the United States declared that it would launch a military operation and go to war if it is necessary to contain the spread of WMD technology.²² However, the author sees a different reason behind American officials' tough attitude toward Iraq. He argues that the major reason behind the Iraqi operation was neither WMD nor 9/11. Rather, Biabannavard sees economic reasons as the main cause behind US intentions. In other words, he believes the current Iraqi war is about oil, and nothing else.

US PSYOP against Iraq had two different legs: one was the preparation of regional and international public opinion against the Iraqi government, and the second was the launching of a negative advertisement campaign against Iraqi political leaders.

Furthermore, Biabannavard notes the US government and media tried to use the September 11th episode,

especially its massive destruction and death toll, as an advertising tool to convince the US and international public of the need to attack Iraq. The United States censored a UN report, which dealt with 24 US companies assisting with the production of chemical weapons in Iraq, using previous news about the Iran-Iraq War.²³ This created an “evil” public opinion image of Saddam Hussein, and threatened that if Iraq maintained WMD, the conflict would rapidly grow and suck other countries into the conflict. It also used the public media to exaggerate Iraq and Saddam’s danger with regards to WMD. Finally, US PSYOP advertised the fact that if Iraqi WMD were destroyed, there would be a positive effect of reducing the overall danger of spreading WMD.²⁴

The US’ international and regional PSYOP against the Iraqi regime was extremely effective. The reason behind this astonishing success was the nature of the Iraqi government and its leadership, who created more regional enemies than anyone else in the history of the Middle East. Another reason was Iraq’s prior use of WMD: it was so real that no one doubted the possibility that Iraq had something to hide from the international community.

The pre-war PSYOP phase ended by discrediting the Iraqi political leadership. Their reputation had already been harmed by their regional behavior: an unforgivable attitude toward opposition, ethnic, and religious groups. These negative domestic and regional attitudes toward Iraq made the US PSYOP designers’ job very easy.

These Iranian observations go on to describe how the US dealt with the Iraqi people, using pamphlets, radio, and television. At the same time, US forces were able to distribute small radios among Iraqi military personnel, and encourage them to listen to the broadcasts. Television programs displayed video of Bathist officials killing people, as a propaganda tool to satisfy the Iraqi anti-government opposition. The TV messages promised to protect Iraqi holy sites and important economic objects, and to prevent the looting of Iraqi antiques. Videos about the lavish lifestyle of Saddam and his family, versus the difficult lives of the majority of Iraqi people, propagated Saddam’s disrespect of Iraqi values and ideals. The Americans repeatedly declared they had killed high ranking Iraqi Army officers and Saddam in order to weaken the people’s resistance against the American forces. Finally, the Americans displayed Saddam’s supporters who were taken prisoner, or their dead bodies.²⁵

It is vital to see how Iranian PSYOP specialists judged US efforts, as well as how they evaluated both Iraqi and Afghan responses—and finally, what was their evaluation? “A Comparative Study of US PSYOP in Iraq and Afghanistan” describes the US PSYOP campaigns as very effective tools, designed to castigate both countries’ political leadership, and convince people that life after Saddam and the Taliban will be better. However, the article also points out serious inadequacies in the Iraqi and Afghani response to US PSYOP. These stem from the style of the Iraqi and Taliban leadership, and how they behaved toward their own citizens and the rest of the world.

Iranians believe the success of US PSYOP was dependant on several important factors: 1) lack of an effective connection between the Iraqi and Taliban leadership and its citizens; 2) the US knowledge of both countries political systems and their governing tools; 3) lack of effective media; 4) people being unsatisfied and discontent with their leaders; 5) inability to mobilize people in a short period of time; 6) lack of effective road systems; 7) no centralized and effective decision-making center; 8) the government’s inability to satisfy the needs of the military because of hasty decision-making; 9) the personalization of operational and administrative plans; 10) their isolation from the rest of the world; 11) their lack of education; and finally, 12) the inability to clearly evaluate the belligerent countries’ capabilities.²⁶

What Did Iranians Learn from Iraq & Afghanistan?

Psychological operations are very complicated. They require in-depth knowledge of the target countries’ culture and their social, economic, military, and political structures. Iranian psychological operations warriors are learning the reality of modern warfare. They value US experience in this field and try very hard to learn and understand American successes and shortcomings in different theaters, regardless of the outcome.

This analysis of US PSYOP in Iraq and Afghanistan also serves Iranian interests very well, helping them understand the reality of life, and how they can contain future US PSYOP against Iran. The Iranian evaluation of Iraqi and Afghanistan’s inadequacies in their fight against American forces is very realistic. They clearly mention the fact that in both countries the political leadership and people were not on the same page. At the same time, both governments were unable to satisfy popular demands.

In the current period, it is especially important to see what Iranian military planners and PSYOP warriors learned from the Iraqi and Afghan experience. Most importantly, they want to contain anti-Iranian US PSYOP efforts in the region.

One can suggest the Islamic Republic of Iran is currently preparing for a PSYOP counterattack against the United States. It is worth mentioning that the current Iranian government and its leadership are not just nationalistic; they consider Iran as a jumping off point to create a worldwide Islamic empire under the leadership of the Lord of Ages (Imam Zaman). They do not value the nature of Iranian nationalism as much as one might suspect, either its distinctive culture or its background.

The Iranian leadership is very realistic and flexible in their thought and belief system. In order to mobilize people, they use the Shia-Islamic order which is called 'Taqiyyah,' which literally means "the practice of hiding one's belief under duress."²⁷ One may also view this as abuse of Iranian people for the government's own ends. Taqiyyah is the Islamic version of Machiavellian politics, in which "politics have no relation to morals." In other words, the current Iranian leadership is in danger, and they know the people are not willing to risk their lives for the defense of Islam. Therefore, they have decided to "hijack" the traditions and belief system, attempting to fulfill their goals under the banner of the Iranian nationalism.

These cosmopolitan Muslim internationalists have a lot to think about. They desire something which is creative, important, escalates Iranian pride and nationalism, creates a safety net around the Iranian political system, unifies the people regardless of their political or ethnic background, and covers the weakness of the state with popular support.

They have also found a magic tool to save themselves, and contain their enemies. This is very interesting and, at the same time, very dangerous: it is called the uranium enrichment process. Such a plan makes economic sense, provides a sense of pride for Iranian people for their scientific achievements, unifies people against an enemy who wants to stop this process, and saves the Iranian political system from further disarray (for the time being). More importantly, it makes any PSYOP success very difficult, and maybe even fruitless.

The current international crisis regarding Iran's uranium enrichment is part of the Iranian psychological counterattack against the United States. It is worth

noting the Iranian political elites clearly understood the uranium enrichment issue has no military use whatsoever. Any damage to the United States interests around the world by nuclear weapons, either by themselves or by their proxies, is not an option. The Iranian political elites undoubtedly accepted that any nuclear blackmail against the US or other countries would trigger a heavy response, quite possibly destroying Iran and her political system.

It appears the Iranian political elites are much more into preserving their grip on power and their Islamic mythology of helping to return the Lord of Ages (Imam Zaman), than thinking about Iranian national interests. They see a close relation between preserving the system and the existence of a viable Iranian state. Therefore, they are defending the country for the sake of their own interest and religious beliefs, and nothing else.

The reason behind this conclusion is very simple. First, Iranians are extremely nationalistic, and they have no positive feeling toward any attacking country as a savior. Second, they want to solve their government problems in-house, without third party involvement. Finally, they are witnesses to the realities on the ground in both Afghanistan and Iraq. Thus, it is very difficult to convince any Iranian that it is greener on the other side of the fence.

Conclusion

"A Comparative Study of US PSYOP in Iraq and Afghanistan" is an important document for understanding how Iranians analyze US PSYOP strengths and weaknesses in Afghanistan and Iraq. Clearly, their analysis uncovered what they see as deficiencies. One conclusion they drew was that in both Iraq and Afghanistan, the center of gravity (COG) (the triangle of government, military, and population) is weaker than the Islamic Republic of Iran's COG. Iran clearly understands they have no time to repair all of their own COG deficiencies. In Biabannavard's opinion, it will require a tremendous Islamic Republic of Iran government effort to successfully respond to US PSYOP efforts. Therefore, they are trying to use preventative measures to reduce the chances of a US invasion of Iran.

Organizing the "suicide divisions" (approximately 60,000 suicide volunteers) is one of the first steps to remind American military planners that attacking Iran will not be an easy task, and will cause unbearably heavy US military casualties. The uranium enrichment issue is also an example of shrewd PSYOP planning. They put a very delicate issue before the people, ask-

ing if they want another country making decisions for their ancient nation with a long tradition of imperial power. Iran should have the right to do whatever it wants according to the Iranian government. Obviously Iranian national pride is no less important than American or British pride, or of citizens in any other modern country anywhere in the world. Therefore, the world will witness an Iranian nationalistic reaction against any forceful solution to the uranium enrichment problem. Iranian PSYOP against the US will be strategic and will cover many different areas of concern. It is important to remember the Islamic Republic of Iran is working hard to contain any US capability of launching an attack against it, and is against any withdrawal from anything its political elites believe.

The recent US visit of former Iranian President Khatami is part of the counter-PSYOP against US efforts regarding the uranium enrichment question. The Iranian regime sent a very charming personality, and highly educated person, to create some influence in US intellectual circles. The goal is to get the world to question American policies on Iran. This type of strategic Iranian PSYOP will be the standard for the coming years: the US must be prepared.

About the Author:

Mr. Njdeh "Nick" Asisian was born in an Armenian family in Kermanshah, Iran. He served two years as a conscript in the Iranian Army in the early 1980s. He immigrated to the United States in October 1988 and became a naturalized US citizen. He currently works for the Battle Command Training Program (BCTP) as a PmESII Analyst and Chief Research Analyst. Prior to that, he worked for the Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO) at Ft. Leavenworth, KS. He earned a BA in International Relations from the University of California Santa Barbara, and a Master of Arts Degree in East European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies from the University of Kansas. He also is pursuing a Ph.D. in International Law and Diplomacy.

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Psychological Operations and the Iranian Elections

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About This Article: *This article was written right after the first popular demonstrations against the Iranian 10th Presidential elections. In this paper, I try to provide an honest assessment of what is going on in the country, which the major players are and what will be the future of this unending struggle of modernism and traditionalism between the Iranian political elites. Further, this paper explains why the conservative wing of the government decided to dismantle the reformist movement within the present Iranian political system. It is important to mention that post Iranian election protests have not died out and the Iranian government still considers demonstrators as the most deadly threat to their installed government. Mr. Asisian's views on the situation in Iran are specific and relevant. He is a US citizen of Iranian decent. His views are not official views of the US government or the JIOWC.*

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Introduction

The recent Iranian election, with Ahmadinejad winning in a landslide and the reaction of the people, was an event unprecedented in the last 30 years of the Islamic Republic. On the one hand, the Iranian people are in search of freedom and democratic reforms. On the other hand, the theocratic regime is trying to prolong its rule in Iran at any cost. For 30 years now, despite many different centers of power in Iranian politics, the Iranian regime has been unified and coherent when it came to the Presidential election. Regardless of who became the President of Iran, the members of the regime were obligated, more or less, to accept the reality.

In the recent elections things have changed very dramatically. As the head of the state, Ayatollah Khamenehi considered Mr. Ahmadinejad as a convenient tool to achieve some of the goals he has been pursuing for the last 30 years. He wanted to rid himself of some people that he has opposed from the beginning of the Islamic

Republic. These people have challenged the Ayatollah Khamenehi and effectively contained his power. They were able to bring some balance to the domestic and foreign policy of the Islamic Republic.

This election is noteworthy for analysis both from the framework of the legality of the Ahmadinejad's presidency and human rights issues. It is also very important to analyze how the Islamic regime was able to purge the higher echelon of the Islamic Republic from unfavorable people by reinstalling Ahmadinejad as President.

This article emphasizes the cultural psychological operations (PSYOP) implemented by the Iranian government and does not discuss a classical or modern understanding of psychological operations in the Western sense. What this paper represents is the cultural psychological operations that may be difficult to understand for many people. In Iran, the collection of actions and reactions, direct or indirect discussions, and edicts of religious myths have played an important role in the implementation of a successful PSYOP.

This election has exhibited all the above mentioned factors. This paper discusses the following issues: the roots of the current Iranian political system, the internal turmoil it has exhibited since 1979 (background), the duality of the Islamic Republic and the presidency of Ahmadinejad, the preparation for the election during which Mousawi became the main contender, the importance of the presidential debates (especially Mousawi-Ahmadinejad debate and its aftermath), and post election unrest and reverse PSYOP.

Background

Ayatollah Khamenehi is one of those Iranian clerics who believe in the uniformity of the government under his rule. In previous years when Rafsanjani and later Khatami were Presidents, he was not able to fully exercise his power. Therefore, he used his constitutional power through the security services, the military, and the judicial system to limit both of those presidents'

programs that might liberalize the Iranian political system, economies, and society. The appearance of Ahmadinejad as a presidential candidate in 2005 was the best news for Khamenehi's plans.

Khamenehi's second son, who is more radical than his father and who held a strong influence on his father's opinions and decision-making, introduced Ahmadinejad to Khamenehi. Ahmadinejad's political affiliation and his ideological worldview are connected to one of the most reactionary political groups in Iranian politics. He has close ties to the secretive Hojatieh organization and its leader Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi, "who believes that an Islamic state does not need to have any democratic aspects because its government is directly sanctioned by God. Such a state ideally would have no elections at all, because its rulers would be appointed by clerical experts divinely inspired to make the right choice."¹

Hojatieh accepts the role of jurisprudence in the society literally as what it was 1,400 years ago. They also accept Khamenehi's role as absolute without any discussion for the time being. Further, Hojatieh and its affiliates are also millenarists who believe that they have to pave the way for second coming of the twelfth Imam (Shia Messiah).

Therefore, Ahmadinejad's political worldview and ideological background were matched with Khamenehi's goals in regard to the absolute power of jurisprudence in politics and religion. For example, in June, right after the election, Ayatollah Khamenehi during Friday prayers mentioned that his opinion is very close to Ahmadinejad's ideas. Ayatollah Khamenehi delighted to have an obedient president who is willing to follow his orders without precondition. Since 2005, Khamenehi and Ahmadinejad have become strange bedfellows. Later, I will explain how Ahmadinejad brought all the executive branches under Khamenehi's full control.

In the recent Iranian elections, Khamenehi faced his worst nightmare due to the massive participation of the people in the election. He understood that this massive popular participation would finally bring back the pre-2005 election status by renewing the conflict of opinion between him and the president he patiently hates.

Khamenehi had serious problems with the main reformist candidate, Mr. Mousawi during his premiership in 1980. In the mid 1980s when he was President, he tried many times to replace Mr. Mousawi with someone

who was more likeminded. Khamenehi always complained that Mr. Mousawi's government was weak and performing poorly. However, according to Ayatollah Rafsanjani's memoirs, Ayatollah Khomeini was strongly against the replacement of the prime minister due to war and economic hardship. Further, Khomeini considered replacing the prime minister a destabilizing factor in the Iranian society and in the international scene.

After the death of Khomeini, the problem of the disobedient prime minister was resolved when Ayatollah Khamenehi obtained his office as a new leader of the Islamic Republic. One of his first changes was abolishing the office of prime minister, transferring all the responsibilities of prime minister to the presidential office. Consequently, Mousawi lost his job and, for nearly 20 years, he did not participate in any election.

Mr. Mousawi was the least of Khamenehi's concerns in this election. He faced stronger opposition. Ayatollah Khamenehi had serious problems with Ayatollah Rafsanjani. In the Friday prayer he openly distinguished his differences with Ayatollah Rafsanjani. He mentioned he has 84 points of disagreement with Rafsanjani in a wide range of issues such as foreign policy, social justice, and culture. Rafsanjani was, and still is, a serious threat to Khamenehi's power. Therefore, this election provided a wonderful tool to change the balance of power in the unelected part of the Iranian political system.

Further, in 21 June 2009, Associated Press reported chilling news that may finalize the Khamenehi-Rafsanjani's relations. The "State-run Press TV reported that Rafsanjani's eldest daughter, Faezeh Hashemi, and four other family members were arrested late Saturday." This incident is an unprecedented event in the last 30 years of the Islamic Republic. The government was very unforgiving toward people who were against the regime in any shape and form. However, they were always very tolerant toward the family members of the Regime. The arrest of the Rafsanjani's oldest daughter widened the friction among the highest members of the Islamic Republic and created serious difficulties for future inner circle reconciliation.

The Islamic Republic's Duality and Ahmadinejad's Presidency

For a long time, the Iranian political system did not have a homogeneous decision-making process. Abas Maleki, who was the previous assistant director of Iran Islamic Republic's Ministry of Foreign Affairs and currently the Chairman of the International Institute for Caspian Studies, described Iranian foreign policy as the conclusion of "complicated and multilevel relations among official and unofficial players, many of whom have different and sometimes opposing interests."²

The 2005 Iranian Presidential election brought hardliners into the center of the Iranian politics. Since the 2005 presidential election, the decision-making process has changed and "for the first time since the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran, the legislative, judicial, and executive powers (which incorporate the military), and security forces have come to hold relatively homogeneous views in all political, economic, ideological, military, security, cultural, and social spheres of policy. Therefore, uniformity of views among the new policy makers is now the hallmark of the political landscape in Iran."³

Under Ahmadinejad's leadership, the executive branch of the Iranian political system has been unified and works much more harmoniously with each other. After unifying the higher echelons of the government, he also purged all reformist officials from government positions in both the central and provincial administrations.

The first phase of the Khamenehi's plan, to have full control of power, has been fulfilled with very little resistance. The second part of the Khamenehi's plan, to purge people from the unelected sections of the Iranian political system, has been left for another time. If Ahmadinejad was not able to have a positive influence on the Iranian society as a whole, he was able to fulfill Ayatollah Khamenehi's order and concentrated more power in his hands than ever before. Therefore, Ahmadinejad enjoyed Ayatollah Khamenehi's full support and trust.

Preparing an Election Scenario

Beginning of Complicated PSYOP

The current Iranian presidential election was a real struggle between both wings of the Iranian ruling elite.

The presidential election was in the making for the last two years. Ahmadinejad and Khamenehi have had the upper hand for planning and execution of the presidential election.

On one hand, Ahmadinejad – as a conservative – lost his last credibility with many urban dwellers, middle class educated Iranians, and many ordinary people who did not want to see Ahmadinejad reelected.

On the other hand, the reform camp had difficulty finding someone to run against Ahmadinejad. Therefore, many people asked ex-Iranian President Khatami to run again for the presidential office. His supporters were mindful of the fact that he does not strongly oppose Khamenehi's orders, but they had no other choice.

Khatami's entrance into the electoral process caused a great shock in the conservatives' camp. Therefore, they decided to open two fronts against the reformers, especially Khatami. First, they tried to discourage Khatami from continuing his presidential bid. Then, they attempted to draw the unskilled reformist into the presidential election.

In the first part of their operation, conservatives began a very sophisticated psychological operation against Khatami. Through their papers, social gatherings, weblogs, and other means, they demonized his personality, accused Khatami of being liberal, pro-Western, corrupt, and many other accusations. Further, Mr. Shariatmadari, the Chief Editor of the Keyhan newspaper, in one of his articles had openly blackmailed Khatami by reminding Khatami that he can share Benazir Bhutto's fate if he stayed in the race for a long time. During this campaign against Khatami, the pressure groups, whose primary role was creating chaos, were operating at full throttle. They even came very close to directly attacking Khatami.

Conservatives evaluated Khatami's psychology quite accurately. They clearly knew that Khatami was not able to take such stress, and, if he found an alternative to his candidacy, he would quit the race. The second phase of the operation was finding someone who was not capable of running an effective presidential campaign against Ahmadinejad. They soon found their wonderful alternative in Mr. Mir Hussain Mousawi, a man who had been away from active politics for the last 20 years. Most of the people did not remember him from the time when he was prime minister.

It seemed that conservatives had found their reformist candidate. Conservatives had won on both fronts. Simultaneously, Mousawi entered the presidential race and Khatami ceased his presidential campaign. The battleground was ready for Ahmadinejad's easy reelection. However, what conservatives did not calculate was that the people were so fed up with Ahmadinejad and the Islamic regime that they would do anything to stop his reelection.

Presidential Election and Importance of Debates

(First Stage of PSYOP with Ahmadinejad and the Rest)

In the beginning of the presidential elections, no one thought that Mousawi would be able to attract many voters. Contrary to all predictions, Mr. Mousawi had become a serious contender against Ahmadinejad. Mousawi was the dark horse of the presidential elections. The reason for Mousawi's success was neither his personality nor his programs. The Iranian people understand very well that all the presidential candidates, including Mousawi, are trusted agents who fully support the Iranian political system. As mentioned before, many urban dwellers, middle class educated Iranians, and ordinary people were fed up with Ahmadinejad and what he represents in Iranian politics. Therefore, they really did not care who was running against Ahmadinejad.

Mousawi's improbable success and his popularity was a real game changer in the Iranian political system. He was able to undermine the conservative political structure that was perfected after the 2005 election. The Mousawi-Ahmadinejad debate was the best example of Khamenehi's desire to clean the unwanted people from his backyard. This was the second stage of a process that was started with Ahmadinejad's first presidency.

As mentioned before, Ahmadinejad solidified his power by purging all reformist officials in the government. However, this time his aim was higher than the first. This time Khamenehi was after the clerics who did not get along with him; people such as Rafsanjani, Khatami, and others. The presidential debate provided the perfect scene to attack Khamenehi's rivals.

It is obvious that Ahmadinejad, without Khamenehi's approval, was not able to attack Rafsanjani and others,

accusing them of corruption and embezzlement of the national wealth. Ahmadinejad's attacks against prominent pragmatic and reformist figures were very well orchestrated. Basically, Khamenehi wanted to force Rafsanjani and others to break their relationship with the government and retire from politics. The purging of politicians such as Rafsanjani could take place only if Ahmadinejad was reelected as president. Not surprisingly, Ahmadinejad won the presidential election.

After the Election and the Future

(Second Stage of PSYOP)

Based on some rumors, Ahmadinejad did not officially win the election. In contrast, he took third place among four candidates while Khamenehi decided to change the election's outcomes. Yet, there is another story behind the presidential election that has more credibility.

Mr. Muhsen Rezaii, who was the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Council's (IRGC) supreme commander during the Iran-Iraq War and is one of the most trusted people in the Islamic regime, participated in the election under the conservative platform. Yet he also joined reformers' protests against the election and accused the government of rigging the vote right after the election. In an interview with the Iranian National Television Channel II, he mentioned that "in 170 voting stations out of 368, the number of votes were 95-140 percent higher than the number of registered voters in those areas." In other words, at least 50 percent of voting stations were filled with invalid votes in favor of Ahmadinejad.

Before the Ministry of Interior declared Ahmadinejad's reelection as president, Khamenehi quickly sent a congratulatory note declaring Ahmadinejad's triumphant victory as "divine will," and asking everyone to accept the election outcome and stay behind the government as both a religious and national duty. This letter was a clear indication of what Khamenehi had in mind. He understood that the pragmatic and reformist wings of the government would do everything they could to express their distaste of the electoral outcomes. He wanted to show them the election was a fait accompli.

Khamenehi's letter was not a simple document. Khamenehi has dual power. On the one hand, he is the head of the state as a political figure; on the other hand, he has religious authority far exceeding his political authority. As a religious leader, or Vali Faghih, the

representative of Mehdi (Shia Twelfth Imam) on the earth, his edicts must be followed unquestionably by all Shia Muslims, especially in Iran, regardless of their validity. For example, the Imam of Tehran's Friday prayer, Ayatollah Khatami (not related to President Khatami), in his Friday sermon stated "A person who opposes the Vali Faghih's order, he also opposes the Imam Masoum order (Twelfth Imam), and opposing Imam Masoum's order is equal to opposing God's order."

Khamenehi abused his power to force people to accept Ahmadinejad's election as a "divine will." In other words, he ordered people to accept Ahmadinejad's presidency, so everyone must obey his order because he is the one who has most knowledge, he is infallible and, therefore, he does not make mistakes.

Ayatollah Khamenehi in the Friday prayers used cultural PSYOP against the opposition, repeatedly asking them to end the opposition and accept the official verdict. He also used the Iranian sensitivity toward people's lives and their future. He openly put the responsibility for bloodshed on the activities of the opposition. Then he washed his hands from any future bloodshed. He indirectly gave carte blanche to the security forces, pressure groups, and the IRGC to use excessive force against the opposition without any hesitation.

Ayatollah Khamenehi learned from the Shah who was very soft against the protesters. He understands that any softness against the opposition in the streets of Tehran will end the Islamic Republic within a few months. Therefore, the regime is not hesitant to use even more powerful tools to end the protests. There are some historical precedents that when Islamic leaders felt their system was in danger, they were ready to take extraordinary steps to stop anti-Islamic regime activities. For instance, one of the most famous examples of this brutal behavior was the massacre of 4,500 of the political dissidents at the end of the Iran-Iraq war.

After the end of the war, the Iranian regime was extremely weak and people were unhappy that, after eight years of war, Iran surrendered without achieving its goals; thus, accepting the destruction of its economy and the death of millions of Iranians. With great fear of an uprising of Iranian people, and with the jailed opposition leaders leading the movement from their cells, Khomeini decided to massacre all political prisoners regardless of their level of political engagement in the Iranian politics.

Based on the latest news, it appears that a single incident will trigger more and bloodier conflict in Iran. Perhaps this incident will cover up the election fraud for a while and will provide permission to use all repressive tools to ruin the Iranian opposition. A suicide bomber has attacked the Ayatollah Khomeini's mausoleum and killed a few people. It is obvious that this incident could be used as an effective PSYOP against the opposition, while at the same time empowering conservatives and religious zealots to attack the opposition mercilessly – as if they are responsible for the suicide bombing incident.

I would like to draw the readers' attention to another fact that the two former presidents, Rafsanjani and Khatami, who are extremely influential within the Iranian political system, have kept their silence neither supporting nor opposing the street demonstrations against the Ahmadinejad and Ayatollah Khamenehi. This silence is very meaningful and sent more messages than any other loud rhetoric.

Their silence is a strong indication that the regime is crumbling from within. The Islamic Republic officials, who in the last 30 years were able to defend their system through their resolution and a unified front, are now losing their major strength – their unity.

Post Election Unrest and Reverse PSYOP

No one could have anticipated the people's anger and impatience; it was unprecedented and a surprise to all. In the past 30 years, there were many opportunities for the people to revolt against the government, but they waited patiently, not raising their voices. According to Mr. Nouradin Pir Mavedat, a former Iranian Parliament Representative, in a stateside interview with Radio Free Europe, said Khamenehi and his allies believe that "[people] will yell for a week and for four years they'll be cooled-off." However, this dream scenario never materialized – they witnessed angry people that will not forgive as in times past!

In reality, Khamenehi and Ahmadinejad were unprepared for such an immense and uncontrollable upheaval, and only when it was too late did the realities dawn on them. Unlike times past, this time lots of bloodshed was required for the government to protect its power. Khamenehi took the first step in the Friday prayer following the election when he declared the people must

cither accept the election results and go home, or face repression and death in the streets.

His words had little influence on the people who have had enough of this government. Unlike the West where freedom to peaceably assemble and dissent against any government is a right of the people, here we witness another type of psychological operation. First, the government's official stance was that the demonstrators were vandals and hooligans; second, such demonstrations justified the government's extraordinarily repressive measures to crush the street demonstrations; and third, they deflected responsibility for the unrest by turning the tables on foreign powers like Great Britain and the United States and blaming them for fomenting the people's unrest.

The Khamenehi-Ahmadinejad government then tried to appeal to the people's sense of Iranian history and their exclusive culture in a bid to use "cultural PSYOP" strategies. In an appeal to national pride, they reminded the people of how many times the US and Great Britain had intrusively interfered in Iranian affairs over the last 100 years. Of course, comparisons were made between the past historical record of foreign abuses and the current state of affairs, suggesting the people's accommodation of "foreign" ideas was "un-Iranian." This propaganda may have influenced the people in some measure, since from all walks of life they have long been exposed to the strong paranoia of foreign intervention.

It is important to mention here that many consider foreign radio broadcasts as having a negative influence and are being used as a tool against their national interests. This concept is deeply rooted in Iranian psychology to the point that people jokingly say that the British Broadcasting Corporation caused the 1979 revolution, yet some seriously believe this.

The government tried to exploit the people's psychological predisposition by turning their focus from election fraud and irregularities toward foreign conspiracy. The government has begun to harness the media to create a massive propaganda campaign against foreign radio and television broadcasters, linking their stations to the street demonstrations. Immediately after the crackdown en masse on the demonstrators, the authorities arrested those involved in radio and television broadcasting and made them confess that foreign media encouraged them to participate in the anti-government street demonstrations.

These types of propaganda are not new in Iranian politics. In the 1980s, the Islamic government tried to establish itself by the use of heavy-handed tactics and forcing opposition members to confess and incriminate themselves on national television. Under such strong-arm measures, one wonders if the opposition party members confessed to crimes they never committed.

This time it was different. The opposition party, among many others (and even the clerics), has openly condemned the corrupt practice of parading people with opposing views in front of a television audience to confess to crimes they did not commit. Further, they reminded the government that such forced confessions are inadmissible in a court of law.

What seems obvious is that the government is in a state of shock and incapable of making an honorable compromise with the opposition; more importantly, it has no reasonable plan to reduce tensions in the streets. The ongoing propaganda of accusing the foreign media and embassies of meddling in Iranian domestic affairs will become a recurring theme and standard of PSYOP in the coming year.

Conclusion

A powerful mixture of politics and deception has been used to reelect Ahmadinejad as President of Iran. The regime believes that the people will eventually accept that fact and go home. However, they did not calculate the people's anger against a regime that is repressive and reactionary in nature. The psychological operations that they launched during the election and post election periods have had deadly results for the Islamic regime. They masterfully have used both religious and Iranian cultural sensitivities in order to silence the political dissent. Nevertheless, it had the opposite outcome.

Also at issue here is the Khamenehi-Ahmadinejad plan to purge moderates, reformers, and pragmatists from the higher echelons of government. The disappearance of more moderate members of the Islamic Republic may facilitate the radicalization of the state, with the governing clerics becoming more conservative and fundamentalist along traditional lines. The Republican system (what some pundits call the "theocratic democracy") will morph from being people-centered into a restrictive Islamic Sharia Law based system with non-negotiable edicts.

In the possible short term, however, many people believe that in the new repressive political environment, Khamenehi will be a big winner. In contrast, at the macro level Khamenehi will lose significant power to forces much more powerful (Hojatieh, Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi, and IRGC high-ranking officers). He could lose his office, too. Khamenehi's misinterpretation of both the people, and his leadership role during the dissent, forced him into an alliance with extremely conservative and reactionary elements that oppose a modern system of government. With the masses yearning to join the 21st Century, in Western parlance, Khamenehi may yet realize he backed the wrong horse.

What we are witnessing is a process of Khamenehi cutting himself off from his main supporters, and wherein his new allies do not trust him but are exploiting him to create an Islamic Khalifate. In such a draconian government, God and religious edicts are the main players and democratic values are not even considered.

If the government wins the street battles with the people and purges powerful moderate clerics from government, there will be little to stop the winds that blow; we will then see the widespread propagandizing of religious superstition and Shia eschatology. At the international level, Iran will be more politically alienated, isolated, and radical in nature.

If they decide to compromise with opposition leaders this regime may survive the current upheaval, but it has been a long and painful process of soul-searching at all levels of the Islamic Republic. If they continue to follow the hard line against their own people, it will be very difficult to believe that the Islamic Republic can survive very long.

The collapse of the Islamic Republic in Iran will produce new sets of problems and challenges in world affairs. The Iranian resilience and political maturity and capabilities, however, should not be underestimated, for they have made phenomenal progress. Under the Islamic Republic of Iran, a new, modern, self-confident, well informed, and democratic Iran is growing. The experiment of "theocratic democracy," of trying to create legitimacy and standing-up political institutions with political campaigns and elections, was the best teacher of democracy for the Iranian people in order to create a vibrant Civic Society.

Besides the political maturity and reasonably fast learning curve of the Iranian people, another quality they possess is the exercise of extreme patience these past 30 years. With no better political alternative to the Islamic Republic, they decided to not openly oppose their government, but rather to work within its protective umbrella to protect their national interests, maintain security, and provide hope for a better future.

In a word, the new Iran after the Islamic Republic will have earned self-respect, become more democratic, and will be seen as a serious power on the world scene. Iran may also be seen as becoming a serious prototypical developmental model for the rest of the Islamic world.

About the Author:

Mr. Njdeh "Nick" Asisian was born in an Armenian family in Kermanshah, Iran. He served two years as a conscript in the Iranian Army in the early 1980s. He immigrated to the United States in October 1988 and became a naturalized US citizen. He currently works for the Battle Command Training Program (BCTP) as a PmESII Analyst and Chief Research Analyst. He earned a BA in International Relations from the University of California Santa Barbara, and a Master of Arts Degree in East European, Russian and Eurasian Studies from the University of Kansas. He also is pursuing a Ph.D. in International Law and Diplomacy.

Endnotes:

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² Abas Maleki, Sanad Cheshmandaz va Ravabet Khareji Iran, trans. By Njdeh Asisian, "The Outlook Document and Iranian Foreign Policy," Institute of Russia, Central Asia, and Caucasus Studies (IRAS), available from <http://www.iras.ir>; internet; accessed 3 May 2008.

³ Center for Strategic Research "Iran's New Foreign Policy"; available from <http://www.csr.ir/departments.aspx?lng=en&abtid=07&&depid=106&&semid=661>; Internet; accessed Oct. 10, 2007.

Afghanistan's Opium Alternative: Poppy Fields to Wheat Fields

Major Glen Weaver, USAF, JCOA Analyst

"If you can protect the farmer and give him the ability to get to market, he's going to do fine with other crops." - Gen. Stanley McChrystal, Wall Street Journal, 14 Aug 09

Introduction

As current forces work to end the demand for opium being exported from Afghanistan, resources must be committed to establishing a viable legal crop. The coalition can help create the conditions for an economy that's dependent on legal agriculture by focusing precious resources and unique advising capabilities on the following: robust rural development, agriculture demonstration farms, and secure farming environments. This paper describes the above three elements of crop transition, provides examples of accomplished farming projects, and delineates how agricultural programs can be expanded as a successful comprehensive approach in Afghanistan.

Historical background

Currently, opium production runs Afghanistan's economy. Since the Taliban rose to power in Afghanistan in 1994, opium has steadily increased from 71,000 hectares to 123,000 hectares in 2009.¹ This is down from a peak of 193,000 hectares in 2007.² In 2006, twenty-one of Afghanistan's thirty-four provinces were producing 94 percent of the world's supply--estimated at a pre-export value of \$4 billion and equivalent to nearly 50 percent of the country's GDP.³ The province producing the most opium is Helmand province; the focus of counterinsurgency operations. Opium is a popular crop because it is resistant to drought, is easily grown in most parts of Afghanistan, and spreads the farmer's workload throughout the year.

Rural Development

The goal of rural development in Afghanistan is to enable farmers to transition from an illegal agricultural economy to an economy that prospers on legal crops. Robust infrastructure revitalization through roads, railways, and grain storage facilities is essential to rural development. The roads and rails to transport crops to market must be given as much, if not more, focus as the actual harvesting of crops. Infrastructure

development must be coordinated with partnered military operations, such as the strategic placement of bridges utilized for military purposes then being handed over to communities as a peace offering for transport of viable crops to feed the population. Poppy fields must be gradually transitioned from opium fields to wheat fields through rural development training on crop rotation, soil quality lessons, and harvesting and storage methods. In exchange for offering up poppy fields for legal crops, farmers would receive free supplemental seeds, fertilizer, irrigation training, and breeding stock. A rushed coca eradication program, as occurred against the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia⁴ and guerillas in Peru⁵ alienated the population and strengthened the insurgent guerillas. Eradication does not accomplish our strategic goal of building positive partnerships with the Afghan government to improve the lives of the Afghan people.⁶ Abruptly burning or spraying poppy fields will only enflame the insurgency and fuel allegiance to the Taliban.⁷ Our goal in defeating an insurgency is to win the support of the population, and destroying their crops will only give local tribesmen a reason to join the insurgency. Rural development programs have the potential to bring farmers into the political fabric by creating a sense of vested partnership and relationship between farmers and the Government of Afghanistan.

Demonstration Farms

Afghan agriculture expertise needs to be significantly bolstered.⁸ By allowing international farmers to establish demonstration farms in Afghanistan they will give Afghan farmers the skills and modern techniques necessary to establish a productive agricultural economy. The uniqueness of greenhouses and grain elevators can serve as an incentive to transition farms from illegal to legal crops. Allowing American farmers and agriculture extension specialists to establish demonstration farms in Afghanistan's opium-rich areas is a viable approach to motivate local farmers to plant alternative and legal crops. Iraqi farmers have greatly benefited from provincial reconstruction teams (PRT) building demonstration farms, consisting of greenhouses, grain elevators, and irrigation systems.⁹ Funds from the Commander's Emergency Reserve Program,¹⁰ along with grants¹¹ to farmers, will enable Afghan farmers


to obtain the initial capital required to build the basic farming infrastructure and offset initial start-up costs. Unique to the harvesting of viable crops, the Afghan people will receive and keep payments as self-sufficient farmers rather than the current system of the Taliban receiving opium income. Demonstration farms will give Afghan farmers a “hands on” farming experience that will educate them on growing new crops. It also allows them to see, touch, and understand concepts and technological advantages for themselves. Inviting Afghan farmers to the heartland of the United States to view a fall harvest or spring planting, and demonstrate how industrialized nations raise crops, must also be a priority and must be resourced.

Protecting Farmers

“We will work with Afghan partners to establish security zones... they provide the ability for an Afghan farmer to raise crops.”¹² As colonial Americans recognized when bravely defending their tobacco farms and cotton fields at the country’s initiation, the security of the land is essential to productive farms. Ideally, military operations should be closely aligned with local planting and harvesting projects in Afghanistan. Protecting the land has personalized importance when the land nurtures the population. Communities with viable agricultural projects will be further committed to defend their own land. A commitment to partnering with farmers and local leaders will help establish long-term strategic partnerships that are vital to national security. We’ve defeated the insurgency when we see Afghanistan citizens defending their amber waves of grain.

About the Author:

Major Glen Weaver, *US Air Force*, grew up on a family farm in west-central Illinois. He received a Bachelor’s Degree in Agriculture and a Master’s Degree in Economics, with a focus on protecting family farms. In addition to working at the US Joint



Forces Command (USJFCOM) Joint Center for Operational Analysis (JCOA), whenever possible Glen farms his several-hundred acre family farm. He is a Navigator on the RC-135 and E-4B aircraft and a commercial pilot who enjoys taking aerial photography.

Endnotes:

¹ Opium Production in Afghanistan 1994-2008, <http://www.swivel.com/charts/2567-Opium-Production-in-Afghanistan-1994-2008>.

² United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), World Drug Report, 2010.

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⁴ Vanda Felbab-Brown, *Shooting Up: Counter-Insurgency and the War on Drugs*, Washington, DC, Brookings Institution Press. 2009.

⁵ Hutchinson Kelsey, *The “War on Coca” in Peru: An Examination of the 1980s and 1990s U.S. “Supply Side” Policies*, Seminar Paper (Spring 2009).

⁶ President Barack Obama, *US National Security Strategy*, May 2010, page 21.

⁷ General James J. Jones, *Afghan Study Group Report*, Center for the study of the Presidency, 30 Jan 08, page 14.

⁸ General James J. Jones, *Afghan Study Group Report*, Center for the study of the Presidency, 30 Jan 08, page 35.

⁹ Army Handbook 10-10, Nov 2009.

¹⁰ General James J. Jones, *Afghan Study Group Report*, Center for the study of the Presidency, 30 Jan 08, page 33.

¹¹ Roots of Peace; USAID Grants \$30 Million to Champion Afghan Farmers, Anonymous. Agriculture Business Week, Atlanta: Feb 18, 2010. pg. 179.

¹² General Stanly McCrystal, COMISAF, 13 Dec 09, CNN Interview.



Afghan farmers discussing planting options

Developing Future Command Surgeons and Staff for Joint Operations and Assignments

Col Edwin Burkett, MD, USJFCOM Command Surgeons' Office
Mr. Jerry Tuero, Medical Analyst, USJFCOM JCOA

Military medical engagement activities as critical pieces of any humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR) mission play an increasing role when the Department of Defense (DOD) is called upon by the United States Government (USG) to support relief efforts during international crises situations (see DODI 6000.16, May 17 2010).¹ Medical efforts also have a prominent role in enhancing the USG's strategic communications impact during relief efforts. Improving our ability to respond efficiently, quickly, and with targeted objectives that meet the needs of the host nation and the responsible commander will require integration of recent lessons learned by the DOD medical community.

It is not the argument of this paper, nor is it intended to suggest, that the medical response to an HA/DR mission is ineffective; DOD medical has in every HA/DR response saved lives, and provided a superior level of care where that capability was often not previously present, or was compromised based on the disaster. What is being discussed here as a topic for consideration and further discussion is the preparation, training, and experiential opportunities that support the development of the surgeon and his or her staff for a contingency response of the magnitude of the Haiti Earthquake (January 2010). Although the medical engagement role is very important in HA/DR missions, perennially it has been an area that medical leadership is often under prepared for from a planning and command and control perspective. To a great degree, this lack of preparation is often due to the system under which the surgeon's office staff is developed, trained, and identified to fulfill operational and strategic level assignments. For one, typically the senior medical leadership position, the command surgeon on a joint staff, joint task force (JTF), or Service component is a physician. This person may be clinically astute and may have had some operational assignments, but often lacks the level of operational planning and experience that is associated with his or her counterparts in the traditional line staff.

The typical career development for a physician includes clinical training that includes residency and specialization, medical practice (the utilization of those medical skills), and leadership roles within medical treatment facilities, clinics, aid stations, or onboard Naval ships. Medical Corps officers may not usually complete primary level (basic) professional military education (PME) because they are promoted to O-3 based upon advanced degree status. However, many choose to complete intermediate PME; and senior level PME completion is essential for promotion to O-6 with few exceptions. The medical corps is typically the staff corps that ultimately serves as a surgeon general (SG) on a geographic or functional combatant command (COCOM) staff, although there are instances when an officer from a different health professions corps might fill this assignment. Clinical training and practice often impacts the SGs operational experience and military planning competencies.

The emphasis on clinical competence is essential because, obviously, we want the best trained clinician overseeing our care and that of our wounded and loved ones, as well as making decisions and advising on issues related to health and human factors in the interaction with global counterparts. However, too often there are trade offs for that clinical competence: such as, limited opportunities and emphasis early in the career on working with and assimilating into operational staffs, training, and experiences with planning and executing missions; and the interactions and engagements with line officers typically associated with preparation for operational engagements.

The other health corps (to include dental, nursing, and biomedical) have similar challenges. Only the medical service corps has an official track for learning, practicing, and doing operational planning. Even so, this is only a handful of medical personnel and they are not equally prepared across the Services: an O-4 Army 70H medical planner has a vastly different preparation than an O-4 US Air Force medical readiness officer. These differences in preparation for operational actions on a joint staff at the JTF or COCOM level greatly affect

efficient planning, SG office interactions with the headquarters staff, and the relevant application of sound clinical knowledge to the operational realities.

This highlights another piece of this complex problem, the medical staffs' integration within a combatant command, a major operational command, or JTF. The surgeon's role at a COCOM is to advise the commander in all things related to health and medical, but comprehensive health implications are often overlooked during the real-world mission planning process, or are underexplored during major command exercises. In this new age of providing increasingly more support and assistance in HA/DR missions, it is critical that the medical officer's role and integration in the planning process be increased, and that exercises integrate a greater and more realistic medical scenario at the very inception of the process. This role should be more comprehensive and sophisticated than in the past; for instance, it does not provide significant constructive training for the medical staff or the line staffs if the medical inject is only "notional," or exceedingly abbreviated for the exercise to be able to meet its other operational objectives. Naturally, to accomplish this will require more sophisticated SG staffs with medical corps expertise, operational planning expertise, and a depth of knowledge with both the force health protection (FHP) and health engagement aspects of the variety of potential operations—to include HA/DR.

The typical medical inject that non-medical personnel are most comfortable with are FHP injects such as an injury or patient transport, making it a fairly simple to mitigate. What should be developed are more complex injects that flex the commands response with potential operationally significant impact: for example, a major pandemic, a disaster where medical is the centerpiece of the response, positive and negative health related strategic communication issues, and interoperability issues with both military and civilian health sector partners. As important as it is for the medical staff to be afforded opportunities to train and exercise complex medical scenarios, it is just as important that the line staff learn to work with and integrate the medical planners and medical staff within their boards, centers, and cells. The line commanders must make the medical staff full participants in the planning and preparations of HA/DR and contingency planning, and ensure full integration and collaboration across all levels of the command. The line commander plays a key role in the development and integration of the SG staff in their

day-to-day battle rhythm planning, but the Services also have a more critical role and responsibility for preparing potential command surgeons, and their staffs, to support and advise the joint commanders confidently and appropriately.

Selecting the exercise training audience is another crucial aspect. Commanders and command surgeons must ensure that the medical personnel in the training audiences are not just "warm bodies" but the actual people with the greatest potential for deploying in the same capacity for real-world operations. As the old saying goes, "you play the way you practice," so the first stringers should be the main personnel as the training audience for major exercises. Congruently, the medical personnel for the exercise training teams must be fully competent—preferably through academic knowledge, experience, and operational savvy—who can then partner with the SG in delivering content that stresses and generates the needed responses to achieve the health related mission essential tasks for pertinent training objectives.

Early identification of candidates for operational billets can help in the development phase and preparation of future operational surgeons general and their staffs. Adopting the joint qualification designation used by the line personnel could be the right step to improving the joint surgeon's staff capabilities, and should be made a requirement for joint medical operational assignments. Educational and training opportunities can be aligned with career milestones and associated with the rank of the officer. In addition to rank appropriate professional military/developmental education, the following training opportunities could be the basis for medical joint qualification: Joint Operations Medical Management Course (JOMMC), Joint Medical Planners Course (JMPC), the United States Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) sponsored Senior Medical Leadership Seminar (SMLS),² and one of the Joint Professional Military Education³ phase II (JPMEII) courses at the Joint Forces Staff College (JFSC). JFSC even has a web-based course for senior enlisted personnel. The JFSC type of education and training opportunity will be a key factor in integrating the medical staff with the operational warfighter. Like the warfare officers, the medical staff corps officers must understand the joint operational planning and execution system (JOPES), course of action (COA) development, time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD), and be well versed in joint and combined processes. In addition to gaining

these skills, they must develop the personal and professional relationships with other Service/nation counterparts in order to foster the synergy needed when a crisis situation arises.

The JTF surgeon's role needs to be well-articulated and institutionalized throughout the Services. The Army, Navy, and Air Force should have a joint training pipeline developed and vetted through the Services and COCOM commanders. This effort could be developed to encompass several years and iterations of specific roles and assignments, each associated with a specific educational, and/or training opportunity, and aligned to the officers rank—all of which is designed to elevate the officers operational knowledge, competence, and experience. A potential and perhaps best fit to develop the necessary training would be via the joint trainer responsibility at USJFCOM, with input and collaboration from each Service's medical command and line leadership. This would require continuous updating using joint experiences and lessons learned. This process would prepare our medical officers to be both practical clinicians and competent in the basics of joint operational planning. Our designated medical operational planners from each Service would become a more consistent and expert joint capability. The joint medical community has proven itself beyond measure in its ability to execute force health protection and life saving actions. Ultimately, with attention to the type of joint operational preparation discussed, we can develop even more capable command surgeons and staffs who are ready to support the joint and Service component commanders in health engagement. This capability is especially critical in HA/DR execution and for any other future operation in the joint operational environment.

Over the past several years, starting with the Haiti peacekeeping mission (2004), the Indian Ocean tsunami (2004), the Pakistan earthquake (2005), and the Guatemala mudslides (2005),⁴ with the latest being Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE—the Haiti Earthquake Response of January 2010—USJFCOM's, Joint Center for Operational Analysis has deployed teams of analysts in support of those HA/DR events. Analysis of these events revealed a number of common enabling capabilities that were critical for success in a HA/DR response. The SG and staff preparation is the main step in being able to address each of the issues in that analysis:

Conclusions of the JCOA studies highlight eight key enablers of international HA/DR operations:

- Speed of response
- Situational awareness
- Distribution management
- Strategic communications
- Planning and organization
- Coordination
- Existing theater engagement
- Medical capabilities.

Although the eight enablers cited above reflect the whole joint task force, all of these enablers have the potential to improve and better prepare SGs and their medical staffs in support of operational commanders. The medical community can utilize these eight enablers as a template from which to continue to improve, as all eight are applicable as an internal medical component and can be addressed by the medical community.

Endnotes:

¹ Department of Defense Instruction 6000.16, May 17, 2010, Subject: Military Health Support for Stability Operations.

² The SMLS contains important considerations for organizing and establishing the JTF surgeon's office within a JTF Headquarters, and provides an initial, general overview of the responsibilities of the JTF surgeon—a "primer" for planning and executing force health protection (FHP) and health service support (HSS) to JTF operations. It also briefly describes relationships between the geographic combatant command (GCC) surgeon, Standing Joint Force Headquarters (Core Element) (SJFHQ-CE) Medical Planner, the JTF surgeon, multinational, and interagency coordination. Further, it describes typical functions and responsibilities of the JTF surgeon's staff, and those staff members that represent the JTF surgeon at various boards, centers, cells, and other JTF coordinating bodies.

³ JPME is divided into two phases. JPME Phase I consists of intermediate and senior level Service college curricula. It emphasizes the fundamentals needed for a sound basis in joint operations, and is taught from the component's perspective. JPME Phase II consists of intermediate and senior level courses offered by the Joint Forces Staff College. Phase II emphasizes joint perspectives; focusing on planning, operations, and procedures. JPME: NRA News/September 2005.

⁴ International Humanitarian Assistance and Relief Operations, Joint Center for Operational Analysis, 23 January 2007.

About the Author:

Colonel (Dr.) Edwin K. Burkett is the Chief, Global Health Branch, in the Office of the Command Surgeon, United States Joint Forces Command, Norfolk, Virginia. He is a graduate of the Uniformed Service University and is a Family Physician, Flight Surgeon, and Air Force International Health Specialist with skills in foreign language and culture, civil-military cooperation, and health engagement. His current responsibilities include integrating cutting edge perspective into joint doctrine and current operations in order to enable the military health system to excel in the joint/multinational environment. Col Burkett co-authored a USJFCOM White Paper entitled *Emerging Challenges in Medical Stability Operations* and has presented on related topics at multiple venues. He has prior experience in humanitarian and health engagement activities in Haiti and in multiple other countries.

Mr. Jerry Tuero, LCDR (Ret), Medical Service Corps, retired after 28-years of active Duty from the US Navy as a Medical Planner. His experiences include assignments in navy medicine, at-sea assignments, joint operations, joint training, and the development of joint capability based assessments. Employed by Booz/Allen/Hamilton Defense Team, he currently serves as an operational analyst focusing on medical related issues for the US Joint Forces Command Joint Center for Operational Analysis.



Patients being returned from USNS Comfort



Medical staff onboard USNS Comfort during Haiti earthquake relief operations



USNS Comfort off the island of Haiti during earthquake relief operations



**United States Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM)
Joint Center for Operational Analysis (JCOA)**

JCOA Products List

(11 June 2010)

The following are descriptions of JCOA studies and their products arranged by topic area. All products are, or soon will be, available on the SIPRNET at <http://kt.jfeom.smil.mil/jcoa>. Although some of the products listed below are classified, all of the descriptions herein are unclassified.

Afghanistan

Civilian Casualties in Afghanistan (2009–2010)

US Central Command commissioned JCOA to conduct a detailed study of civilian casualty (CIVCAS) incidents in Afghanistan. This study was conducted in two phases: Phase I focuses on causal factors in the CIVCAS incident in Farah on 4 May 2009; Phase II is a comprehensive study of US-caused CIVCAS incidents in Afghanistan between 2007 and mid-2009. These products identify trends and causal factors associated with CIVCAS incidents; they also include doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) change recommendations for reducing coalition-caused CIVCAS incidents and improving the coalition's response to those incidents. Issues addressed in these products include challenges in positive identification, capturing CIVCAS battle damage assessments, improving escalation-of-force incidents, exercising tactical patience, moving toward special operations–conventional force collaboration, and conducting the battle for the narrative. This study is classified.

Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan Police Reform Challenges (2008)

This study identifies and documents challenges associated with Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan's (CSTC-A's) organizing, training, and equipping of the Afghan National Police (ANP) forces and captures lessons learned associated with transitioning security responsibilities from coalition forces to the Government of Afghanistan during a counterinsurgency. Starting in April 2005, CSTC-A was tasked to

organize, train, and equip the ANP forces. CSTC-A's mission supports security sector reform of Afghanistan, to counter internal and external threats and ultimately ensure the long-term success of the Afghan government. This study is classified.

Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan (2006)

In October 2005, a team from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the Department of State, and JCOA assessed provincial reconstruction team (PRT) operations in Afghanistan as part of an effort to distill best practices. The goals of the assessment were to (1) generate lessons to inform greater cooperation and coordination among various US government departments and agencies in conflict and post-conflict settings, (2) determine key lessons to inform the transition of PRTs to International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), and (3) analyze the PRT concept and various implementation approaches to determine their applicability to other current and future US peace and stability operations. This study is unclassified.

Iraq

Iraq Information Activities (2009)

JCOA identified lessons from the planning and execution of various information activities in Iraq from April 2008 to June 2009. JCOA learned that when commanders discussed information operations (IO), they referred to an activity beyond the five IO capabilities defined in joint doctrine (military deception, operations security, psychological operations, computer network operations, and electronic warfare). They were talking

instead about the integrated employment of these core IO capabilities, in concert with supporting and related capabilities including public affairs and defense support to public diplomacy, under the larger strategic communication umbrella. Our study, which used this broader concept of IO, focused on four key areas: the recognition of IO as “commanders’ business” used to convey his intent through a purposeful set of ideas and actions intended to both influence and inform; the unity of effort required to synthesize IO policy, doctrine, and the realities on the ground; the operational principles of IO that emerged over time; and the practical and methodological challenges that made assessment of IO difficult. In summary, JCOA observed a growing understanding and appreciation for the decisive role that information and influence played in the Iraqi operational environment, where commanders identified IO as “the most important issue facing the warfighter today.” We propose that the concept of the “battle for the narrative,” which characterizes today’s IO in Iraq and elsewhere, could provide the framework to align, coordinate, integrate, employ, and organize lethal and nonlethal capabilities for counterinsurgencies and other types of warfare. This study is classified.

Strategic Communication Best Practices (2009)

In April 2008, at the request of the Multi-National Force–Iraq (MNF-I) Chief of Staff, the USJFCOM Deputy Director for Strategic Communication undertook a data collection effort to document MNF-I strategic communication best practices and their doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) implications. That effort culminated in a brief that was disseminated to appropriate customers within the Department of Defense. JCOA reviewed the brief and felt that the recent successes in MNF-I strategic communication needed to be further documented and shared with other combatant commands and joint task forces. This JCOA paper therefore builds upon the foundation laid by the USJFCOM Deputy Director for Strategic Communication and presents a further look at the key elements of this good-news story. This study is unclassified.

Comprehensive Approach–Iraq (2009)

GEN David Petraeus requested that JCOA capture successes in the coalition’s integrated counterinsurgency efforts against Al Qaeda in Iraq during 2007–2008 (“Anaconda Strategy”). GEN Ray Odierno and AMB Ryan Crocker added that the study should emphasize civil-military cooperation from strategic to tactical levels. This study focused on four main themes:

unifying efforts, attacking insurgent networks, separating the population from the insurgents, and building Government of Iraq capabilities. The study began in September 2008 and continued into 2009. This study includes both classified and unclassified products.

Joint Tactical Environment (2008)

The Joint Tactical Environment (JTE) study originated from a request by Multi-National Force–Iraq to USJFCOM to document the innovation in Iraq between air-weapons teams and unmanned aerial vehicles during operations in Sadr City. That task expanded to include other urban areas in Iraq and the critical command and control and airspace operations in those urban environments. Ultimately, the JTE mission documented innovation and best practices involving the integration of joint capabilities in urban operations. Specifically, the study was tasked to address four main pillars: command and control; fires; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; and airspace from the joint perspective in an effort to better understand how units in environments such as Sadr City, Basrah, Mosul, and others employed joint or nonorganic capabilities for their specific operational environment. This study includes both classified and unclassified products.

Counterinsurgency Targeting and Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (2008)

Multi-National Force–Iraq requested this study to capture, document, and validate intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) best practices and lessons to improve ISR employment in support of counterinsurgency (COIN) targeting in Iraq. JCOA collected data from almost all brigades, some battalions, and selected companies, in addition to higher-echelon headquarters. Team members observed operations, conducted interviews, and collected data to document best practices important to success or failure in COIN targeting. While conducting this study, it became clear that ISR support to COIN targeting had to be understood in relation to ISR support to the broader spectrum of COIN missions. This study is classified.

Counterinsurgency Operations (2007)

The counterinsurgency (COIN) study examines the shift in focus from reconstruction operations in 2003 to COIN operations (supported by a “surge” of US troops) in 2007. It focuses on the following areas: (1) evolution of US coalition strategy in Iraq, (2) elements of the latest strategy, and (3) impact of implementation of the latest strategy. This study includes both classified and unclassified products.

Task Force Freedom, Mosul, Iraq (2007)

This is the story of Task Force Freedom and how teamwork between those conducting operations and those providing intelligence led to success. Task Force Freedom adapted to a severely degraded security situation by developing a streamlined targeting cycle, lowering the threshold of actionable intelligence, and enabling distributed execution—underpinned by shared awareness and purpose. This study is classified.

Al Anbar Best Practice Study (2007)

This study examines how Al Anbar changed dramatically between fall 2006 and spring 2007, from one of the most violent, anti-coalition insurgent strongholds to one in which local tribal leaders partnered with coalition forces in an effort to defeat Al Qaeda in Iraq. Violence dropped significantly, reconstruction projects began, the economy resurged, and normalcy returned. This study is classified.

Transition to Sovereignty (2007)

This study examines Operation IRAQI FREEDOM from June 2004 to December 2005. This period began when the Coalition Provisional Authority transferred sovereignty to the newly elected Iraq government. During this time frame, the insurgency gained momentum, as it became apparent that the capabilities of other elements of US government could not be brought to bear on the situation because of the deteriorating security situation. This study is classified.

Stabilization, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction in a Counterinsurgency (2006)

The Joint Staff and JCOA collected lessons during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. Each evaluated stability, security, transition, and reconstruction operations from the end of joint combined combat operations in May 2003 until the transition to Iraqi sovereignty on 28 June 2004. This study combines the two efforts to allow the reader to review them in a single document, if desired. This study is classified.

Joint Health Service Operations (2005)

The Department of Defense (DOD) medical community has had great success in the treatment of combat casualties in Iraq. Combat mortality, defined as a measurement of the percentage of all battle casualties that result in death (Killed in Action + Died of Wounds/Total Battle Casualties), is the lowest level in recorded warfare. Despite the success in the reduction of combat mortality among coalition combat casualties, DOD medical treatment facilities still face many

difficult challenges. These medical support challenges are examined in the JCOA medical study. The study is classified.

Synchronizing Counter-IED Efforts in Iraq (2005)

This study examines the challenges of synchronizing and coordinating the activities of multiple entities working to counter adversaries' use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs). This study is classified.

Joint Combined Combat Operations (2004)

This study compiles operational insights gathered during major combat operations and assesses their impact on future joint warfighting at the operational level. It catalogs important findings, puts those findings in context, and outlines the nature of the actions needed to address them. This study is classified.

Irregular Warfare

Sri Lanka (2009)

In May 2009, the Sri Lankan military concluded a three-year sustained offensive against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), completely overwhelming the Tamil Tiger organization and killing its leader, Vellupillai Prabhakaran. In the wake of this military victory, the Government of Sri Lanka announced its final triumph over Sri Lanka's Tamil insurgency following twenty-six years of bloody civil war and centuries of ethnic conflict between Sri Lanka's Buddhist Sinhalese majority and its Hindu Tamil minority. Sri Lanka's self-proclaimed triumph over the LTTE has left some in the international community wondering whether the Sri Lankan approach represents a viable, aggressive alternative to less confrontational methods of resolving ethno-religious insurgencies. This study examines the approaches of Sri Lanka and the LTTE in executing their respective counterinsurgent and insurgent campaigns, and presents conclusions and implications applicable to counterinsurgency and irregular warfare. This study includes both classified and unclassified products.

2nd Lebanon War (2008)

In 2006 the world watched as Israel responded to the 12 July killing of three Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) soldiers and the kidnapping of two additional IDF soldiers by fighters of the Islamic Resistance, the military arm of Hizballah. Over the course of the next month, Israel struggled to use military force and diplomacy to achieve the goals set out by Prime Minister Olmert. When Israel

did not achieve these goals through an aggressive air campaign and subsequent ground invasion of southern Lebanon, many observers began to question Israel's military capabilities. As one officer stated, "Israel has defeated larger Arab armies repeatedly since its creation in 1948. The IDF enjoyed a reputation of invincibility among its Arab neighbors, until last year." What happened? Why? And what are the implications for future conflicts? Many institutions, government agencies, and military services have studied the 2nd Lebanon War. None, however, have reported all the major findings in one holistic account. Using those previous studies as primary data sources, this JCOA study seeks to identify, synthesize, and present the lessons learned about the hybrid threat that seemed to emerge in the 2nd Lebanon War. This study is classified.

Super Empowered Threat (2008)

A follow-on to the JCOA *Techno-Guerrilla* (TG) and *National Response to Biological Contagion* (NRBC), *Super-Empowered Threat* (SET) examines the development of modern terrorist groups and the changes in the asymmetric threat. Work in TG and NRBC demonstrated the exponential increase in the operational and destructive capabilities of small terrorist groups. The threat continues to evolve. Alliances between state sponsors, terrorists groups, organized crime, and transnational gangs are expanding. Terrorists groups are becoming more sophisticated in their use of commercially available electronic and modern telecommunications networks. Their influence is spreading across the globe while our focus is on the Middle East. The study evaluates the emerging terrorist threat using a law enforcement model analyzing behavioral resolve, operational practicality, and technical feasibility. This study includes both classified and unclassified products.

Georgia-Russia Conflict (2008)

This study, tasked by the Joint Staff and conducted in coordination with EUCOM and several USG agencies, examines the summer 2008 Georgia-Russia conflict in terms of background, conduct of the conflict, and the resulting regional/strategic implications. The analysis highlights direct military action in conventional approaches that at the same time used irregular approaches which shaped this conflict for well over a decade. The study offers an opportunity to see the strengths and weaknesses of a re-emergent Russia, as well as the impact of the evolving nature of hybrid warfare with its impact on policy, plans, and preparations for future conflict. This study is classified.

Techno-Guerrilla (2007)

This study explores the evolution of asymmetric warfare and terrorism. The techno-guerrilla is an asymmetric force with conventional techniques and capabilities that utilizes open source warfare ("wiki warfare") and systems disruption, as it seeks to create a transnational insurgency. The study examines the phenomenon of super-empowerment—which is defined as the point at which a small group of individuals can create social-network disruption to an entire society with global effect, also known as the "9/11 effect." This study includes both classified and unclassified products.

Modern Irregular Warfare (2005)

This study provides an executive-level lessons learned overview of modern irregular warfare operations. It focuses on the nature of insurgencies and countering insurgencies, while recognizing that terrorism and intimidation are popular tools for insurgents. This study is unclassified.

Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief

Haiti Earthquake Response (2010)

On 12 January 2010, a 7.0-magnitude earthquake struck Haiti. The earthquake, centered 10 miles west of Port-au-Prince, was the worst to hit the region since 1770. The earthquake killed more than 200,000 and affected more than 3 million people. Haitian capacity was completely overwhelmed, triggering a large international humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (IHADR) effort. At the request of US Southern Command, JCOA deployed a team to collect lessons learned on the IHADR response in Haiti. The initial objective of JCOA's mission was to provide leaders with insights from studies of US government involvement in recent IHADR operations to support planning and informed decisions. A complementary objective was to observe Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE to capture enduring lessons and best practices of combatant commander and joint task force collaborative efforts with the US interagency, United Nations, and nongovernmental organizations. This study is unclassified.

International Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Operations (2007)

This study analyzes four major humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HADR) events: the Haiti peacekeeping mission (2004), the Indian Ocean tsunami (2004), the Pakistan earthquake (2005), and the Guatemala mudslides (2005). Analysis of these events revealed a number of common enabling capabilities that were

critical for success in a HADR response. This study is unclassified.

Guatemala Disaster Relief (2006)

In October 2005, a team of JCOA observers, in conjunction with US Southern Command, conducted a study of Joint Task Force–Bravo’s quick response in the initial phase of helping the Guatemalan government deal with the devastation caused by Hurricane Stan. This study is unclassified.

Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief in Pakistan (2006)

In October 2005, a devastating earthquake caused widespread destruction in northern Pakistan and adjacent areas. In response, US Central Command designated Expeditionary Support Group One as the Combined Disaster Assistance Command—Pakistan to assist the Pakistani government in recovery efforts. A team from JCOA observed and detailed the effectiveness of US forces in accomplishing the mission and strengthening the strategic ties that bind Pakistan and the United States in the Global War on Terror. This study is unclassified.

Operation SECURE TOMORROW (Haiti) (2005)

This study focuses on issues that concerned US Southern Command, Combined Joint Task Force–Haiti, and their staffs as US-led multinational forces conducted a transition of military responsibility to the United Nations. The report describes these issues along with others developed through follow-on analyses of data and observations. It catalogs the team’s important findings, places those findings in context, and outlines the nature of the actions needed to address shortcomings. This study is classified.

Homeland Defense

Defense Support of Civil Authorities (2007)

As a follow-on to the Hurricane Katrina report, this study develops a framework for analyzing incident management and highlights challenges that affect the level of unmet requirements in a catastrophe. It illustrates ways in which post-Katrina improvements can close the response gap. This study is unclassified.

National Response to Catastrophic Event (2006)

The report and briefing focus on the national response to Hurricane Katrina by local, state, and federal agen-

cies during the month between the storm’s formation in the Atlantic Ocean and the post-hurricane stabilization of conditions in the Gulf Coast region. The report concentrates on response—as opposed to disaster mitigation or recovery—because the role of the Department of Defense (DOD) in coping with domestic disasters lies primarily in providing civil authorities with response capabilities, not in providing assets for long-term recovery. This study is unclassified.

National Response to Biological Contagion (2006)

Future biotechnology advancements will make it easier for a wide range of adversaries—including terrorist organizations—to launch a biological attack. This product studies biological incidents and examines USNORTHCOM’s role as the Global Synchronizer for Pandemic Influenza planning. The study goes beyond the example of Pandemic Influenza to inform decision makers and planners to help mitigate the effects of pandemic or similar biological threats. It identifies gaps and shortfalls in DOD’s participation in the nation’s preparation and response to a significant pandemic. This study is unclassified.

Other Products

Haiti Stabilization Initiative (2009)

Originating in response to a request from the US Ambassador to Haiti through United States Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM), the Haiti study’s purpose is to assess, document lessons learned, and capture best practices of the “comprehensive approach” implementation of the Haiti Stabilization Initiative (HSI). The HSI was a pilot project designed to test and demonstrate a highly integrated civilian stabilization program, funded by DOD Section 1207, and designed and implemented by elements of the US State Department and USAID. The HSI effort focused on Cite Soleil, an area of metropolitan Port-au-Prince that was completely lost to Government of Haiti control until reclaimed by United Nations Stabilization Mission–Haiti (MINUSTAH) military operations at the beginning of 2007. The study provides insights into whether this approach supported both the USSOUTHCOM Theater Security Strategy and the US Embassy’s Mission Strategic Plans and has potential wider application in other stability operations. This study is unclassified.

USJFCOM 2009 Lessons Learned Conference (2009)

Today's operations require that military forces work with interagency, nongovernmental, and multinational partners as part of a comprehensive approach. This report summarizes the findings and recommendations from the United States Joint Forces Command 2009 Lessons Learned Conference, hosted by JCOA, held on 17–20 March 2009 in Newport News, Virginia. The conference welcomed participants from the United States and eight partner nations, and its working groups were divided into four focus areas derived from the US National Defense Strategy: Joint Warfighting, Joint Adaptation to Irregular Warfare, Theater Security Cooperation, and Homeland Defense. This study is unclassified.

9-11 Commission Report/Global War on Terrorism (2005)

This briefing compares the purposes, approaches, and results of the 9-11 Commission Report to JCOA observations. This study is classified.

Kosovo (2004)

This is a combined study by NATO JALLC and USJFCOM Joint Center for Lessons Learned on operations in Kosovo and surrounding regions. This study is classified.

JCOA-Supported Products

Iraqi Perspectives Project

The Iraqi Perspectives Project (IPP) was a Secretary of Defense directed research project, sponsored by JCOA, and conducted by the Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA) and Joint Advanced Warfighting Program (JAWP). This project examined the perspective of the former Iraqi regime's civilian and military leadership on issues of interest to the US military, using information gathered through interviews and reviews of captured documents. The goal of this project was to determine how US operations were viewed and understood by the enemy. The following products emerged from this project:

Mother of All Battles: Saddam Hussein's Strategic Plan for the Persian Gulf War (2008).

Events in this report on the "Mother of All Battles," as Saddam designated the 1991 war, are drawn from pri-

mary Iraqi sources, including government documents, videos, audiotapes, maps, and photographs captured by U.S. forces in 2003 from the regime's archives and never intended for outsiders eyes. The report is part of a JCOA research project to examine contemporary warfare from the point of view of the adversary's archives and senior leader interviews. Its purpose is to stimulate thoughtful analyses of currently accepted lessons of the first Gulf War. While not a comprehensive history, this balanced Iraqi perspective of events between 1990 and 1991 takes full advantage of unique access to material. This product is unclassified.

Saddam and the Tribes: Regime Adaptation to Internal Challenges (2007).

This study explores the complex relationship between Saddam's regime and the tribes that lived under it between 1979 and 2003. This product explores the dynamics between tribe and state in dictatorial societies, and the ways in which tribal leadership can impact success or failure of central governance. This product is unclassified.

Saddam and Terrorism: Emerging Insights from Captured Iraqi Documents (2007).

This study uses captured former regime documents to examine the links and motivations behind Saddam Hussein's interactions with regional and global terrorism, including a variety of revolutionary, liberation, nationalist, and Islamic terrorist organizations. This product is classified.

Iraqi Perspectives Project: A View of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM from Saddam's Senior Leadership (2006).

This book presents a historical analysis of the forces and motivation that drove our opponent's decisions during Phase III (March 2003–May 2003) of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. Through dozens of interviews with senior Iraqi military and political leaders, and by making extensive use of thousands of official Iraqi documents, it substantively examines Saddam Hussein's leadership and its effect on the Iraqi military decision-making process, revealing the inner workings of a closed regime from the insiders' points of view. This product is unclassified.

Toward an Operational-Level Understanding of Operation Iraqi Freedom (2005).

This report is the classified report associated with the *Iraqi Perspectives Project* book. In addition to providing the Iraqi view of combat operations from early preparation through the collapse of the regime during Operation IRAQI

FREEDOM, it also presents the Iraqi understanding of our capabilities and their efforts to exploit that understanding. A classified briefing and audio narrative slide show version is also available for this product. This product is classified.

Terrorist Perspectives Project

The Terrorist Perspectives Project (TPP) examines the perspectives of the members of Al Qaeda, and other terrorist groups which share its theology and world view, on issues of interest to the US military, using primary source information principally gathered through open source and captured enemy documents. The goal of the project was to better “know the enemy” and to develop insights into enemy weaknesses and potential “blue” strategies.

The Call to Global Islamic Jihad: The Jihad Manifesto (2008). US intelligence has identified Abu Mnsab Al-Suri as the most important theorist of the global Islamic jihad, and considers his manifesto to be the definitive strategic document produced by al Qaida or any jihadi organization in more than a decade. But to Americans, his 1,600-page manuscript largely consists of incomprehensible, impenetrable Islamic scholarship. This publication is a distillation of Al-Suri’s Call to Global Islamic Resistance. This product is unclassified.

The Terrorist Perspective Project: Strategic and Operational Views of al Qaida and Associated Movements (2008). This book synthesizes the perspectives of Osama bin Laden and his fellow Salafi jihadists on how to wage war on their enemies. This product is unclassified.

The Canons of Jihad: A Terrorists’ Perspective of Warfare and Defeating America (2008). Noting that the best way to understand Salafi jihadists is to ignore statements they release to the West in favor of examining what they say to each other, this book provides a definitive collection of the writings that intellectually underpin the jihadi movement. This product is unclassified.

Strategic and Operational Perspectives of Al Qaeda and Associated Movements: Phase 1 (2007). This project approaches Al Qaeda and Associated Movements (AQAM) as a movement rather than as a network, and tries to understand whether and

in what ways its members think above the tactical level. Drawing on the enemy’s own words both from open source materials and captured documents, it identifies seams and subjects of concern within the AQAM community. It explores the dichotomy between those members of AQAM who think instrumentally about their war and those who do not, and discuss topics such as the evolution of the enemy’s political and military thought, enemy assessments of the United States, their comparative views of their media and our media, and their concerns about attracting people to the movement. This product is unclassified.

Strategic and Operational Perspectives of Al Qaeda and Associated Movements: Phase 2 (2007). This study draws upon words of AQAM found in captured documents and open-source pronouncements to describe a revolutionary movement which does not think of itself as a network. Intellectual leaders of AQAM are very concerned about the status of this movement, believing that the uncoordinated actions of its members repel the very Muslims that they need to attract. They are also concerned that they are losing the war of ideas and are isolated in an overwhelming hostile media environment. In response, the movement’s intellectual leadership engages in a vigorous process of analysis, self-criticism and adaptation. Unfortunately for them, their ability to implement their adaptive policies is imperfect. This product is classified.

Voices of the Enemy Quotations from Al-Qaeda and Associated Movements (AQAM) (2007). AQAM have been living in a state of war for more than four decades. Salafi jihadist leaders have developed a powerful narrative of history that appeals to and mobilizes their membership, though this narrative is based on questionable historical interpretations and future assumptions. Their strategists have learned that they will need to have a sound strategy and leaders who will ensure that such strategy is followed. The IDA study team used the enemy’s own words from more than 250,000 documents from open and classified sources, including documents captured during Operations ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM, to illustrate the enemy message for the reader. This product is unclassified.

Other Supported Products

Achieving Unity of Effort: A Case Study of US Government Operations in the Horn of Africa (2007). This paper was prepared under the task order Joint Advanced Warfighting Program (JAWP), sub-task Global War on Terrorism—Africa, for USJFCOM. It helps address two objectives: (1) identify lessons from interagency efforts in the Horn of Africa; and (2) explore national security challenges and interagency collaboration processes and their results. This product is unclassified.

UK and US Friendly Fire in Recent Combat Operations (2006). The Technical Cooperation Programme—a cooperative venture between Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States—Joint Systems and Analysis Group established Action Group 13 on Fratricide Mitigation with an objective, among others, of collaborative sharing of records, analyses and findings on friendly fire

and fratricide. This report presents the results of an event-by-event collaborative comparison of friendly fire records between the UK and the US, covering three recent Coalition warfighting operations: Operation DESERT STORM/GRANBY, Operation ENDURING FREEDOM/HERRICK, and Operation IRAQI FREEDOM/TELIC. This study is unclassified.

Communications Architecture and Bandwidth Analyses (2005). The study characterizes the Operation IRAQI FREEDOM communications architecture and bandwidth used by US Central Command in theatre, including: joint command centers; service component operational and tactical centers; and the last tactical mile, including global reach back. The study covered Joint Combined Combat Operations. It expresses bandwidths in terms of allocated data rate equivalent capacity and performance based on actual usage derived from historical logs. This product is classified.

Requests for Information

Requests for information can be sent to jcoa.ed@jfc.com (NIPRnet) or jcoa.ed@hq.jfc.com (SIPRnet), or jcoa.ed@usa.bices.org (NATO).

We will respond to your request as soon as possible. Please indicate the type of information you require and the context of how the information will be used. If there is an urgent time requirement, please include that information as well.

Websites

NIPRnet:

USJFCOM portal (internal): <https://us.jfc.com/sites/JCOA>

Defense Knowledge Online (external): <https://www.us.army.mil/suite/page/409019>

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USJFCOM Knowledge Today (external): <http://kt.jfc.com.smil.mil/JCOA>

NATO:

BICES/CRONOS: <http://jcoa.act.nato.int/portal>

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U.S. Army War College **STRATEGIC LANDPOWER** *Essay Contest 2011*

The United States Army War College and the United States Army War College Foundation are pleased to announce the annual **STRATEGIC LANDPOWER** Essay Contest.



The topic of the essay must relate to the strategic use of landpower. A specific topic of interest, for this year's contest is the application of design in conflict termination.

Anyone is eligible to enter and win except those involved in the judging. The Army War College Foundation will award a prize of \$4000 to the author of the best essay and a prize of \$1000 to the second place winner.

For more information or for a copy of the essay contest rules, contact:

Dr. Michael R. Matheny, U.S. Army War College, Department of Military Strategy, Planning and Operations, 122 Forbes Avenue, Carlisle, PA 17013-5242 (717) 245-3459, DSN 242-3459, michael.matheny@us.army.mil

STRATEGIC LANDPOWER Essay Contest Rules:

1. Essays must be original, not to exceed 5000 words, and must not have been previously published. An exact word count must appear on the title page.
2. All entries should be directed to: Dr. Michael R. Matheny, USAWC Strategic Landpower Essay Contest, U.S. Army War College, Department of Military Strategy, Planning and Operations, 122 Forbes Avenue, Carlisle, PA 17013-5242.
3. Essays must be postmarked on or before 17 February 2011.
4. The name of the author shall not appear on the essay. Each author will assign a codename in addition to a title to the essay. This codename shall appear: (a) on the title page of the essay, with the title in lieu of the author's name, and (b) by itself on the outside of an accompanying sealed envelope. This sealed envelope should contain a typed sheet giving the name, rank/title, branch of service (if applicable), biographical sketch, address, and office and home phone numbers (if available) of the essayist, along with the title of the essay and the codename. This envelope will not be opened until after the final selections are made and the identity of the essayist will not be known by the selection committee.
5. All essays must be typewritten, double-spaced, on paper approximately 8 1/2"x11". Submit two complete copies. If prepared on a computer, please also submit the entry on a disk, indicating specific word-processing software used.
6. The award winners will be notified in early Spring 2011. Letters notifying all other entrants will be mailed by 1 April 2011.
7. The author of the best essay will receive \$4000 from the U.S. Army War College Foundation. A separate prize of \$1000 will be awarded to the author of the second best essay.

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